He explains his Patents and his Processes against Judges of court of
appeal and 
against Judges of district court - of Düsseldorf - Germany

Dr.-Ing. Th. SARTOROS

 

DAS PATENT "ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISMUS" DPMA Nr. 10 2010 105 501

WIRD ZUM VERKAUF ANGEBOTEN, PREIS: 265.000,-- € + 19% MWSt

PATENT "ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM" TO SELL DPMA Nr. 10 2010 105 501

PRICE 265.000,-- € + 19% Tax (MWSt)

WHO IS THE "GODFATHER" OF THE CRIMINALS ??

 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL-DÜSSELDORF

              LETS THE PROCESS FRAUD / CRIMINALS

 

1. Ms. M. STEIN (CHAIRWOMAN of the 18th CIVIL SENATE)

2. Ms. FUHR (NOW IN THE 7th CIVIL SENATE)

3. Ms. GLAESER (DEPUTY of CHAIRWOMAN

               of the 18th CIVIL SENATE)

4. Ms. KIRSCHNER (NOW IN THE 17th CIVIL SENATE)

5. Ms. BARBIAN (AT THE 18th CIVIL SENATE)

6. Ms. SKIBBE (NOW ?? OLG Düsseldorf?)

7. Ms. ANDEREGG (NOW IN THE 17th CIVIL SENATE)

        

                       AND OTHER CRIMINALS

    IN JUDGES-GOWN OF COURT OF APPEAL-DÜSSELDORF

    IN THEIR FUNCTION ACT, AS IF THEY DO NOT

    WOULD HAVE COMMITTED LEGAL FRAUD.

 ---------------------------------------------------------------

  THE PUBLIC PROSECUTIVE OFFICE DOES NOT BRINGS  

           A PUBLIC CHARGE AGAINST JUDGE.

--------------------------------------------------------------

THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL FINDES IT O.K.

--------------------------------------------------------------

THE NRW JUSTICE MINISTER DIRECTS / APPROVES

                       AND IS SILENT.

---------------------------------------------------------------

               THE VICTIM OF LEGAL FRAUD

OF THE JUDGES OF COURT OF APPEAL (OF DÜSSELDORF)

        MUST BE THE (JUDICIAL AND ADVOCATES)

                        BEAR COST.

 

                          MORE IN:

 

          WWW.SARTOROS-DR-ING.DE

Last modified on Sunday, 20 June 2021 21:02

The reader of the attached article will not be surprised at the content;

he has so many jokes to tell about authority. So another one.

 

As if nothing had happened, the OLG-D'dorf President refuses, or the person handling

his correspondence wholeheartedly rejects the removal from the OLG-D'dorf, the female judges

of Court of Appeal which has been accused of fraudsters since Sept. 19, 2019, of the 18th

Civil Senate, Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr/Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner, even publicly dubbed

"female criminals".

 

The above-mentioned criminals have remained in their places and are allowed to do so

themselves decide on the plaintiff's pending complaints in 2021.

 

The head of the judiciary is obviously not yet convinced that a "purge"

(from the offenders) of the judicial staff is necessary.

 

He chooses the people to be promoted, or he appoints certain people as chairmen

Provide willing persons to carry out his recommendations or verbal instructions,

but he is reluctant to revise some of his decisions.

 

The damage to the judiciary is therefore greater; The distrust of the population in the judicial

authorities becomes more obvious with new jokes.

 

In addition, the costs that burden the taxpayer are always addressed.

Not just the refusal to remove the criminals in OLG judges' gowns

but also the effort that is made is not understandable for the taxpayer.

 

For a normal letter written in an official sheet, there are very often (3) names

plus the hidden name of the OLG president (who does not appear anywhere).

 

Could it get any easier?

                                                                                                                                            

                                                                                                                                                 Dr. Th. Sartoros

                                                                                                                                                 Laddringsweg 15

                                                                                                                                                45219 Essen

                                                                                                                                                 February 08, 2021

                                                                                                                        

In advance by fax: 0211-4971-548

President of the Court of Appeal Düsseldorf

(personally)

Cecilienallee 3

40474 Düsseldorf

 

Re: Reminder to President of Court of Appeal-Düsseldorf to sign himself the letters to the plaintiff.

 

Mister President of the Court of Appeal of Düsseldorf,

 

Your correspondence person is already exercising the authority of an OLG president.

 

The "I" form used by him in his last letter dated January 18, 2021 is

not only conspicuous, but also pejorative for you.

 

In addition, the spontaneous question arises: "Who is actually the OLG-D'dorf President?".

 

As a lawyer from the administration of justice, it should actually be clear to you, that the letters

to the plaintiff have to sign, and the place in the right column for the person handling the correspondence

of the sheet under "Editor" is suitable.

 

After all, it is about procedural fraud by female judges, including those of the 18th Civil Senate

(Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) who are publicly classified as CRIMINALS

titled and indicated.

 

To keep the criminals in their place as if nothing had happened, in spite of the

a lot of evidence, also means a serious ethical / judicial / legal liability a burden

on you that is not circumvented with tricks. Are you aware of the facts?

 

Remove the women from OLG-Düsseldorf before it is too late and sign the letters yourself.

 

With best regards

 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

Last modified on Saturday, 06 March 2021 11:50

From this article the reader learns that approx. 19 OLG judges (with their names) are accused

of criminal offensesprocedural fraud and perversion of rights according to § 339 StGB, in the case

of the Greek engineer and inventor.

He may wonder, how none of the accused judges for his trial fraud is condemned.

What does the prosecutor do?

The statement of the author here is: that "the German judiciary is not independent"

Who president of a higher regional court, or president of a regional court, or the

Public Prosecutor's Office, or the Attorney General's Office, is determined by the Minister of Justice

of the individual country. In this respect, the persons are also who as the chairman of a civil chamber

of the regional court, or as chairman of a senate of the higher regional appeal court, or as

Office manager is promoted, is a decision of the director of the judiciary staff.

This is because a HITLER law from 1935 still applies in Germany today.

(Judicial Constitutional Ordinance (= GVVO) named, from Nazi rule)

Yes, the reader got it right;

the "FÜHRER" empowered all FRG democratic governments to direct the judiciary since 1935.

More in another publication.                                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                                                                Dr. Th. Sartoros

                                                                                                                                                  Laddringsweg 15

                                                                                                                                                 45 219 Essen

                                                                                                                                                  March 3, 2021

In advance by fax: 0211-87565-1260 (without receipts)

District Court of Düsseldorf

2b civil chamber

Werdener Str. 1

40327 Düsseldorf

              

Re: Az new; (PKH from March 3, 2021 for official liability suit (= AHK) against NRW, represented by

                       of the Minister of Justice, represented by the Public Prosecutor General Düsseldorf,

                         because of Perversion of the law / fraudulent proceedings of the OLG-D'dorf judge of

                         the 18th civil senate Ms. STEIN,in the judgment of October 18, 2017 on Az 18 U 69/16

                         (LG-Düsseldorf (=D'dorf) Az 2b o 271/01).

                       The Court of Appeal D´dorf (=OLG) ruling on October 18, 2017 is based on legal fraud

                         (alleged statute of limitations on "6/30/2000", the reported claims for damages, based

                       on the crimes of tax-offfice (=FA)-Mettmann in 1979-2006 against the Greek engineer

                       and inventor).

                       The judgment due to the fraudulent proceedings cannot become final;

                       it will canceled; The fraudster and criminal Mrs. STEIN must from OLG-D'dorf

                        away; The statute of limitations has not occurred; There is a legitimate interest

                       Ms. STEIN is responsible for the decisions made in 2017 (with the help of

                       known criminals who were excluded by law according to § 41 No. 6 ZPO

 

A.

             The judges are subject to the law (Art. 97 GG) and there is then a breach of the law,

             if a decision cannot be justified based on legal rules.

 

Facts in brief

 

The present PKH/lawsuit deals only with the planned and executed fraudulent proceedings relating to Az

18 U 69/16 (2b o 271/01) in 2017 by the chairwoman of the 18th civil senate, Ms. STEIN, and with the harmful

consequences (financial, economic, sanitary) of perversions.

 

The frauds of the OLG judges Ms. STEIN (temporary help: Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner)

in the appeal proceedings with OLG-D'dorf Az 18 U 69/16 (LG-D'dorf Az 2b o 271 / 01), are here

treated briefly because are considered proven; Conspiracy of the OLG judges undisputed !! in this respect,

Ms. STEIN is only treated as a consequence of the previous decisions; Here a new determination of the

damage is proposed and claims for damages are made.

 

The other resolutions of the fraudsters (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) in the years

2018/2019/2020 and 2021 and their consequences will be dealt with in new lawsuits / PKH.

 

In the, from the accused OLG judges (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner, responsible for the trial fraud

of October 18, 2017 in the judgment on Az 18 U 69/16), Ms. Glaeser, was already in the trial fraud on Az

18 W 1/13 (and 18 W 44/14) of September 3, 2015 with Mr. Malsch and Mr. Anger involved. (see lawsuit /

PKH from Feb. 17, 2021, no proceedings-Nr (=Az) communicated here yet!)

 

So Ms. STEIN absolutely wanted (and she proved this with the decision of January 12, 2017) to have

Ms. Glaeser on the decision-making body; Reason: the knowledge of the files and the experience (Ms. Glaeser)

on litigation fraud on September 3, 2015 so that her knowledge about perversion of the law in the new litigation

fraud to Az 18 U 69/16 flows into (NB: the "limitation period" for the claims to Az 2b o 271/01 ordered by

LG-D´dorf, Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Fr. Brecht on July 7th, 2014 was in OLG decision 3.9.15 by means

of manipulation / addition / amendment of Legal texts of the BGB old version supposedly occurred

on "July 31, 2006" !!).

 

An exclusion request from August 19, 2016 against Ms. Glaeser because of his fraud in the case of Az

18 W 1/13 from September 3, 2015, etc., decided on January 12, 2017, failed due to the resistance of the

chairwoman Ms. STEIN although the act of § 41 No. 6 ZPO excluded Mrs. Fuhr (the old confidante, of the

former chairwoman of the 2b civil chamber, Mrs. Tannert)

 

The OLG decision of January 12, 2017 on Az 18 U 69/16 signed Fr. STEIN / Fr. Fuhr / Kirschner (discharge

Ms. Glaeser from the accusation of partiality, but not from the accusation according to § 339 StGB (=German

Penal Code) of fraud) was conspicuously illegal (because of Ms. Fuhr's involvement). Ms. STEIN not only

kept silent about this but also defended the offender (Ms. Glaeser).

 

Oral hearing on Az 18 U 69/16 took place on Sept. 27, 2017, with the decisive body Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser /

Ms. Kirschner, the plaintiff personally with attorney D.Z., and attorney Fassnacht, representative of NRW.

So again the well-known criminal (Ms. Glaeser) sat next to Ms. STEIN on the decisive OLG committee.

Reference is made to the OLG judgment 18.10.17 with 29 pages

 

In the months of Aug / Sept. In 2017, the plaintiff sent, or personally handed over to the OLG to Az 18 U 69/16,

a total of 17 mailings with more than 200 sheets of "curled up" from court files 2b o 271/01; The plaintiff

accused the LG judges (including Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll, Ms. Strupp-Müller, Ms. Engelkamp-Neeser,

Ms. Hoffmann, Ms. Brecht) and OLG judges including Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger, Bünten & Co,

were interested in tweaking / manipulating the GA from incriminating documents.

 

The legal fraud committed in the judgment of October 18, 2017 by the OLG committee Ms. STEIN /

Ms. Glaeser /Ms. Kirschner are uncovered and reported to the monopolists (D'dorf public prosecutor's

office) with a criminal complaint (and a large amount of evidence) on September 19, 2019, but a result

(via the criminal complaint) has not yet been announced. The General Prosecutor- D'dorf has been informed

about the protract/abduction.

 

  1. First concept of the conspirators Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner, the damage

   to declare compensation claims of the engineer + inventor to Az 2b o 271/01 as statute-barred on

   06/30/2000

 

After the application of partiality against Ms. Glaeser (decision of January 12, 2017 signed Ms. STEIN /

Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Kirschner) and the exclusion request against Ms. Fuhr (decision of July 19, 2017 signed.

Ms. STEIN / Unger / Ms. Kirschner) failed due to the resistance of Ms. Stein, now the conspirators (Ms. STEIN /

Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) on August 30, 2017 also refused the financial aid (= PKH) for the appeal of August 18,

2016 to Az 18 U 69 / 16; (see lawsuit / PKH of February 8th, 2021 due to infractions by Ms. Fuhr;

Az not known here).

The comparison of the OLG decision issued on August 30, 2017 and rejecting the PKH, with the content and

wording of the judgment of October 18, 2017 on Az 18 U 69/16 reveals the involvement and breadth of the

individual conspirators (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) in the individual chapters.

 

Ms. Fuhr, who is excluded by law (§ 41 No. 6 ZPO), determined the wording of the rejection of the PKH

application for appeal in the OLG decision on August 30, 2017, which was later also verbatim in the OLG

judgment of October 18 2017 to Az 18 U 69/16 were taken over. (See below: Comparison of the OLG

decision of August 30, 2017, page 5-7, with OLG judgment of October 18, 2017, page 23 ff, version

with 29 pages; in it the reader will find the sentence served with the 6th Months extension of the legal force

of § 209 BGB old version which was "made in favour of the plaintiff" !!).

The fraud committed by the criminal trio was therefore clear

.

Ms. Glaeser delivered, among other things, the parachute for the manipulation / addition / amendment of the

legal text, e.g. § 209 BGB old version with the alleged extension of the legal effect by 6 months after delivery

of the FG judgment, which she also referred to Az 18 W 1 / 13 had signed in resolution 3.9.15, and a lot more.

 

Ms. STEIN created the heavy clouds of smoke for the case law of the Constitutional Court (= BVerfG), to distract

the plaintiff from the fraud, and served (enthusiastically) several times the fraud as

"in favour of the plaintiff", and a lot more.

 

What has been written above also shows that Ms. STEIN only had one thing in mind with the other like-minded

female criminals; That the process fraud is inconspicuous and offers the least possible or no target for later

revisions. Ms. STEIN worked just as criminally against the plaintiff in 2021 (more in the new lawsuits!)

 

The activity of Ms. STEIN with the criminals Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner was "CRIMINAL"

from the start when the judgment was drawn up on October 18, 2017 for Az 18 U 69/16.

The new claims for damages are therefore justified.

 

The head of the judiciary had ensured that Ms. STEIN (Sept. 2015) and then Ms. Fuhr (early 2017) took the place

in the 18th Civil Senate. (Ms. Glaeser had already got on board in March 2015 and, despite the fraudulent

proceedings on September 3, 2015, at Az 18 W 1/13, stayed with the 18th Civil Senate in order to bring her

experience of fraud against the plaintiff). Ms. Kirschner came from the Chamber of Representatives and was

responsible for the theoretical / theatrical relief of the other women (Glaeser / Fuhr) from the allegations of bias.

 

The criminal quartet with Ms. STEIN as chairperson (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner)

did not take care of the plaintiff's legal arguments, contained in the appeal; The proven importance of the facts /

events on the statute of limitations has been suppressed / deleted from the facts of the judgment of October 18,

2017. It was Ms. Stein's job to downgrade and delete everything that was presented as insignificant (insofar as

the applications were permissible!).

 

The following section "C" proves how the formulations of Ms. Fuhr in resolution 30.8.17, after consultation

with Ms. Stein, were adopted in the judgment of 18 October 2017 on Az 18 U 69/16;

The evidence justifies the new claims for damages.

 

"The plaintiff was already informed of the alleged inadmissibility of the applications in the PKH decision

of the Senate of August 30, 2017". (Text from OLG judgment October 18, 2017, on Az 18 U 69/16, page 17, point 3)

 

  1. Comparison of some excerpts from the OLG decision. August 30, 2017 Ms. Stein/Ms. Fuhr/Ms. Glaeser
  2. (= S / F / G) and of the OLG-D'dorf judgment of October 18, 2017 on Az 18 U 69/16
  3. Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner (= S / G / K)

 

C1. On page 6, paragraph 2, lines 1-2, of the above resolution August 30, 2017, the committee (STEIN /

         Fuhr / Glaeser) explains the validity and applicability of the BGB (old version) (§ 211), that "after

           legally binding conclusion of the proceedings at the FG, the 3-year limitation period began to

           run again ".

         The reader will find the same sentence identical in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 on Az

         18 U 69/16 (Page 22, line 17 ff, judgment version 29 pages) of the committee ( STEIN /Glaeser /    

         Kirschner)

      

           The committee (S / F / G) commits the multiple process fraud in the last 3.5 lines of the 2nd

           Paragraph in conjunction with lines 1-2 of the 2nd paragraph; There (decision 30.8.17, page 6,

           last Lines, paragraph 2) is the following

    

         "In favour of the plaintiff, the Senate has already made earlier resolutions for this period

           until the legal force of six months, so that the legal action before the interruption of the statute

           of limitations triggered by the tax court ended on June 30, 2000 at the latest "

 

         The reader finds the above sentence identical in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 on Az 18

         U 69/16 (Page 22, line 25 ff, judgment version 29 pages).

                    

             From the above lines it can be seen that (underlinings are made by the plaintiff);

  1. a) the statute of limitations has been interrupted due to the FG proceedings, and
  2. b) according to lines 1-2 of paragraph 2, the 3-year limitation period has started again.
  3. c) The 18th Senate also committed the fraud proven below in "earlier resolutions"
  4. d) which they belittle as in favor of the plaintiff
  5. e) the legal force (of the interruption of the limitation period) six (6) months after delivery of the

           FG ruling lasts.

 

   Under the above "point c" ("in previous decisions") is the fraud of Ms. Glaeser to Az 18 W1/13

   (and 18 W 44/14) signed on September 3rd, 2015 Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger meant, the next

   Lines (also in the lawsuit / PKH of February 17, 2017 also against Ms. Glaeser) is analyzed /

   commented on

 

   The play on words with the terms "limitation", "limitation fixed period", "limitation interruption"

   the offender (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) about the mix-up and then the wrong one To

   achieve the result of the alleged "limitation of claims" is also in the judgment of 18.10.2017 identical

   to Az 18 U 69/16 (page 22). The criminals were already in Aug. 2017 for the lawsuit fraud agreed.

                                

     So it should be noted briefly that

 

"The FG proceedings have interrupted the statute of limitations (primary legal protection) and this

   Interruption of the statute of limitations because of the FG proceedings (i.e. because of the primary

   legal protection) ended one month (and not 6 months !!) after delivery of the (last ?!) FG

   judgment".

 

   Well, based on the data of the OLG decision 30.8.2017 in page 6, paragraph 2, the (allegedly !!), the    

   last FG judgment was issued on November 24, 1999 (which was also included in the OLG judgment

   of 18.10.2017!!), it follows that:

 

   Assuming that the FG judgment was served at the beginning of January 2000, took (due to the

   primary legal protection) the triggered interruption of the primary statute of limitations until the

   beginning February 2000 (statutory period of one month for a dispute at the BFH !!).

 

   Thereafter, i.e. from the beginning of February 2000, the statutory 3-year limitation period applies

   (according to BGB) started to run for the filing of the official liability suit

   (as confirmed by OLG decision 30.8.17, page 6, in line 1, paragraph 2, and judgment 18.10.17,

   page 22)

 

     The end of this statutory limitation period according to the BGB would be 3 years later, i.e.

     joined in February 2003.

 

   Ms. STEIN has the legal infractions with the OLG committees (STEIN / Fuhr / Glaeser, decision

   30.8.17) as well as (STEIN / Glaeser / Kirschner, judgment 18.10.2017) and the above-mentioned

   criminal OLG committees claim that the interruption of the (BGB) "statute of limitations" ended on

"6/30/2000" without being specify that the interruption of the statute of limitations ended due to

   primary legal protection and then the 3 year limitation period has started to run.

    

   The offense is thus completed and the offense is also revealed in page 6, paragraph 3, in point a),

(Decision 30.8.17) where it writes that the limitation period of 3 years according to BGB old version

  • § 211 on "Occurred 6/30/2000 at the latest on 7/31/2006".

  

   The reader finds the above sentence identical in the OLG judgment of the (S / G / K) October 18,

   2017 on Az 18 U 69/16 (Page 22, last lines, and page 23 first 2 lines, version 29 pages)

 

   That, neither on "6/30/2000" nor on "7/31/2006" did the 3-year (BGB) statute of limitations (the

   one in Febr. 2000 started to run) ended on 6/30/2000, is only the result of the planned / executed

   Fraud of Ms. STEIN with like-minded criminal women.

   This justifies the present lawsuit / PKH and the claims for damages

 

 The criminal committees in OLG judges' gowns (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) and Ms. STEIN /

   Ms.Glaeser / Fri. Kirschner) have deliberately avoided writing that the 3-year statute of limitations

   period according to the German Civil Code (= BGB) began to run in February 2000.

 

The reader will find the same suppressions in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 (S / G / K).

 

     By suppressing and using the word "limitation period interruption" (from the primary legal

   protection !!) the committees misled the reader and thus the wrong result reached i.e. that the

     3-year (BGB) limitation period on 30.6.2000 or at the latest (!?) on July 31, 2006 would have

     expired. The addition (July 31, 2006) comes from Ms. Glaeser.

 

   In addition, the committee (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) both in the resolution "30.8.2017"

     and also the committee (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) in the entire OLG judgment of

   October 18, 2017Az 18 U 69/16 does not explain how the parachute-fallen date "31.7.2006" results.

 

   The 3rd paragraph, page 6, of the resolution 8/30/17 is concluded with the enigmatic date

   "7/31/2006"which proves the arbitrariness of the panel and the fraud / crimes with which the panel

   in any case tried to enforce the absurd "statute of limitations".

 

   The reader finds the same puzzling date "July 31, 2006" in the judgment of October 18, 2017

     (page 23)

 

   According to the StGB, this is punishable by imprisonment for more than 5 years. That justifies the

   present Public liability suit against the women STEIN & Co (Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirchner).

     The date "7/31/2006", which fell with the parachute, will later serve the committee for others

     criminal conclusions and "the fraud is served as being in favour of the plaintiff"

    

  The ladies are obviously above the laws and can have any statutory monthly period

     lengthen or shorten.

 

C2. The distortion of the facts committed in page 7 (decision 30.8.17) and in the judgment

     18.10.2017, Page 23, version 29 pages) serves the above-mentioned goal, i.e. the limitation of

     claims for damages enforce and "cap" the crimes of FA-Mettmann

 

   In the entire OLG decision of "August 30, 2017" Az 18 U 69/16 signed criminal trio (Ms. STEIN / Ms.

     Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) as well as in the judgment 18.10.2017 of the criminal trio (Ms. STEIN / Ms.

     Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner)

 

     Nowhere is a word written about the often directed complaint / reminder that the

     Bank seizures from 1986-1989 have not yet been lifted, although three subject areas

       heads of the FA-Mettmann had applied for repeal twice. The head of the swamp

       (M. Eigendoof) was against it.

 

           "As long as the damage intervention lasts, the limitation period cannot start."

                                   the BGH decided (which is still valid today).

  

   If the criminal OLG-D'dorf committees with the offenders (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser)

 and (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) reported the above facts in the facts of the case,

     then the PKH applied for would have to approve and on 18.10.2017 in the judgment on 18 U 69/16

     of Compensation need to agree. The compensation, however, contradicted the fraud plan

  

   The OLG committees wanted in any case the "statute of limitations" ordered by the LG-D´dorf on

   07/07/2014 enforce, therefore of the bank seizures and the application of the 3 department

   heads of area and thus distorted / manipulated the facts as it was convenient for them.

   This is also punishable by § 339 StGB (= German Penal Code) and thus the present lawsuit / PKH

   for official liability of the criminal Mrs. STEIN founded

.

C3. According to the offenders (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser), compensation for pain and

         suffering is also "Statute of limitations" (see decision 30.8.2017, Az 18 U 69/16, page 10, point e)

         as well as in the judgment of October 18, 2017, to Az 18 U 69/16 (page 27) signed Ms. STEIN / Ms.

      Glaeser /Ms Kirschner also as statute-barred contain

 

According to the old version of the German Civil Code (= BGB) and the new version of the German

   Civil Code, the damage to health expires in 30 years.

 

      The lawsuit 2b o 271/01 was filed on February 5, 2001 and the statute of limitations was

     interrupted beforehand (primary legal protection). When did the 30-year limitation period of the

     BGB expire?

    

       If the above bank seizures were taken into account, the limitation period does not yet have

       started to run. This is convincing again about the intent of the offenders who have the goal

     "Enforce the statute of limitations for all applications"; about their criminal liability according

       to § 339 StGB and over there should be no doubt about the merits of the present action / PKH.

  

     In addition, it has been repeatedly stated that the compensation for pain and suffering in Az

     2b o 268/01 is not identical

     The cause has, as the requested compensation for pain and suffering to Az 2b o 271/01 for the crimes

     of the Tax-office (= FA)-Mettmann (loss of subsidy etc.), even if they happen to have the same amount).

    

The allegation of the OLG committee was also dealt with in detail in the appeal of August 18, 2016

     (Pp. 59-60, as well as in brief July 12, 2012, pp. 3, 94, 117) and invalidated, but the two OLG

     committees wanted in any case the claims for damages of the plaintiff with erroneous allegations

     destroy. This is convincing of the intent for a criminal offense within the meaning of Section 339

     StGB and the local merits of the action.

     Incidentally, what the trio (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) in the PKH negative decision of

     August 30, 2017 to reject claims due to alleged statute of limitations is unchanged

   in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017, so that the criminal offenses of the OLG committees

   is repeated and justifies the present action / PKH.

  1. Contributions by Ms. STEIN to the judgment Az 18 U 69/16 so that the trial fraud of October 18,

     2017 succeeds.

 

D1. In addition to the offenses of Ms. Fuhr and Ms. Glaeser described above, for which Ms. STEIN

       with her signature as an accomplice, Ms. STEIN is also responsible for the

     multiple distortions of the facts for the deliberate lies of the 2 women (Ms. Fuhr / Ms.

     Glaeser) as well as for the legal violations committed in the resolutions signed by her and

     Judgment of October 18, 2017.

 

D2. The distortion of the facts concerns, among other things, the suppression of the facts that the

      whole 2001, in the attorney's pleadings only of "lawsuit" and "petitions" or "lawsuit with."

       PKH request of the same date "or" Increase in suit "is read what the 2 OLG committees have

      concealed; and in this sense only from the PKH application dated 5.2.2001 on the part of the

       OLG Committee (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) in the judgment of October 18, 2017.

     The RA Letter of July 17, 2003 (GA sheet 283) that the RA filed an UNCONDITIONAL ACTION on

     February 5, 2001is mentioned in the facts of the judgment (page 12); But neither in the LG

       judgment on May 11, 2016 still in the OLG decisions of 3.9.2015 Az 18 W 1/13 or 30.8.2017 and

     also not in the OLG judgment from 18.10.2017 to Az 18 U 69/16 is mentioned.

     The importance of the statute of limitations was completely concealed.

 

     Hiding / hiding the fact and its meaning is not an "accidental" one Error or overlook of the

       document "but a targeted maneuver around the" legal consequences of the unconditional

       action "to circumvent the limitation period and thus the plaintiff damage.

     The intentional and criminal act of the LG / OLG committees is covered by § 339 StGB and sees

     Imprisonment (PRISON) from 5 years ago.

 

D3. The "announcement of the newly drafted complaints from December 29, 2001 to the court

       received on December 31, 2001 mean, according to the BGB (old version), an "interruption of the

       statute of limitations"

 

     The fact that the newly drafted claims of the OFD-D'dorf have been made known proves one

       Letter from the Supervision of Tax-offices (OFD) dated February 27, 2002 signed Nissen

     (GA Bl. = Sheet Nr. of files: 168)

 

     All of the above-mentioned bodies (LG / OLG) have the meaning of the OFD letter as well as the

     "newly formulated Claims of 29.12.2001 "kept silent about the statute of limitations, and only

       mention the PKH-Application dated February 5, 2001 in order to come to the conclusion that no

       unconditional action was raised on February 5, 2001 or according to the old version of the German

     Civil Code (BGB) until December 31, 2001. (see OLG judgment, page 23, point a)

 

     The criminal offense charged all signatories of the LG / OLG-PKH negative decisions and

     Judgments on LG-Az 2b o 271/01, as well as the judgment on OLG-Az 18 U 69/16 u.v.V.

 

D4. The most conspicuous legal fraud committed, in page 22 (last lines) of the OLG judgment of

     October 18, 2017 on Az 18 U 69/16 (version of 29 pages), reveals the influence of Ms. Glaeser,

     but all signatories of the OLG ruling of October 18, 2017 were aware of the crime.

 

     On page 22, where the committee (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) reported fraud with the

     6-month extension of § 209 BGB (old version), which the above as "BENEFIT OF THE CLAIMENT"

     (Page 25) serve, it can be seen that the ladies are going to do so by naming the date 6/30/2000

      to mislead the reader and to harm the plaintiff. This is punishable under Section 339 of the German

     Penal Code (= StGB)

     A date of 6/30/2000 results only after adding the fraudulent 6 months to the fictitious

     End of December 31, 1999, i.e. the alleged end of the suspension of the limitation period (due to

     the primary legal protection); Afterwards, according to the OLG committee, the confirmation had to

     follow:

     "The 3-year limitation period according to the old version of the German Civil Code to start running

     again."

   Instead of repeating the sentence of (3 years limitation period etc), add the 6 months and

   then determine the supposedly remaining 18 (?) months (pages 24, 25) that they also need

   in order to be able to assert that no unconditional (limitation-interrupting) Lawsuit is filed.

   The criminal liability of women STEIN / Glaeser / Kirschner according to § 339 StGB is clear.

 

D5. In addition, she (Ms. STEIN) should have known that complaints were filed with the FG for

     reimbursement of the overpaid or seized or withheld tax due to unlawful tax assessment notices

     cause an interruption of the statute of limitations and insofar the assertion (Pages 22, 24) that the

   FG process 4 K 3384/01 would not have interrupted the statute of limitations, aIs an empty phrase

     that only serves to explain the alleged "limitation of claims" and the litigation fraud to belittle

   (See NCB of 19 March 2018, page 9); Criminal offense according to § 339 StGB undisputed.

 

D6. About the beginning of the limitation period (page 22, of the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017,

     version 29 pages)     the OLG committee denies the legal effect of the FG lawsuit with Az 4 K 3384/01 and

     thus not only calls on the plaintiff and his legal representatives, but also on the BGH judges. Latter

     but prefer to remain silent about the fraudulent proceedings of the LG / OLG judges and

     no positive discharge delivered. So it stays with the cited point D5 above.

     (see also Not-Admission of Revision (= NZB) pages 7-8 of 19 March 2018)

 

D7. The plaintiff repeatedly complained about the "styling of the court files on the part of the

       Court staff ". In the above-mentioned OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 from page 19 and mostly

       on page 20, Point 2, (version 29 page) the reader finds explanations that are more than excuses

     and less than legal arguments could work. Ms. STEIN claims

    

   "The plaintiff attempted the RA procedure by sending the "souped-up documents" to pry out !! "

      

     Towards the end of the paragraph on page 20, even the RAe are accused of having the files (which

     are open to inspection received) to have their hair done.

     The GA are only sent to OFD-D'dorf, RA D.Z., and to RA Fassnacht.

     The probability that the GA within the LG-D'dorf and OLG-D'dorf are coiffed is

     became undisputed due to the evidence.

     It is correct that the plaintiff personally sent 17 forwardings to the OLG from Aug. 2017

     Az 18 U 69/16 has sent more than 200 missing pages from the "souped-up"  files (GA 

     (the OLG has only confirmed 13 broadcasts !!)

    

   The short time, the high costs and the work pressure did not allow it back then

     to forward further missing sheets; some of these are named here:

 

  1. The list for Az 2b o 77/08 (16 pages) of the 273 illegal notices of the FA-Mettmann is missing

       for the period 1979-1992, sent to Az 2b o 271/01 at that time with a brief from RA-Lasaroff

  1. The "patent grant certificate (colored) on the Antikythera mechanism" is missing
  2. The colored picture about the "Antikythera patent mechanism" is missing
  3. The immediate complaint of October 9, 2007 against LG decision of September 18, 2007 is

     missing signed Strupp-Müller / Engelkamp-Neeser / Galle (i.e. against the trial fraud of

       September 18, 2007)

  1. The parties have not been summoned to the hearing on Oct. 1, 2002 on 2.8.2002
  2. The court order of February 18, 2002 is missing that the "newly drafted claims" of

         December 29, 2001 on Az 2b o 271/01 "has been announced to the defendant".

  

   The above-mentioned missing documents (see also point D3 above) show that only LG / OLG judges

     were interested in removing the leaves from the GA. Therefore in some places of the GA,

     foreign sheets (tables of salaries and allowances !!) can be found.

  

   According to our knowledge, the care to respect the files rests with the office (= GS),

     but also burdens the chairwoman.

    

   Especially since the separation of the 2 procedures (2b o 118/99 and 2b o 271/01) on the part of

     Stockschlaeder-Nöll is carried out, and when sorting some of the original sheets that belonged to Az

     2b o 271/01, are buried in Az 2b o 118/99 or Stockschlaeder-Nöll has completely removed from the

     files. The GS cannot, however, complain if the chairperson removes sheets from the GA.

 

D8. The "COVERING" of the illegal composition of the LG committees obviously constitutes one

         special preference of the OLG judges.

 

     There is reason to mention the LG decision three times in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017,

     page 27dated May 11, 2005 (signed Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Dress / Galle); on May 11th, 2005

     the bias Motion against Strupp-Müller on the part of the above-mentioned body, which is not

     responsible according to GVP and proclaimed a body violating Section 75 of the GVG or Article 101

     of the Basic Law;

 

     The OLG committee (STEIN / Glaeser / Kirschner) but not a word about the illegal

     and does not mention that the earlier occupation of the 18th Senate (Malsch & Co)

     looked over it.

     The application for annulment against the LG decision of May 11, 2005 has never been decided.

     The plaintiff waited for the decision on the annulment and was not forever

     remained inactive; because the monthly payments for court fees

     had been neat and received at the court treasury every month since August 2004.

 

D9. The resolutions with the discharge of Ms. Fuhr and Ms. Glaeser burden the signatories

       (Ms. STEIN & Co)

 

D10. The committee Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner has in judgment of October 18, 2017 on

         Az 18 U 69/16 (Page 2) the appeal on points of law (regarding the appeal) is not admitted.

 

         Thus, the committee violated the BGH decision, which says that the revision always

       is to be admitted if a judge was involved in an earlier instance (e.g. Ms. Fuhr)

       See BGHZ 172, 250 in NJW 2007, 2702; This was emphasized in all of the plaintiff's writings

       In addition to all other criminal offenses, this arbitrary blocking of legal recourse is effective

       of the OLG committee to enforce the rights of the plaintiff, particularly serious, and

       the signatories of the judgment of October 18, 2017, and Ms. Fuhr deserve the name of the

       "Criminal", because the offense committed according to the StGB with 5 years imprisonment

         is punished.

    

 The finding that the criminal trio (STEIN / Fuhr / Glaeser) on August 30, 2017, as well as the criminal

       Trio (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) on October 18, 2017 only had one thing in mind, i.e.

       the process to realize fraud is confirmed again; therefore the fraudsters inside not bothered about

     the text of the laws in force; they were sure that nothing could happen.

 

  1. Estimation of the damage as a function of the value in dispute, taking into account the fraudulent

       proceedings of Ms. Fuhr and the Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger

 

The court is offered the following estimate of the damage in accordance with Section 287 of the German Code

of Civil Procedure:

In the appeal of 2b o 271/01 (with Az 18 U 69/16 at the OLG-D'dorf), about 19 OLG judges had committed crimes

according to § 339 StGB until March 2021. Including Ms. Fuhr on Jan. 12, 2017 and August 30, 2017.

 

                                      The names of the offenders OLG judges are:

 

Malsch, Haarmann, Ms. Schroeder, Ms. Anderegg, Ms. Baan, Ms. Glaeser, Anger, Ms. Stein, Ms. Fuhr,

Ms. Kirschner, Roßwinkel, Ms. Barbian, Ms. Skibbe, Bünten, Ms. Jungclaus, Wermeckes,

Ms. Grabensee, C.-G. Müller, Dahm (list not exhaustive)

 

Because the local lawsuit / PKH only the consequences of the fraudulent proceedings of Ms. STEIN /

Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner has as an object, one can assume the amount in dispute of the OLG judgment

18 U 69/16 of October 18, 2017 and limit the number of judges involved to those who actually caused

damage in 2015-2017. These were the OLG judges: STEIN / Fuhr / Glaeser, STEIN / Glaeser / Kirschner,

Malsch / Glaeser / Anger and Ms. Fuhr (The consequences of Ms. Fuhr's fraud due to participation

in the committee on August 30, 2017 are already in of the lawsuit / PKH of 8.2.2021 has been determined

and taken into account, so that must be deducted here

 

The estimated damage of litigation fraud on 3 September 2015 to Az 18 W 1/13 (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger)

was already determined in the lawsuit / PKH against the above. The two losses already determined will be

deducted; what remains is the damage caused by Ms. STEIN & Co with the fraud on Az 18 U 69/16 for 2017).

The invoice / estimate looks like this:

 

The amount in dispute of the OLG appeal of Az 18 U 69/16 was in the amount of € 1,973,319.93; (see proof)

 

Taking into account the fact that the OLG committee STEIN / Glaeser / Kirschner caused the remaining damage

(excluding the damage to Ms. Fuhr and Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) (the costs / fees of the Advocates

(=RAe) will be finalized in taken into account in a new lawsuit), surrendered:

 

                                       € 1,973,319.93 - € 51,929.47 - € 429,845.99 = € 1,491,544.47

                      

Of course, the above damage assessment could be refined, depending on the value of each

judgment / resolution, the processing time (or the blockade) until the judgment / resolution is issued and its effect

(whether only had an individual effect or had an effect on the entire procedure)

The refinement, however, comes up against real limits with regard to the number of signatures of the chairman,

because each time the chairman has to sign the respective resolution.

 

  1. Knowledge of the person and the beginning of the material damage

 

The offenders (Ms. STEIN) and their assistants (Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) confirmed the intent to fraudulent

proceedings immediately and repeatedly.

The start of the damage, however, is only on September 19, 2019 when the fraud of the OLG judges Ms. STEIN

and the assistants (Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) discovered or completely in the judgment of 18.10.2017

on Az 18 U 69/16 and reported to the Düsseldorf (= D'dorf) public prosecutor's office with a criminal complaint.

 

The procedure LG-Az 2b o 271/01, OLG-Az 18 U 69/16, BGH Az III ZR 332/17 has ended, as already written

several times, after receipt of the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on October 6, 2018. Insofar

no statute of limitations occurred.

Knowledge of the start of the damage also requires knowledge of the start of interest payments (i.e. from 19.9.2019)

 

  1. Immaterial damage caused by the criminal OLG-D'dorf committee (Ms. STEIN/Ms. Glaeser/

     Ms. Kirschner) in 2017 up to the discovery of litigation fraud relating to Az 18 U 69/16

 

The plaintiff was forced for almost 3 years (October 2016 to September 2019) to research the method of fraudulent

proceedings of the OLG judges to Az 18 U 69/16, to collect evidence, with well-known lawyers according to the

evidence in the judgment of 18.10.2017 to discuss, to inquire about RAe, and at the same time to conduct

the contacts and work for the NZB at the BGH.

These weren't easy tasks for a non-lawyer. The nerves are overloaded.

 

In addition, there were the claims for payment from the court treasury for the costs of litigation fraud.

The health situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the plaintiff also had to take medication for previously

unknown symptoms of illness.

The cost of medication is a small item compared to the material damage, but the consequences of the health

symptoms have now been medically confirmed and have become even more serious.

Neither medication nor medical certificates are presented; The judges, no matter who they are, also have no right

to learn about the plaintiff's specific illnesses.

It goes without saying that the immaterial damage caused at that time due to the almost 3 years of exposure

can now be estimated at € 24,000. The immaterial damage was caused by the fraudsters and criminals in

OLG-D'dorf Richter Talaren (Ms. STEIN / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner)

 

  1. Application for exclusion for OLG judges Ms. Dr. Hoffmann and Ms. Gassan

The OLG judges known to the plaintiff (of the 11th, 18th, 24th Senate were loyal executors of the LG orders.

They knew that even for crimes within the meaning of the StGB, people would not be sent to prison.

 

The exclusion of Ms. Gassan is due to her abuse of § 348 ZPO to Az 2b o 76/20 (Az directly connected with

the LG-2b o 271/01 and the useless turn out expenses (=NGA) or with the present proceedings)

 

The current chairwoman, Ms. Dr. Hoffmann recommended and approved. Both are therefore excluded as

criminals from each of the plaintiff's proceedings

 

In addition, all named OLG judges of the 18th and 11th or 24th Senate who have been accused of fraudulent

proceedings / perversion of the law are excluded (regardless of the case) where they are now sitting in which

Senate or Chamber).

We reserve the right to make further presentations (on the requests for exclusion and on the lawsuit / motions).

 

  1. Emergency attorney

 

Despite the intensive efforts, the undersigned has not found an attorney who would be willing to override mandates

with the subject of claims for damages due to the judge's perversion of rights. to take. 

List of requested RAe is provided with the completed official form of the declaration personal and economic

circumstances

An emergency attorney for the plaintiff according to § 78b Civil Process Code (=ZPO) is therefore applied

for in the legal proceedings to order.

 

Requests;                  It is requested:

 

  1. After the annulment of the judgment of October 18, 2017, to sentence Az 18 U 69/16 to the

   defendant country, to the plaintiff € 1,491,544.47 plus interest of 5 percentage points above the

   base rate since October 18, 2017 to pay

 

  1. To condemn the defendant country to pay reasonable compensation for pain and suffering of at

     least € 24,000.00 plus interest of 5 percentage points above the base rate since October 18, 2017

 

The court is written to deal with the case quickly and an Az is sent here in advance

and to make the copy known to the NRW legal representative (due to the statute of limitations).

 

If you have any questions, please ask here.

 

Kind regards

 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

 

Investments

OLG-Düsseldorf (= D´dorf), judgment on Az 18 U 69/16 of October 18, 2017; Pages 1 + 29

Last modified on Friday, 05 March 2021 19:57

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                                                                                                                              Dr. Th. Sartoros

                                                                                                                                             Laddringsweg 15

                                                                                                                                            45219 Essen

                                                                                                                                             Oct 15, 2020

In advance by fax: 0211-4971-548

 

Court of Appeal of Düsseldorf

  1. Civil Senate

Cecilien Allee 3

40474 Düsseldorf

 

Abbreviations used

  

AG = AmtsGericht = district court of one magistrate

Az = AktenZeichen = File number

Bez. = Bezug = As to, reference

BGB a.F. = Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch alte Fassung= Civil Code old version =

BGH = BundesGerichtsHof =   Federal Court of Justice

D´dorf = Düsseldorf = city of N.W.-Germany

FA= Finanzamt = revenue-office

FG= FinanzGericht = Fiscal Tribunal

GG = GrundGesetz = Basic Law

GVG = GerichtsVerfassungsGesetz=   Judicial Constitutional Law

GVP = GeschäftsVerteilungsPlan = Business Distribution Plan

LG = Landgericht = Regional Court

Mettmann = city of Germany about 30 Km N.W. of D´dorf

NZB = Nicht ZulassungsBeschwerde = non-admission complaint

o.g. = oben genannte = above mentioned

OLG= Oberlandessgericht= Court of Appeal (of Düsseldorf)

PKH=ProzessKostenHilfe= application for legal aid

VRiLG = Vorsitzender Richter an Landgericht = Chairman of a chamber of regional court

ZPO = Zivil Prozess Ordnung = Code Civile

 

Ref: OLG-Az 18 W 74/19 (LG-Az 2b o 145/19; PKH application of August 19, 2019;

                                                                                   LG decision of August 26, 2019)

Bez.: Public liability suit with PKH v. 5.2.2001 Az 2b o 271/01, with claims for damages due to

           the crimes of FA-Mettmann; Confirmation of the Advocate on July 17th, 2003 that on 5.2.2001

             he brought unconditional action. PKH dated February 5, 2001 for action according to BGB

             old version, is indisputable.

      

         : Ms. Tannert / Ms. Fuhr / Mr. Schumacher. On November 28, 2000, issued a decision to take

           evidence and ordered the medical association D'dorf to prove that the plaintiff for the process

           pending at the 2b chamber is incapable of litigation; the decision to take evidence was passed,

           but on 11/29/2001 by another Chamber occupation cancelled;

 

           Ms. Fuhr is promoted to OLG judge, H. Schumacher to VRiLG. Reasons?

         : Minutes of the LG hearing on November 12, 2002;

           Confirmation of the legal representative (Mr. Nissen):

         "the bank seizures of the FA-Mettmann causally for the failure of the company of Plaintiff"

 

       : LG decision of 04/04/2003, PKH rejection, signed by an illegal LG committee Brückner-

           Hoffmann & Co (violation of § 75 GVG and Article 101 GG on legal judges);

 

         : OLG-11 Senate (Bünten) praises the legal violation of 04/04/2003 of the LG-illegal body;

           In 2003, Mrs. Brückner-Hoffmann was promoted to chairwoman judge of a chamber of

           commerce.

 

         : Rejection request against Stockschlaeder-Nöll from December 18, 2002 to Az 2b o 271/01,

           decided only on January 17th, 2008 (after almost 6 years!) by an unlawful LG committee (Ms.

             Köstner-Plümpe /Ms. Vaupel / Ms. Schmidt, violation of Art. 101 GG u. against § 75 GVG) and

             rejected as unfounded.

 

           : Motions to repeal the resolutions signed Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll on Az 2b o 271/01 since

             December 18, 2002 never decided; All accused LG / OLG judges are silent about it.

           The new OLG committee (Barbian & Co) is silent; Köstner-Plümpe promoted to OLG judge!

        

         : LG Decision May 11, 2005 signed Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Drees / Galle (last without GVP

             responsibility)

             The rejection request against Ms. Strupp-Müller, is rejected as unfounded.

 

           Result of the legal infringement: Ms. Strupp-Müller never legally exonerated; she shouldn't

           participate in other decisions; anyway on 8/9/2007 and September 18, 2007 dares 2 frauds

 

         : LG decisions of August 9, 2007 and September 18, 2007 signed by unlawful LG bodies

           (Ms. Strupp-Müller / Ms. Engelkamp-Neeser / Galle) and litigation fraud that the court fees

             allegedly not paid in full; Promotion of Ms. Strupp-Müller to the chairwoman of a chamber;

           Ms. Engelkamp-Neeser is bullied and sent away to AG-Ratingen.

 

         : Help from the cost officer Mr. Habich on August 29, 2007 on litigation fraud of August 9, 2007

             and September 18, 2007 to the above LG judges; Manipulation of the file contents 2b o 271/01.

 

         : Stockschlaeder-Nöll (helped by Mr. Galle) secretly corresponds (2008-2016) with FG-

               D'dorf presiding judge SCHUCK to turn off the plaintiff and the proceedings

               2b o 77/08 to be destroyed; Participant in plot Mr. Malsch of the OLG-18th Senate

 

       : MURDER ATTEMPT on April 16, 2008 on the A5 motorway south of Karlsruhe,against the plaintiff !!

           How did the murderer know that the plaintiff was driving the A5 in a strange car that day?

 

       : 14 LG resolutions signed Ms. Tigges / Ms. Schmidt / Ms. Dr. Hoffmann from April 23/24, 2009

           that the due of the secret motions from July-Sept. 2008 at the AG-Essen, accused Ms.

         Stockschlaeder-Nöll and Ms. Engelkamp-Neeser (to eliminate the plaintiff as incapable of

          litigation), allegedly not biased would be. (Violations of the aforementioned judges against

           Art. 101 GG and against § 75 GVG never judged)

 

           : 99 OLG decisions of the 11th Senate from February 16, 2010 to May 12, 2010 by a putsch club

             by 9 OLG judges (organized in 3 groups, such as criminals), led by Bünten / Ms. Jungclaus/

             / Wermeckes to create a fait accompli against the plaintiff. The coup failed against the plaintiff;

               the club is dissolved; the members "transferred".

           Promotion of Mrs. Grabensee to chairwoman of the Higher Regional Court judge of a criminal senate.

 

         LG default judgment on March 16, 2011 signed by 2 rejected judges (Stockschlaeder- Nöll

           and Ms. Dr. Hoffmann; Case blocked; Promotion of Ms. Dr. Hoffmann as chairwoman .

               Expert opinion from Dr. Med. K.-H. L. are moved, cannot be found, suppressed

 

         : LG-PKH Resolutions, on 26.11.2012 and from May 24, 2014 signed Stockschlaeder-Nöll /

           Ms. Jürging / Ms Brecht and Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Brecht / Ms. Freitag ; alleged statute

             of limitations Claims on December 31, 2009 or June 30, 2010; Promotion of Ms. Brecht to the

             OLG-D´dorf and Ms. Freitag to the LG chairwoman judge. Reasons ?

 

         : LG order of 7.7.2014 to the OLG about final result on the immediate complaint;

           "The Chamber insists on the statute of limitations", signed Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Brecht

             / Mr. Feldmann

        

       : The lawyer of the defendant country, Stef. Minnerop, recommand/requires from LG to "punch

           through the Procedure 2b o 271/01 "also" alla gangster kind ". A little later the LG / OLG tries

 

       : OLG decision 3.9.2015 to Az 18 W 1/13 signed Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger; Limitation of Claims

           allegedly on July 31, 2006; Litigation fraud by manipulating the legal texts and the like

           Ms. Glaeser. Detecting litigation fraud the presiding judge Malsch is retired

 

       : LG-D´dorf final judgment 11.5.2016 Az 2b o 271/01 signed Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll /Ms.Gundlach /Frank

            alleged limitation of claims on July 31, 2006; complete takeover / identification with

           litigation fraud of 3.9.2015 of the OLG committee Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger for Az 18 W 1/13

          

       : Voluntary self-disclosure of bias according to § 48 ZPO of Ms.Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Gundlach

         for Az 2b o 271/01 without time restriction; Then removal of Ms. Gundlach from 2b chamber

 

         : LG decision Az 2b o 76/16 dated June 16, 2016 signed Ms. Junglaus / Ms. Harsta / Witte;

           Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Gundlach (with reference to voluntary disclosure of partiality

           Az 2b o 271/01) excluded;

           Despite the exclusion, Stockschlaeder-Nöll continues as if nothing happened !!

 

         : Appeal of August 18, 2016 against LG final judgment May 11, 2016 signed Stockschlaeder-Nöll /

             Ms. Gundlach;

 

             Proof that Ms. Fuhr was excluded according to § 41 No. 6 ZPO; Dozens of evidence for that

             Crimes of FA-Mettmann and of the judges Ms.Tannert / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Stöve / Ms. Wolks-Falter

 

         : PKH application dated August 19, 2016 for appeal 18 U 69/16 and application for exclusion

           against Ms. Glaeser because of the litigation fraud on Az 18 W 1/13 on September 3, 2015 with

           manipulation of the legal texts

        

         : Appeal procedure OLG-Az 18 U 69/16 (LG-Az 2b o 271/01), proof of the according to § 41 No. 6

           ZPO exclusion of Ms. Fuhr; Forwarding in Aug./Sept. 2017 to the 18th Senate of coiffed more

           than 200 sheets from the files of 2b o 271/01; "done up" by the judicial staff (judges

           Inside). The evidence from the OLG-18. Senate (Ms. Stein & Co) have been ignored.

      

         : OLG decision January 12, 2017 to Az 18 U 69/16; Rejection as unfounded by the exclusion

         against Ms. Glaeser, signed Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Kirschner; she is needed in litigation fraud

                

         : OLG-PKH negative decision on August 30, 2017 for Az 18 U 69/16 signed Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr /

             Ms. Glaeser (on page 6 of Decision); "The claimant's claims for damages would allegedly no

             later than 31.7.2006 statute of limitations; Litigation fraud on the part of the above allegedly

             "IN FAVOUR OF THE CLAIMENT" !!!

 

         : OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 signed Ms. Stein / Fr. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner;

           "LEGAL FRAUD" with the 6 months extension of § 209 BGB old version (IN FAVOUR OF THE

           APPLICANT) on running belt; Claims allegedly on June 30th, 2000; !? statute of limitations

               on July 31, 2006 at the latest;

         : Appeal dismissed; Appeal not admitted; Default judgment (= VU)

             of 16.3.2011 maintained !!; The claimant bears the costs!

 

         : Non-admission complaint (NZB) directed to the BGH, Az III ZR 332/17 (Mr Herrmann /Mr Seiters

               /Mr Reiter / Ms. Liebert / Ms. Böttscher); Evidence of the crimes of FA-Mettmann, the trial

           fraud of the OLG 18th Senate in the OLG judgment of 18.10.2017 Az 18 U 69/16 and the non-

           limitation of claims Provided in 14 pages but ignored by the BGH. Violation of the BGH standard

             case law

 

         : May 24, 2018 and July 26, 2018, decisions of the BGH on Az III ZR 332/17: Seiter's rapporteur

           Rejection of the NZB and the hearing complaint with 5 lines! No relief for the right flexors

 

           : In 2019 Ms. Gundlach will return to the 2b civil chamber. Reasons not known.

        

           : Public liability suit with PKH from August 19, 2019, LG-Az 2b o 145/19, for the resumption of

             the Az 2b o 271/01. Serious allegations and Evidence of LG / OLG litigation fraud on Az 2b o 271/01

             

         : 19.9.2019: Criminal complaint to the D'dorf public prosecutor's office against the OLG judges

           Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirchner and against LG judges Ms.Stockschlaeder-

             Nöll, Ms. Brecht, Ms. Gundlach et al. for criminal offenses / perversion of justice / violations of

             Art. 101 GG etc

         : 16.1.2020: Criminal complaint against Ms. Strupp-Müller, Mr. Galle, cost officials Mr. Habich

                 and others

       : February 22, 2020: Criminal complaint against Ms. Jungclaus / Ms. Wolks-Falter / Ms. Grabensee

             / Mr. Malsch /Mr. Bünten / Ms. Baan / Wermeckes et others, for perversion of justice;

             No Az despite 3 memories !!

       : April 27, 2020: Criminal complaint against the judiciary Ms. Krüger and against the LG judge

                         Ms. Dr. Hoffmann due to perversion of the law on January 23, 2020 to Az 2b o 271/01

 

       : LG-PKH-negative decision Aug. 26, 2019 signed Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll/Ms. Jürging/Ms. Büchler

               to Az 2b o 145/19; The lawsuit allegedly has no prospect of success; Ms. Büchler leaves the 2b.

 

       : Approx. End of Nov. / beginning of Dec. 2019: removal of Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll from the 2b

         civil chamber. Ms. Dr. Hoffmann becomes chairwoman of the 2b civil chamber around the

           beginning of December 2019 !!

 

     : Request for exclusion from 7.1.2020 to Az 18 W 74/19 against the judges Ms. Stein / Fr. Fuhr /

           Ms.Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner due to several fraudulent proceedings relating to OLG-18 U 69/16

           (according to note in page 15 of the PKH application from August 19, 2019 on LG Az 2b o 145/19)

           and reference to the there Requests

    

     : Application for an EMERGENCY ADVOCATE according to § 78b ZPO and list of Jan. 21, 2020 of the

           requested RAe for LG / OLG proceedings, and Ask for the name of the rapporteur on 18 W 74/19

        

       : Reminder of March 2, 2020 to send the name of the rapporteur here

             and timeliness of the application according to § 78b ZPO

        

     : OLG notification v. 17.7.2020 signed Ms. Stein, including the composition of the 18th Senate

             Ms. Stein and Ms. Glaeser are there; The personal information given to the suspects is ignored

 

   : Request for exclusion from July 22nd, 2020 against Ms. Stein and against Ms. Glaeser because of

         the existing Risk of repetition of the lawsuit deceit / perversions (in favour of the plaintiff!)

       (Pages 25, 26, 28 of the judgment of October 18, 2017, Az 18 U 69/16 signed Ms. Stein / Ms.

         Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner, Version 29 pages) and as in the PKH decision of August 30, 2017

       signed Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser (page 6).

          

   : Aug. 18, 2020; OLG decision on Az 18 W 74/19 signed Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe;

           The accused OLG judges (Ms. Stein / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) are excluded because

               permanently eliminated; Ms. Fuhr was already transferred!

  

     : 25 Aug 2020: Application to delete the name of Ms. Jürging in the above Decision 18.8.2020

             Az 18 W 74/19, page 2: Concerns about the lack of official statements from

         accused Mrs. Stein & Co (case name of Mrs. Jürging in the decision 18.8.20 finished on 6.10.2020)

 

   : Sept. 10, 2020, notification from the LG-2b civil chamber that Ms. Gundlach will leave the

                 chamber, retired on September 2, 2020.

               The 2nd time that Ms. Gundlach leaves the 2b chamber !!

 

   : Immediate complaint 25.9.2020 against LG decision. August 26, 2020 (because of rejection of bias

         Ms. Stockschlaeder- Nöll)

 

   : Immediate complaint 25.9.2020 against LG decision. August 26, 2020 Az 2b o 145/19 (because of

       PKH rejection.)

 

   : Decision of October 6, 2020 on Az 18 W 74/19 signed Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe

     (the accused OLG judges Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser / Kirschner allegedly did not commit any legal

     infractions / criminal offenses committed on 18 U 69/16; Also the LG judges Ms. Stockschlaeder-

     Nöll / Ms. Gundlach too the main proceedings Az 2b o 271/01 had not committed any perversion

     of justice; Rejection of the application for an EMERGENCY ADVOCATE, legal complaint not

       permitted; Complaint procedure costs according to No. 1812 GKG! wearing.... ??!!

 

Here: complaint / notice of hearing against the OLG decision October 6, 2020 signed Ms. Barbian /

              Mr. Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe

       : Explanations what in the contested OLG decision 10/6/2020 deliberately suppressed / distorted

             /is set out incorrectly (see long list in "Reference" above)

       : Application for annulment of the contested decision October 6, 2020 and of the judgment of

           October 18, 2017 to Az 18 U 69/16, as well as authorization from the PKH for Az 2b o 145/19 or

         for resumption the official liability suit LG-D´dorf 2b o 271/01 with the claims for damages

       : There are no prerequisites for the application for an EMERGENCY ADVOCATE according to § 78b ZPO

           

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

 

A.

That in the "Bez." Listed, helps the OLG committee (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) to recognize, what

was forgotten in their last decision of Oct. 6, 2020 on Az 18 W 74/19 (LG Az 2b o 145/19) / suppressed or distorted

in order to come to the conclusion that the accused OLG CRIMINALS (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser /

Ms. Kirschner) and the LG criminals Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Gundlach, allegedly no fraud, no perversion

of justice, no criminal offenses. No criminal offenses "evident" writes the OLG committee, and how usual in applications

for rejection against judges, the plaintiff has presented everything "inconclusive"

Unfortunately, the criminal charges against the criminals with RichterTalaren are still pending or in processing

at the D'dorf public prosecutor's office since 19.9.2019.

 

As a summary and preliminary result, it can be said here that more than 2 dozen OLG / LG trial fraudsters are

removed from the plaintiff's line of fire or from their positions in the Senate or from the 2b civil chamber, or retired,

or in other courts " have been moved ". Many women (OLG / LG judges) accused of perverting the law have

been promoted.

The final result (payment to the plaintiff of his compensation claims for the crimes of the FA-Mettmann and for the

fraudulent proceedings of the OLG / LG guild) is yet to come. This letter explains why. The law is stronger than

the arbitrariness of some judges.

 

B.

 

The decision 6.10.2020 Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe to Az 18 W 74/19 (LG 2b o 145/19) recalls the ruling

of the former finance minister of the FRG, Schäuble, that the Greek government or the Greek people because

of the damage (destruction of infrastructure, executions of civilians, Burning of whole villages, sinking of fishing boats,

confiscation of food, hunger, diseases etc.), suffered

during the 1st and 2nd World War, has no claims for damages against FRG. It is remembered:

 

The reparation debt of the FRG to Greece amounts to 332.8 billion € (as of 2012)

 

Forget everything ??!! ΑΛΛΑΞΕ Ο ΜΑΝΟΛΙΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΟΡΕΣΕ ΤΑ ΡΟΥΧΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΛΛΟΙΩΣ?

                                                άλλαξε ο Μανολιός και φόρεσε τα ρούχα του αλλοιώς?

                             Translation from Greek: (Manolios = Name of a Person)

                                     DID MANOLIOS CHANGE AND WEAR HIS CLOTHES ELSE?

                

When asked whether the accused OLG / LG judges (Ms. Stein/Ms. Fuhr/Ms. Glaeser/Ms. Kirschner,

and Stockschlaeder-Nöll and Ms. Gundlach) have committed legal infractions / fraudulent proceedings /

criminal offenses secondly Section 339 of the Criminal Code, is referenced to the extensive immediate

complaints, hearings and Exclusion requests against the above, to shorten the answers.

                                 : The result is: no statute of limitations

 

C.

 

Most of the documents would have to be contained in the files of the LG case 2b o 271/01,

as well as in the files of the OLG-Az 18 U 69/16 and the PKH applications (if they are not "fudged").

The plaintiff last saw the contents of the status on a memory stick in 2017:

He found the big "FRISIER-AKTION" of the LG / OLG judges and therefore in Aug./Sept. 2017 in 17 transmitted

more than 200 sheets (= documents removed from file 2b o 271/01) to the OLG-18. Senate. The documents

have been ignored by Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner. Since then (May 2017) a lot of water

has run down the Rhine; A short reply is given here so that the allegations of the new OLG committee

(Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) are exposed as false / distorted.

The appeal 18 U 69/16 and the NZB at the BGH Az III ZR 332/17 also apply in full here.

 

1.

Question: why in the OLG decision October 6, 2020 (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) it has been suppressed

that on April 4, 2003 the LG decision on Az 2b o 271/01 signed Brückner-Hoffmann / Strupp-Müller / Adam,

(GA sheet no. 206) unlawful was? and the PKH application for the loss of the subsidy bonus etc was considered

rejected? although the decision was appealed against? is it also not visible?

2.

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) it has been

                 suppressed that the OLG-11. Senate (Bünten) the legal violation of the LG committee of

               4 April 2003 (Brückner-Hoffmann & Co), instead of admitting the complaint, and revoke the

          decision; are not Criminal offenses evident? and the responsibility of the Stockschlaeder-Nöll

          for the blackmail the rapporteur (to reject all the plaintiff's requests so that the judiciary does

          not bogged down?) also error-free? or have (Ms. Stein/Ms.Fuhr /Ms. Glaeser /Ms. Kirschner) a

           word in the PKH-Decision of August 30, 2017 or in judgment 18 U 69/16 of October 18, 2017 on

           the violation of the law written? also not relevant for the fraudsters?

           Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges no perversion of the law?

3.

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Ms. Barbian /Mr Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) it has been

suppressed that after that (i.e. after PKH rejection on April 4th, 2003) Ms. Brückner-Hoffmann became the presiding

judge of a chamber of commerce? The illegal LG committee was tinkered and controlled by Stockschlaeder-Nöll.

The violation of the law charges Stockschlaeder-Nöll and Brückner-Hoffmann, Is this also not evident?.

Was the promotion of Ms. Brückner-Hoffmann a kind of recognition by the employer for the violation      

of the law and the arbitrariness of the LG committee?

         Where did Stockschlaeder-Nöll get the right from the reporter Brückner-Hoffmann to demand

 

                                    "to reject all applications of the plaintiff en bloc

                                    so that the judiciary does not get bogged down?

 

         Also not apparent? although presented very often (to be found in retent folder 2b o 271/01)

             Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges not perversion of the law?

4th

Question: why in the OLG decision October 6, 2020 (Ms. Barbian / Mr. Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) it

       has been suppressed that the legal representative (Nissen) of the defendant state (NRW) at the

         "hearing of the parties"on 12.11.2002 had confirmed that

       "the bank seizures operated by the FA-Mettmann were causal for the failure of the plaintiff's company?

             

       Why does the o.g. OLG Committee in decision 6.10.2020 write, that the plaintiff has not provided

         evidence of causality ??

       Is the recognition and confirmation of the NRW legal representative on November 12, 2002 for

       the Causality of the failure of the plaintiff's company due to the bank garnishments of the FA-

       Mettmann no proof? or is the confirmation from Stockschlaeder-Nöll and Ms. Gundlach

       in the judgment of May 11, 2016 to Az 2b o 271/01, or from Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser /

       Ms. Kirschner in the PKH decision of August 30, 2017, or in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017

       on Az 18 U 69/16 been?

       Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges no perversion of the law?

5.

Question: why in the OLG decision October 6th, 2020 (Ms.Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) it has been

suppressed, that in the decision of November 26, 2012 signed Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Jürging /

Ms. Brecht, the alleged statute of limitations of the claimant's claims for damages according to BGB old version,

occurred on December 31, 2009? and 1.5 years later (on May 28, 2014) in the new LG decision, signed

Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Brecht / Ms. Freitag the alleged limitation of claims on June 30, 2010 according

to BGB new version occurred?

why was the previous decision of November 26th, 2012 not cancelled although it was contested?

Did Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll's opinion change depending on the direction of the flag?

 

And why did the accused OLG committee (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) not have written

a word, either in the PKH decision on August 30, 2017, or in judgment 18 U 69/16 of October 18, 2017 on the LG

decisions with the different dates of the alleged statute of limitations?  no error visible either?

                  Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges no perversion of the law?

6th

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Ms. Barbian/Roßwinkel/Ms. Skibbe) it has been

             suppressed that the exclusion request from December 18th, 2002 against Mrs. Stockschlaeder-

             Nöll only on January 17th, 2008 on the part of an illegal LG committee (Ms. Köstner-Plümpe /

             Ms. Vaupel / Ms. Schmidt, violation of Art. 101 GG and against § 75 GVG); the above Decision

              and committee composition is under attack.

              Nevertheless, the 11th Senate (Bünten & Co) and 18th Senate (Malsch & Co) remained silent

             about it.

            Also the accused OLG committee (Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser / Kirschner) has the o.g. LG decision

            January 17th, 2008 and ignoring the incriminations against the Stockschlaeder-Nöll; was no

            legal been violated?

                 and Ms. Köstner-Plümpe, earned the promotion because of the legal violation?

               Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges no perversion of the law?

7th

Question: why in the OLG decision October 6th, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) and others, it has been

suppressed, that the frequently requested annulment of the resolutions signed Stockschlaeder-Nöll since

December 18, 2002 until the legal validity of the theoretical discharge of the above Offender, not decided?

and even to this day to bury? Were the decisions of Ms. Stockschlaeder-Nöll, which were contested as unlawful,

not decisive for the statute of limitations between 2002 and 2009? or for the postponement of the procedure 2b o 271/01?

Why did the accused OLG committee (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) not write a word in

either the PKH decision on August 30, 2017 or in the judgment 18 U 69/16 of October 18, 2017 about the delaying

of the LG decisions? that was not a mistake by the accused OLG fraudsters?

               Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges not perversion of justice?

8th.

Question: why in the OLG decision October 6th, 2020 (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel /Ms. Skibbe) it has

                 been suppressed, that on August 9, 2007 and on September 18, 2007 by a controlled and

                 unlawful LG committee (Ms. Strupp-Müller / Ms. Engelkamp-Neeser /Mr. Galle, violation

               against § 75 GVG and against Art. 101 GG, and with Mr. Galle who is not responsible  

                   according to GVP !!) one has committed lawsuit fraud, claiming that the Court fees

                  they have been paying since Dec 2006 (without LG invoice!) allegedly not paid in full?

                 does the above mentioned LG committee Strupp-Müller / Engelkamp-Neeser / Galle

                 did not commit any fraudulent proceedings ??

               if the decision would have been lifted, how would he have applied to the statute of

                 limitations and at the expense of the proceedings 2b o 271/01 worked ??

             the accused LG committee (Ms.Strupp-Müller/Ms. Engelkamp-Neeser/Galle) or Stockschlaeder-

               Nöll, or the OLG committee (Ms.Stein/Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) in PKH decision

               of August 30, 2017 or in judgment 18 U 69/16 of October 18, 2017 on fraud written about

                 8/9/2007 or 9/18/2007? was also for the new OLG committee (Ms. Barbian & Co), the

               material in the files, not relevant for the statute of limitations? and for the cost of the

               Procedure?

               (NB: In 2013 the court fees and RA fees were increased !!!)

               Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges no perversion of the law?

9.

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) it has been suppressed

that the manipulation of the file contents ordered by Stockschlaeder-Nöll was committed by the cost officer

Mr. Habich on Aug. 29, 2007? Was the manipulation of files (in the files available and provable) of

mr. Habich, not a criminal offense? and no bending of the law ?? and not worth mentioning for the statute

of limitations and for the costs (of the proceedings that were delayed for a few years) ??        

is the suppression of evidence not perversion of justice?

 

10.

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) it has been

                   suppressed that from the 99 decisions of the Putsch club of the criminal 9 OLG judges of

                the 11th Senate, (3 * 14 =)42 resolutions served within a week (Febr. 2010) were

                accomplished facts against the plaintiff (for alleged failure to meet deadlines)?

                  Ms. Jungclaus then became Vice President of the LG-D'dorf !! did she deserve the title?

                 Is the suppression of evidence on the part of LG / OLG judges no perversion of the law?

11.

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) it has been

               suppressed, that for the LG order of 07/07/2014 to the OLG 18th Senate that "the Chamber

             on the statute of limitations insist ", neither in the PKH decision of August 30, 2017 nor in

               the judgment of October 18, 2017 anything written /or is commented ?? is something like

             that not relevant for the alleged statute of limitations theory of accused OLG committee

             (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) ??

            is the suppression of evidence for the statute of limitations not perversion of justice?

 

12th

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe), it has been

                   suppressed that on September 3, 2015 the OLG committee (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger)

                  on Az 18 W 1/13 the LG order of July 7th, 2014 with respect to the statute of limitations in

               litigation fraud by manipulation / change / addition the legal texts (e.g. § 209 BGB old

             version) had implemented ?? (the manipulation of the legal text is also from Ms. Stein / Ms.

             Glaeser / Anger was fully taken over in the decision of April 5, 2016 !!)

             Did the OLG committee not commit any perversion of rights with Ms. Glaeser

             on September 3, 2015?

           and the theory of the alleged extension for 6 months of § 209 BGB old version. ,

             is in BGB a.F. to find??? The plaintiff's answer was and still is: "Litigation fraud"

            Did the above Trial fraud from 3 September 2015 of the OLG committee Malsch /Ms. Glaeser

             / Anger non influenced the costs of the procedure? why the OLG committee (Ms.Stein / Ms.

               Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) is silent about it ?; Why is the LG order 7/7/2014 for the

           later alleged limitation of claims not relevant? why in the PKH decision on August 30, 2017

           and in the OLG judgment of 18.10.2017 on Az 18 U 69/16 nothing written??

           is the suppression of evidence for the statute of limitations not perversion of justice?

  

13.

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) it has been

                 suppressed that Ms. Fuhr is not allowed to participate in the OLG proceedings 18 U 69/16?

                 Ms. Fuhr had in hers official statement according to § 44 ZPO from April 11, 2017 admitted

               that in the earlier Phase of the underlying proceedings was active. So according to § 41 No.

                 6 ZPO she was Excluded by law; Nevertheless, your colleagues (Ms. Stein / Unger /Ms.

                 Kirschner) have fraudsters Ms. Fuhr of the allegation of bias or the request for

                 exclusion rejected as unfounded on 07/19/2017. One more fraudster was required?

               The PKH application that was rejected on August 30, 2017 was signed by Ms. Fuhr and had

                to be cancelled after contestation. The alleged statute of limitations was ordered by LG and

                the accused (Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner) had to reach them in any case! ??

              The allegations in the PKH decision are interesting:

               August 30, 2017 signed Fr. Stein / Fr. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser , that the legal fraud (with the

               alleged statute of limitations of the claims) "IN THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF "took place;

               The above sentence (that the legal fraud for the alleged limitation of the

                Claims "in favour of the plaintiff" were made), can be found 3 times in the judgment

               18.10.2017 to Az 18 U 69/16. The ladies liked that sentence so much!

               That the ladies (Stein & Co) are above the laws and fraudulent proceedings made in favour

               of the plaintiff is not relevant to the new OLG committee (Barbian & Co)?

                                       is the suppression of evidence not perversion of justice?

 

14th

Question: why in the OLG decision. October 6th, 2020 (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) it has been

                   suppressed that in the NZB the crimes of FA-Mettmann are described ?? and that Mrs.

                 Fuhr according to Law was excluded ?? and that the trial fraud of the OLG judges to Az

                 18 U 69/16 was also displayed there (in NZB) in the shortest and most decent way?

                 Why do the eloquent BGH judges have no exonerating word written for the OLG / LG

               litigation cheaters or for the crimes of FA-Mettmann, but with only about 5 lines rejected

                the NZB and then the complaint? Is everything not relevant for the OLG committee?

                           is the suppression of evidence not perversion of justice?

 

15th

     If, the OLG judges accused of litigation fraud / perversion of the law to Az 18 U 69/16

     of the 18th civil senate (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) would not be

       burdened, why are then with the decision of August 18, 2020 by the same OLG committee

     (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) excluded from the Senate? Why is no official statement!

     from the accused or excluded judges? NB: Their removal from the OLG-18. Senate was only

     achieved on the basis of the evidence provided of the fraudulent proceedings;

     That what the panel (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) writes in the new resolution of

     October 6, 2020, is only for Avoidance of further dire consequences for the process fraudsters

       (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner), a homage to the judges' famous

     "solidarity".

     Therefore what was written by Barbian & Co is contested as inaccurate

 

16.

The new OLG committee (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) claims in the decision of 6. Oct. 2020

Az 18 W 74/19, page 3, last 2 lines, and continued in page 4, lines 1 to 8 inclusive, that:

 

"The applicant has not presented any facts that would make an official liability claim in accordance

with § 839 BGB in conjunction with Art. 34 GG due to the perversion of the judges Stein, Fuhr, Glaeser, Kirschner

appear even rudimentary also judge - if a judgment in a legal matter is his official duty, he is only responsible

for the resulting damage according to § 839 Abs. 2 Satz 1 BGB if the breach of duty consists of a criminal offense.

in particular the perversion of the law asserted by the applicant, there are no indications ".

 

Whether the accused OLG judges (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) have committed

criminal offenses, the OLG committee that is decisive here will find answers, among other things from page 8

of the application from August 19, 2019

 

in chapter: The multiple fraud of the OLG judges Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner;

on page 10: The role of the criminal Ms. Glaeser on September 27, 2017 and October 18, 2017.

in page 14: intent to harm

as in

the supplement of Sept. 2, 2019 of the PKH application of August 19, 2019 for Az 2b o 145/19

from page 3 to page 10.

The description is detailed there and not contradicted. The chapters have titles such as:

 

  1. ARGUMENTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE BGB (old version)
  2. EVIDENCE IN THE UNCONDITIONAL CLAIM dated 5/02/2001
  3. The connection and the separation of the 2 procedures Az 2b o 118/99 and 2b o 271/01,

       the secret Application to initiate supervision proceedings; the decision to take evidence of

     November 28, 2000 and the legal consequences according to BGB old version to the interruption

     of the statute of limitations of the related proceedings

  1. The application from March 2000 for support, and the rejection of 2.1.2002 by AG-Essen; Legal

   consequences on the interruption of the statute of limitations and then on the suspension of  

     the statute of limitations

  1. The cap in the OLG judgment 18.10.2017 of the illegal education of decisive LG bodies

   as well as the theatrical homage of the BVerfG and BGH case law on Art. 101 and Art. 103 GG

   (see definition of terms in Thomas Fischer StGB "before § 13, RNr 1")

 

The general blah-blah about "bending the right" (page 4, sentence 2, of the OLG decision 6.10.2020)

doesn't convince anyone, and neither does the BGH judge. It will be, focusing on interruption

the statute of limitations according to BGB old version, contested with the following;

The contested OLG decision. October 6, 2020 must be cancelled.

    

  1. The unconditional official liability suit of 5.2.2001 is from the LG / OLG and in all resolutions

   or LG judgment of May 11, 2016 and in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 according to BGB

   old version recognized / undisputed.

 

  1. The FG lawsuits won, forced the FA-Mettmann to reimburse (1999-2002, 2006) the

   much-paid tax; According to BGB old version, the reimbursements the statute of limitations

     is interrupted.

     The OLG committees (Ms. Stein /Ms. Fuhr /Ms. Glaeser /Ms. Kirschner) or (Ms. Barbian /

     Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) don't write anything about it.

     Why ? Are the files too heavy? is the topic not relevant either?

 

  1. The FG lawsuit, which ended in 2006 with "settlement" and reimbursement, has,

     according to BGB old version, the statute of limitations interrupted.

       The following from Palandt BGB a.F. with indication of the §, RNr and page

       > Interruption of the statute of limitations by acknowledgment (e.g. a FG judgment

         or tax refund or payment after a FG judgment has become final)

         BGB § 208 margin nos. 1-4, p. 198

       > The FA refunded tax in June 2000 and May 2001; the payment continues

      a new limitation period. Acknowledgment = business-like act

       e.g. Payment or set-off against undisputed claims

     > The OLG committees (Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser / Kirschner) are deliberately silent on the subject

      on August 30, 2017 / October 18, 2017 and (Barbian / Roßwinkel / Skibbe) on October 6, 2017;

  

  1. The accused OLG judges Ms. Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser / Kirschner recognize that the PKH application

    of February 5, 2001 already served on the defendant on February 20, 2002 before the beginning

     of 2002 is; However, they are silent about the interruption of the limitation period / suspension

       according to BGB old version.

     (This also applies in relation to § 209 BGB new version) The omission is also a criminal offense

     according to the StGB !!

  

  1. For the lawsuit dated February 5, 2001, Sections of the BGB (old version) therefore apply;

   The consequence is that the period during which the limitation period is suspended, is not

   included in the limitation period.

 

While only in page 22, line 20 counted from above, page 23 last line, and in page 25, paragraph 3,

of the judgment 18.10.2017 to Az 18 U 69/16 (version 30 pages) the interruption of the statute of limitations

is openly confirmed , the OLG committee Ms. Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser / Kirschner tries on all other pages

to convince the reader that no interruption of the statute of limitations would have occurred.

(See also the assertion in OLG judgment 18.10.17 (e.g. p. 23, version with 29 pages) about PKH application

from 5.2.2001, point a; or

about loss of subsidy, page 22 ff item 4 (verse 29 pages); About pension entitlement page 27, point 6

on compensation for pain and suffering, page 27, point 5. The goal is always the same to achieve the statute

of limitations. The "attempt" is also a criminal offense, punished according to the StGB with 1 to 5 years

imprisonment.

               is the suppression of evidence on the part of OLG judges not perversion of justice?

 

17th

It is submitted to the written submission on September 2, 2019 to Az OLG-Az 18 W 26/19 (LG-

D´dorf 2b o 233/18 PKH for declaratory action regarding expenses that have become useless

(= NGA) in conjunction with 2b o 271/01) because the judges do not want to search in other case files.

   

 

     C1. Excerpts from the OLG decision of August 30, 2017 signed Ms. Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser

               Az 18 U 69/16

 

     C2. The Committee (Ms. Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner), explain on page 22, line 17ff, judgment of

           October 18, 2017, Az 18 U 69/16, version 29 pages, the validity and applicability of the BGB

           old version. (§ 211),

             that

                           "The three-year limitation period therefore began after the legally binding conclusion

                           (cf. § 211 BGB old version) of these output tax assessments from the 80 years

                           to run the relevant proceedings again before the Finance Court in Düsseldorf.

 

       On page 6, PKH decision 30.8.2017 (Ms. Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser) Az 18 W 69/16 the reader will find

     the above Sentence in the following form

       ("the three-year limitation period therefore began after a legally binding conclusion

     (cf. § 211 BGB old version) to run the proceedings before the Düsseldorf Finance Court again ")

 

           The committee commits the "multiple litigation fraud" in the last 3.5 lines of the above

           Paragraph (page 22, judgment version 29 pages), as well as in PKH decision 30.8.17, Az

           18 U 69/16 Page 6 (Ms. Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser) in identical form; in both cases (decision /

           judgment) the following:

 

         "In favor of the plaintiff, the Senate has, as in previous decisions, for this period up to

           Legal force of six months, so that through the legal action before the tax court

         The interruption of the statute of limitations triggered ended on 06/30/2000 at the latest. "

 

         From the above Lines result that

  1. a) an interruption of the statute of limitations due to the FG proceedings (due to the primary

             Legal protection) has occurred and

  1. b) according to lines 17 ff, p. 22, the 3-year BGB limitation period has started again.
  2. c) the 18th Senate also committed the fraud proven below in "previous resolutions"
  3. d) belittling the fraudulent proceedings with the 6 months extension as "in favor of the plaintiff"
  4.    e) the legal force (the interruption of the limitation period) six (6) months after delivery of the

           FG ruling extended (and referred to as in favour of the plaintiff)

 

   Under the above "Point c" ("earlier decisions") is the "fraud of Ms. Glaeser" in the decision

   to Az 18 W 1/13 (and 18 W 44/14) from 3.9.2015 signed Malsch / Ms. Glaser / Anger meant,

   who in the next lines are analyzed / commented on.

 

   The play on words with the terms "limitation ", "limitation term", "limitation period interruption"

   of the offenders (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) about the mix-up and then used the wrong

   one in order to achieve the result of the alleged "limitation of claims" is provable;

   as follows:

  

"The FG proceedings have interrupted the statute of limitations (primary legal protection) and this

   Interruption of the statute of limitations because of the FG proceedings (i.e. because of the primary

   legal protection) ended one month (and not 6 months !!) after delivery of the (last ?!) FG judgment"

  

   (The reader will find the 6 month extension first on page 7, OLG decision 3.9.2015,

   Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger)

 

The OLG committee adds the 6 months in order to reach the process fraud by means of deception

 

   Now, based on the data of the OLG-PKH decision 30.8.17 in page 6, paragraph 2, as well as in

   OLG judgment October 18, 2017, page 22, version 29 pages, the last FG judgment (allegedly !!)

   pronnunced on November 24, 1999

     it follows that:

   Assuming that the FG judgment was served at the beginning of January 2000, took (due to the

   primary legal protection) the triggered interruption of the primary statute of limitations until the

   beginning February 2000 (legal deadline one month for the appeal at the BFH !! and not 6

   months).

 

       After that i.e. from the beginning of February 2000 there is a statutory 3-year limitation period

       (according to BGB!) started to run for the filing of the official liability suit.

       (as confirmed by OLG-PKH decision on August 30, 2017, page 6 in line 1, paragraph 2!)

       The end of this statutory limitation period according to the BGB would be 3 years later

       i.e. occurred in February 2003 (if you don't take into account the old version of the BGB!)

 

     The OLG committee, however, claims that the interruption of the (BGB) "limitation period"

     on "06/30/2000" ended, without specifying that the period of limitation was interrupted

     of primary legal protection (in January 2000) ended, and thereafter the 3 year limitation period

     of the BGB old version has started to run (as already confirmed; see above).

    

   The new OLG committee (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel/Skibbe) supports the massive fraud with the

   above Understood

 

     The offense is thus completed and the offense is revealed in the OLG-PKH decision on August 30,

     2017 ( Ms. Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser) also in page 6, paragraph 3, in point d) where it states that the

     limitation period of 3 years according to BGB old version Section 211 occurred on "June 30, 2000

     at the latest on July 31, 2006".

 

     That, neither on "6/30/2000" nor on "7/31/2006" does the 3 year (BGB) limitation period (the

     February 2000 started to run!) Ended on "30.6.2000" is only the result of the planned /

     executed "trial fraud of women". The same can be said for Ms. Barbian & Co

 

The trio (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) intentionally avoided (at the most important point) to

       write that the 3-year limitation period according to the German Civil Code (BGB) began to run in  

       February 2000.

 

       By suppressing and then using the word "limitation period interruption" (from

       the primary legal protection !!) the trio misled the reader, and thus the wrong result

       reached i.e. that the 3 year (BGB) limitation period on June 30th, 2000 (!?), or at the latest (!?) on

       July 31, 2006 would have expired.

       The same reproach can be said for the new committee Ms. Barbian / Skibbe & Co

     In addition, the committee (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser), both in resolution 30.8.2017 and

     also in the whole OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 (Ms. Stein / Ms. Glaeser / Ms. Kirschner) on

     Az 18 U 69/16 not credibly explains how the date 7/31/2006 results.

         It is undoubtedly a criminal offense.

 

     The 3d paragr. , Page 6, point d, of the OLG-PKH decision of August 30, 2017, and in page 23,

     line 1, 29-page version of the judgment, ends with an enigmatic date "7/31/2006"

     the arbitrariness of the committee and the "fraudulent proceedings" proves what the committee

     does in each case enforce the absurd "statute of limitations".

     The same reproach can be made for Ms. Barbian & Co

     According to the StGB, this is punishable by imprisonment for more than 5 years.

       This is no trivial matter.

 

   The date "7/31/2006", which fell with the parachute of Ms. Glaeser, will serve the committee

     later for other criminal conclusions and "the fraud is served in favour of the plaintiff"

     The ladies (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) stand obviously above the laws and

     can extend or shorten the statutory monthly period arbitrarily as desired.

 

C3. The distortion of the facts committed in page 7 of the PKH decision of August 30, 2017

       serves the o.g. Panel , i.e. enforce the statute of limitations for claims for damages and

       to "cap" the crimes of FA-Mettmann (BANK SEIZURES)

 

     In the entire OLG-PKH decision of August 30, 2017 Az 18 U 69/16 signed (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr /

     Ms. Glaeser) and in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 (i.e. regarding both versions), and in

     the OLG decision 16.9.2019, Az 18 W 26/19, nowhere a word written about the complaint /

   reminder that has been raised, is that the bank seizures from 1986-1989 have not yet been lifted,

   although three-Head of department at FA-Mettmann had applied twice for cancellation.

     The head of the swamp was against it. Were the bank seizures and the corresponding case law

         of the BGH (shown here below) not relevant for the process fraudsters ???

 

           "As long as the damaging intervention lasts, the statute of limitations cannot start

                 the BGH decided (which still applies today) ".

 

      If the trio with the 2 offenders (from earlier proceedings, Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser)

      had reported o.g. facts in the initial report of facts, then the PKH applied for (08/30/2017 and

     16.9.2019) and on 18.10.2017 in the judgment on 18 U 69/16 (signed Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner)

     would have agreed to the compensation.

     The new OLG committee Ms. Barbian & Co is silent about this point.

     So they wanted to enforce the "appointed statute of limitations" in any case, so the bank

     seizures and the application of the 3 department heads kept silent and thus the facts

   distorted / manipulated as they were comfortable. This is also punishable by § 339 StGB.

               is the suppression of evidence on the part of OLG judges not perversion of justice?

 

  1. Some things about the case of Ms. Glaeser

 

  1. She is in the OLG-18. Civil Senate entered around March 2015, and signed the Decision,

       in which the committee (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) the criminal "process fraud"

       committed.

     She proves which criminal instincts Fr. Glaeser possessed / owns in the resolutions of 3.9.2015

     to OLG-Az 18 W 1/13 and 18 W 44/14.

 

The following facts are noticeable in this decision of September 3, 2015, Az 18 W 1/13:

 

  1. all events that took place in the period 2000-2003 and for the question of the statute of limitations

             were relevant, are kept secret by the committee (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger); e.g. about

  1. Connection in March 2001 u. Separation in November 2001 of the 2 proceedings 2b o 118/99 and

             2b o 271/01,

III. or about the secret motions of March 2000 from Ms. Tannert / Ms. Fuhr to the AG meal

  1. or via the AG-Essen resolution on 2.1.2002, rejection by the supervisor with reservation of

           consent

  1. or about the final clarification of the plaintiff's litigation capability on January 23, 2003,
  2. or about the decision to take evidence of November 28, 2000 (Tannert / Fuhr / Schumacher)

           which was not issued until 11/29/2001 is cancelled by another chamber occupation.

VII. or on the exclusion of Ms. Fuhr (according to § 41 No. 6 ZPO or according to § 48 ZPO)

             in further decisions requests to Az 2b o 271/01 to participate

VIII. or about the illegality of the composition of the LG bodies (e.g. 04/04/2003, 11/05/2005,

           March 16, 2011)

  1. or about the consequences of the statute of limitations of the requests for bias against the LG

          judges (December 18th, 2002 Stockschlaeder-Nöll, May 5th, 2003 against Strupp-Müller,

           September 21st, 2010 against Ms. Hoffmann)

  1. or about the consequences of the fraudulent proceedings on August 9, 2007 and September 18,

          2007 by Strupp-Müller /Engelkamp-Neeser / Galle and the litigation fraud of August 29, 2007

         of the cost officer (Mr. Habich)

  1. or about the repayments of the FA-Mettmann to the plaintiff in the years 1999-2000-2001-

    (The repayment after the COMPARISON 15.12.2006 is valued differently by the LG / OLG !!)

 

Likewise, not a word is written in the comment section about the effects of bank seizures, although

the OLG ruling on September 3, 2015 (on immediate complaint against LG rulings with PKH rejection)

counts on page 5, line 7 from below, the "unlawful seizures" mentioned will;

 

There is no word in any LG / OLG decision or LG / OLG judgment about the applications

of the three department heads of the FA-Mettmann to lift the bank seizures altogether.

Suppression of essential evidence is a criminal offense that must be punished.

 

Also in the OLG decision 3.9.2015 (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) it is argued that the claimant's

claims for damages "were statute barred on July 31, 2006" (page 9, line 7 counted from above),

because the "lawsuit "was only delivered in September 2010 and the full payment of the court fees

in December 2006 could no longer change the statute of limitations that had already occurred.

 

                          The aim of the OLG group (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) is obvious:

                Statute of limitations before full court fee payment takes effect in Dec. 2006

 

In order to get to the absurd result, the above mentioned Body arbitrarily manipulated / supplemented

the legal texts of the BGB old version (e.g. § 209) with 6 months supplement / extension of the period

of limitation interruption after delivery of the last FG judgment

(see page 6, paragraph 2, line 10 counted from above, or page 7, line 3 counted from above).

 

The arbitrary change / manipulation of the text of the law is a serious criminal offense

which is punished with at least 5 years imprisonment according to the StGB.

 

After the above-mentioned OLG decision of 3.9.2015 signed Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger followed

on September 22nd, 2015 vehement hearing complaint and (approx. September 22nd, 2015) the

chairman Malsch is relieved of his position and sent into retirement. Mr. Anger was removed from

the 18th Senate around the end of the year, while Ms. Glaeser stayed with the 18th Senate and

committed further crimes.

To avoid repetition, see hearing notice on September 22, 2015 on Az 18 W 1/13 and supplements.

 

19th

Legal differences between the two OLG committees with the participation of Ms. Glaeser

(on 3.9.15 and 30.8.2017)

 

Below are some noticeable legal differences between the two OLG bodies on September 3, 2015

(Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) on Az 18 W 1/13 and 8/30/2017 (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser)

to Az 18 U 69/16 shown (which also reveal the contribution of Ms. Stein to "litigation fraud").

 

In the decision of September 3, 2015 (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) it is stated that the

brief submitted on February 5, 2001 by a "lawsuit" or "petitions" (7) is reported seven times,

e.g.

> Page 2, line 10 counted from the bottom, about "Claims dated December 29, 2001";

> Page 2, lines 5-4 counted from the bottom, about "Claim 1 revised on August 13, 2004";

                             NB: the "claim 1" was filed with the claim of 5 February 2001;

> Page 3, line 20 counted from above "the lawsuit (pleadings of 5.2.2001 and 13.8.2004)

                           was delivered on September 13, 2010 ";

> Page 3, line 24 counted from above "The lawsuit dismissed"

                         (From which date the complaint is not specified !!), that is, the one from 5.2.2001 !!

> Page 5, line 9 counted from above, "Claim 1";

                             NB: the "claim 1" was filed with the claim of 5 February 2001;

> Page 8, point b) "Claim to II";

> Page 8, point c) "Claim to III"

 

So it is not written about applications in the PKH proceedings, but about "lawsuits" or "complaints".

In this respect, this is consistent with the submissions of the Advocate.

 

In the resolution of August 30, 2017 signed Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser, on the other hand, only speaks

of "service of action" on page 7 and page 9, but otherwise only reports about MOTIONS; the term

"Lawsuit" or "petitions" of the decision of 3 September 2015 is deleted / not used !! Coincidence ??

 

Further serious differences relate to "the complaints drafted on December 29, 2001"

(according to the decision of 3 September 2015, page 2),

while in page 11, line 7 of the OLG decision of 30.8.2017 from a "payment action"

is reported, but the legal consequences of the interruption of the limitation period in both of the above

Decisions (3.9.15 and 30.8.17) withheld. The text in resolution 30.8.2017 is as follows:

 

"... revised application for legal aid received by the court on December 31, 2001

   dropped, u. limited to an action for payment and an application for a supplementary pension ".

 

Well, in the newly drafted complaint of December 29, 2001 of the RA is the alleged PKH application

dropped and filed a lawsuit for payment; on the first page 2 times there was talk of a lawsuit and

on page 2 also 2 reports of a lawsuit.

In addition, this brief (December 29, 2001, which was received by the court on December 31, 2001) was

"made known" to the defendant On December 31, 2001, a claim for payment was received following

OLG confirmation

 

A lawsuit filed before January 1st, 2002 interrupts the statute of limitations.

 

Both, the LG (Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Gundlach) on May 11, 2016, as well as the OLG committees in

the two resolutions (3 September 2015 (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger), and on 30 August 2017

(Ms. Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser) as well as in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 (Ms. Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner)

suppressed, in order to hide the legal consequences of the alleged limitation of claims.

 

The new OLG committee Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe suppressed in the decision 6.10.2020 on

OLG Az 18 W 74/19 (LG 2b o 145/19). Why?  Coincidence ??

 

All of the above LG / OLG bodies claim that the limitation period was not interrupted before 1.1.2002.

This is the "process fraud of all those accused".

It is a "crime" punished with 5 years imprisonment.

 

In the OLG-PKH decision of August 30, 2017, page 6, as well as in the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017,

page 22 (version 29 pages), the manipulation / change of the legal text (§ 209) BGB old version reported that

the 6 month extension of the limitation period "IN THE FAVOUR OF THE CLAIMANT" takes place, during

in the decision of 3.9.2015 (Malsch & Co) the 6-month extension is not commented on page 7.

 

So the women (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) suddenly stand above the law and are allowed to

changed arbitrary the duration of the interruption of the statute of limitations due to the FG judgments

"Extend or shorten in favour of one party", and thus procure procedural advantages or disadvantages

for one party (and the BGH is silent about it !!).

This is punishable under Section 339 of the Criminal Code.

               is the suppression of evidence on the part of OLG judges not perversion of justice?

 

20th

     Another noticeable difference between the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 and the previous

       one LG decisions issued on November 26, 2012 and May 28, 2014, as well as the OLG decision

       3.9.15 the reader finds the date of the end of the limitation period (after taking into account

     of the FG agreement on December 15, 2006, or ignoring the FG agreement of December 15,

     2006).

 

     In the LG decision of November 26, 2012 (Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Jürging / Ms. Brecht) the

     termination of the limitation period according to BGB old version, determined on December 31,

     In the LG decision of May 28, 2014 (Stockschlaeder-Nöll / Ms. Brecht / Ms. Frreitag) the

               termination of the limitation period according to BGB new version on June 30, 2010.

     In the OLG decision of September 3, 2015, the end of the limitation period according to the old

            version of the German Civil Code (BGB) at the July 31, 2006.

     In the OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 (Ms. Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner) the end of the

             limitation period according to BGB new version on June 30th, 2000, at the latest (!?)

           July 31st, 2006.

    

For the OLG committee Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe in the decision 6.10.2020 page 6, let

         such noticeable differences do not recognize errors !!!. Why not ?

    

All of the above Decisions only show that the writers and the panels willfully deliberate the issue

      and falsified the legal situation to come to the conclusion that the claims were statute-barred.

 

In the 1st LG decision (dated November 26, 2012) the statute of limitations according to BGB old

         version, allegedly occurs on December 31, 2009,

         so before the service of the lawsuit, which only took place in September 2010.

In the 2nd LG decision (dated May 28, 2014) the statute of limitations according to BGB new  

         version, allegedly occurs on June 30, 2010,

         i.e. before the service was served in September 2010

In the 3rd OLG decision (of September 3, 2015) the statute of limitations according to BGB old

           version allegedly occurs on July 31, 2006,

           i.e. before the court fees were paid in full in Dec. 2006.

In the 4th OLG decision (of October 18, 2017) the statute of limitations according to BGB new

           version / BGB old version allegedly occurs on June 30th, 2000 (!!!),

          i.e. before the new statute of limitations comes into force (on January 1st, 2002)

 

As you can see, the disagreement of the LG / OLG bodies only concerns the date of the limitation

       period occurs, but the goal is always the same "LIMITATION". And everyone wants to be correct

         and accurate have decided!!! Who should do the above accused of believing what they write?

         The offenses are punished with more than 5 years imprisonment.

               is the suppression of evidence on the part of OLG judges not perversion of justice?

 

21st

         Art. 229 § 6 EGBGB and the endless confusion in the OLG decisions of

         3.9.2015, 30.8.2017, in the OLG judgment of 18.10.2017, and OLG decision of. October 6, 2020

  

         As the opinions of the 4 above OLG committees (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger), (Stein / Fuhr /

         Glaeser), (Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner) and (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) in terms of

         the application of Art. 229 § 6 EGBGB diverge is further evidence that all bodies by means of

         Litigation fraud and erroneous allegations to right the "statute of limitations" of the claims

           try finished.

 

       In the OLG decision of 3 September 2015 (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) on page 7, the

         application is of Art. 229, Paragraph 6, Paragraph 3 of the EGBGB confirmed, but in the

         resolution of 30.8.2017, in point 3, page 8 claims the OLG committee (Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser)

         that Art. 229 § 6 Abs. 4 EGBGB would be correct, and it is on page 24 (version 29 pages) in the

         OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 (Stein / Glaeser /Kirschner) disputed that there is a case

         where Art. 229 § 6 Paragraph 3 applies.

        

     Ms. Glaeser sits on the three committees, who obviously have different opinions

         who signed on September 3, 2015 and October 18, 2017, thinks the least.

       She signs everything that is presented to her so that salaries and pensions are secured.

 

   In page 6 of the OLG decision. v. October 6, 2020, Az 18 W 74/19, signed Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel

  /Ms. Skibbe will generally denied, that the previous OLG bodies have an elementary violation

       of the law committed, but without assessing the facts or without providing concrete evidence.

 

22nd

     Nothing writes about the compensation for pain and suffering, the new OLG committee

   (Ms. Barbian /Roßwinkel / Fr. Skibbe), although the topic belongs to Az 18 W 74/19 (2b o 145/19).

       Both, in resolution 3.9.2015, Az 18 W 1/13 (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) and

       in the decision 30.8.2017, Az 18 W 69/16, (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) and in the

       OLG judgment of October 18, 2017 on Az 18 U 69/16 (Ms. Stein / Ms. Glaeser / Kirschner)

       incorrect allegations that represent criminal offenses and justify elementary legal violations or

       criminal offenses.

       The first instance asserted compensation for pain and suffering was not the subject

       of the proceedings to LG Düsseldorf Az 2b o 268/01 - OLG Düsseldorf Az 18 U 223/11 - like the

       files of 2b o 268/01 Prove. To say the opposite is a deliberate, punishable lie.

 

       The subject of Az 2b o 268/01 were claims from lost profits and

       a claim for damages due to a lost order (AVT).

 

       In addition, in the opinion of the LG Düsseldorf, the claim for compensation for pain and

         suffering was no longer applicable

       so that no decision has been made about it that would have become final.

       . The criminal offense through violation of Art. 103 GG is obvious.

 

       In addition, the committee (Ms. Stein / Ms. Fuhr / Ms. Glaeser) arbitrarily claims on page 10,

       Point a, of the resolution on August 30, 2017, that the compensation claims (which in 30 years

       would be statute-barred !!!) already on July 31, 2006 (!!) in addition, in Az 18 W 26/19

       Page 5, on the committed "process fraud" with the manipulation of the legal text § 209

         BGB old version The reference to litigation fraud is convincing about the intention to harm the

         plaintiff

 

       Almost identical to the above, the reader will also find this topic in the OLG judgment on

         October 18, 2017,Az 18 U 69/16, in page 27 (version 29 pages), to which reference is made,

       with which the continuation of litigation fraud is proven and the resumption of 2b o 271/01 is

       justified.

23

   The new committee (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) will not discuss the statutory pension

   In the decision of October 6, 2020, nothing was written on Az 18 W 74/19 (2b o 145/19); only on

   page 7 of the above it is generally alleged that there is a "suppression" of evidence and

     infringement, merely alleged by the plaintiff. It is referred to the brief on August 19, 2019

     (2b o 145/19) with the 16 Pages and also on the additional evidence (in the FG letter of November

   12, 1999 signed Stuffer) referred; The above FG letter is dated 11/12/1999 before the FG judgment

   of 11/24/1999. In this respect, no statute of limitations should have occurred.

  

   The facts are set out below that have not been considered by any LG / OLG committee.

    

   In the OLG decision of 3.9.2015 Az 18 W 1/13, the allegedly missing need for legal protection

     brought up by the plaintiff as an argument; also in the OLG decision 30.8.2017 page 11, and

     afterwards Mentioned in OLG judgment October 18, 2017, page 27, point 6 (version 29 pages)

 

     Regarding the claimant's pension entitlement, the OLG committee (Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger) 

                     in his decision of September 3, 2015 on page 8 writes:

 

                 “The complaint is unfounded for the reasons given by the LG.

The claim lacks the need for legal protection, since it is the subject of proceedings 2b O 118/99 -

                 in varying amounts but unchanged in terms of reason. "

 

   It is undisputed that in the claims of the action of August 13, 2004 to

   File number 2b o 118/99 no pension claims have been asserted,

     as the files of Az 2b o 118/99 prove.

   To assert the opposite is a punishable deliberate lie that justifies the crime.

 

             The plaintiff waived the application for a supplementary pension

             on the grounds in the application of June 21, 1999.

 

On the other hand, the need for legal protection for a statutory pension remains,

because the decisions on the PKH applications have not grown into material legal force.

 

This means that the claimant (without loss of rights) can submit pension applications

(for statutory or supplementary pension) and can justify them anew each time.

 

The pension application for Az 2b o 271/01 is for the first time a detailed pension calculation

- by his pension advisor. This calculation has never been objected to (cf. brief on Az 2b o 271/01

of July 12, 2012, page 118 ff.).

 

Further legal violations on the part of the OLG committee Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger are in the

Appeal from 08/18/2016 and is referred to in order to avoid redundancy.

 

24.

 

Alleged limitation on June 30th, 2000 at the latest on July 31st, 2006 !! ??

(OLG judgment October 18, 2017 signed Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner, page 23, version with 29 pages;

OLG-PKH negative decision of August 30, 2017 (signed Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser) page 6, point d);

 

   How can a statute of limitations suddenly occur "at the latest" on July 31, 2006, neither

       Ms. Glaeser has explained in the resolution on Az 18 W 1/13 on September 3, 2015

     (signed Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger), yet the process fraudsters Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner

   in the judgment 18.10.2017 on Az 18 U 69/16 set out. Also in the OLG-PKH negative decision

     signed Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser of August 30, 2017, Page 6, point d) has not been clarified how

     the statute of limitations suddenly occurred on July 31, 2006 !?

     About it i.e. an explanation for the alleged statute of limitations at the latest 31.7.2006 also

       provides not the rapporteur here.

     What kind of result is that with the parachute of Ms. Glaeser suddenly falls down ???

     The alleged errors of the rapporteur in decision 6.10.2020, page 5, Az 18 W 74/19 are

     here unforgivable and reveal the intent of the process fraudsters Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser /

     Kirschner, to spare from further criminal consequences.

     With the removal of the above Process fraudsters (Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser / Kirschner) from the

     OLG-18.Civil Senate, but are they not yet punished under criminal law, i.d.S. they are not out of

     justice yet dismiss; That could still come.

 

25th

Section 209 of the old version of the German Civil Code (BGB), i.e. valid for the period up to the filing

of the official liability suit on February 5, 2001 does not provide for an extension of the limitation period

of 6 months. The new OLG committee claims the opposite in the sense of the process fraudsters.

That happens when you don't want to look.

 

         The manipulation to supplement the legal text (§ 209 BGB old version) originally has that

         Committee Malsch / Ms. Glaeser / Anger on September 3, 2015 for Az 18 W 1/13

           for the period of limitation ordered to reach;

 

     That cost Malsch the job. Now comes the time of Mrs. Glaeser, the justice to leave.

       The rapporteur here on Az 18 W 74/19 also does not explain where the 6 months

       extention (in favour of the plaintiff !!!) of § 209 a.F. come?

 

       So litigation fraud in favour of the plaintiff?

 

     Why does a new start of the BGB statute of limitations of 3 years only start on July 1st, 2000

       and not after End of the statute of limitations for primary legal protection (the FG actions)

         i.e. not until 1.2.2000?

     There is also no context that could explain that "end of 2005" means the end of January 2005

       is meant; the hodgepodge in p. 5 u. 6 of the decision of October 6, 2020 is therefore rejected.

 

26th

For the application according to § 78b ZPO for the appointment of an EMERGENCY Advocate,

the OLG committee (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) on page 8 of the resolution of October 6, 2020,

writes only 9 words (including articles of nouns) to reject (the request).

                     "The prerequisites are allegedly not available".

The three-line paragraph on page 8 of the contested resolution for rejecting an emergency advocate

reveals the panel's fear of looking an emergency attorney in the eye.

However, the reader does not find out which requirements are missing.

The conditions mentioned by law and supplemented by the BGH are in the view of the plaintiff

fully fulfilled. In the absence of a specific indication of what is missing, the OLG decision must

October 6, 2020, next to all other contested resolutions are repealed

 

27.

Finally, the OLG committee remembers to explain on page 8 why the brief was August 19, 2019

has not been sent to the representative of the defendant country. The rejection of the delivery of the PKH

application, although according to the ZPO (to inhibit the statute of limitations) should have been made,

reveals the already decided overall rejection, so that the judiciary does not again pollute with the dirt made

by the judges and therefore does not have to be employed.

 

Epilogue

  

The new committee of the OLG-18th Senate (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) has with the lawsuit /

PKH More than 40 pieces of evidence received from August 19, 2019 to substantiate the fraud committed

by the LG / OLG judges to Az 18 U 69/16, 18 W 1/13, 2b o 271/01, and nevertheless it speaks in the decision

6.10.2020. Everything is so general and blanket that it could be applied to any other negative decision.

 

The panel tried just as many suppressions of facts or evidence, several circumnavigations, as well as many

confusions of facts with incorrect law no, in order to spare the fraudsters from further criminal consequences.

 

28.

             The § 321a ZPO and summary

 

The rejection on the part of the OLG-D'dorf of the statute of limitations information from the plaintiff for

the delivery of the PKH / lawsuit from August 19, 2019, Az 2b o 145/19, to the defendant's representative

constitutes a serious violation of the right to be heard.

 

The complaint to be heard according to § 321a ZPO must be communicated to the other side and given

the opportunity to comment. (Zöller, ZPO § 321a RNr 15, edition 2018)

 

The new OLG committee (Ms. Barbian / Roßwinkel / Ms. Skibbe) has the right to hear the plaintiff

the evident misconduct of the facts seriously violated, as demonstrated here above

 

The OLG committee made a blatantly wrong decision in view of the large number of legal violations

reported (litigation fraud).

 

In addition, numerous offers of evidence (and evidence) for the fraudulent proceedings of the LG /

OLG judges were overlooked both in the appeal (OLG-D'dorf Az 18 U 69/16) and in proceedings 2b o 145/19.

 

The party arguments are largely ignored;

this means a significant violation of the right to be heard.

 

What is essential, however, is the fact that, without the legal infractions of the accused OLG judges,

the original process (2b o 271/01) and the underlying proceedings

(2b o 145/19) guaranteed complete success.

 

The simplifications mentioned in the BGH decision (NJW 2016, 2690) due to the obvious significance

of the hearing injuries have not been taken into account by the new body.

 

The court will be informed that the proceedings will be resumed soon (18 U 69/16) or

of procedure 2b o 145/19.

 

Best regards

 

 

 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

Last modified on Monday, 26 October 2020 16:01

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

Laddringsweg 15

45219 Essen-Kettwig

Dec. 05, 2019

 

in advance by fax 0211-4971-548

Court of Appeal Düsseldorf

18.Zivilsenat

Mrs. Stein personally

Cecilien avenue 3

40474 Dusseldorf

 

Re: Info to Mrs. Stein that she leads in the applicant's website the list of "Offenders in Judge's Garb"

       : Recommendation to disappear from the plaintiff's horizon

 

Mrs. Martina Stein,

 

You took over the chairmanship of the 18th Civil Senate of the court of appeal-Düsseldorf in Sept. 2015,

shortly after your predecessor, Volker Malsch, due to severe legal inflection on 3 September 2015 and

with the shame of trial fraud (e.g. manipulation of legal texts e.g. § 209 BGB a.F.) to

Az 18 W 1/13 (and 18 W 44/14) dismissed from his position and sent into retirement.

 

Amazing at your first appearance was that you the 2 assistants (Mrs. Glaeser and Mr. Anger) to above

mentioned Process fraud by Volker Malsch on 3.9.2015 to Az 18 W 1/13, accepted in your team and kept,

although this you would have to decline and initiate a new right-faithful course. The expectations have

unfortunately been disappointed.

 

Surprisingly, it was that you had been happy to welcome that Mrs. Fuhr from 1.1.2017 in the

18th Senate (to strengthen the process fraudster Mrs. Glaeser) will be active. That was a warning sign.

What is subsequently signed by you and the other offenders proves that you deliberately and knowingly

endorsed the already long - planned and from the 2b Civil Chamber of the regional court of

Düsseldorf last with no-remedy decision to Az 2b o 271/01 on 7/7/2014 ordered process fraud (with reason,

the "statute of limitations" of the damage claims of the engineer & inventor), co-designed and supported.

(see resolution of 30.8.2017 signed Mrs. Stein / Mrs. Fuhr / Mrs. Glaeser,

and judgment on Az 18 U 69/16 dated 18.10.2017 signed Mrs. Stein / Mrs. Glaeser / Mrs. Kirschner).

 

Amazing was that you have rejected my bias applications against the criminals Mrs. Glaeser and Mrs. Fuhr

each time as unfounded or inadmissible, although you knew what Mrs. Glaeser with Mr. Malsch and Mr. Anger

on 3.9.2015 to Az 18 W 1/13 (and 18 W 44/14) for a serious process fraud executed.

The process frauds did not seem important to you.

 

You also knew that against Mrs. Fuhr for infringement of the law (due to circumvention of the EuGVÜ Art. 1 and

the EGBGB Art. 7), as well as undermining of the valid laws in the years 1999-2001 by signing the "Proof of Evidence"

of 28.11.2000, Az 2b o 118/99 (linked to Az 2b o 271/01), at the regional court-Düsseldorf, already 3 processes

(2003, Az 2b o 250/03, 2008, Az 2b o 91/08 and 2012, Az 2b o 23 / 12) were attempted.

 

These failed because Stockschlaeder-Nöll intrigued against it and lacked the plaintiff's liquidity.

 

You have in many resolutions accused me of trying with the bias applications "to exclude uncomfortable judges

from any decision-making" and the applications as right-abusive and therefore as "inadmissible"! discarded.

 

The "uncomfortable judges" were already known as "lawbreakers" and then turned out to be "trial scammers"

and heavy "criminals." Despite the warning (to Mrs. Fuhr on 10.10.2019 Az 18 W 26/19) to refrain from

authoritarian decisions, you have one with the signatures of the two above mentioned Criminals signed.

The statements of the plaintiff into reproach or counter statements, other than of the Court of Appeal (meant

the Panel: Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser) allegedly did not infringe the right to be heard, and therefore never admitted

the appeal on a point of law. That was abuse of judicial powers.

 

At the same time, with the help of the two criminals (Mrs. Fuhr and Mrs. Glaeser), you prepared the next scam

for court of appeal Az 18 U 69/16 and on 30.8.2017 refused my demand for financial aid for the appeal 18 U 69/16

on the grounds, that that the claims for damages (due to the crimes of the tax office of the city Mettmann in the

years 1979 to 2006) were already barred on "30.6.2000".

 

The above mentioned the trial fraud of 30.8.2017 continued in the judgment of 18.10.2017 on Az

18 U 69/16 which was "covered with heavy clouds of smoke"; even the claims for damages of sanity (which

expire in 30 years !!) have been "barred" within half a year, after your judgment (of 18.10.2017).

 

The process fraud to Az 18 U 69/16 has been discovered recently and your co-designing too.

 

You and other judges are now standing as defendants and have to state, who devised the plan to

"attempted murder" of the plaintiff on 16.4.2008, on the A5 motorway, south of Karlsruhe, and who

executed it; who has pulled the criminal Mrs. Fuhr to 18. Civil Senate, as well as those "who ordered"

the process frauds on 30.8.2017 and 18.10.2017.

 

You have conspicuously the written statement of grounds of appeal of 18.8.2016 against the final verdict

of the process fraudsters Mrs. Stockschlaeder-Nöll and Mrs. Gundlach from 11 May 2016 to regional

court Az 2b o 271/01 (which was blocked over 16.5 years) with the many legal violations of the regional

court judges, downgraded, and instead the brief of 22.9.2017 based, where much is presented as

"view of the plaintiff", and for you the meaning of the "hint" was clear.

 

By ignoring the grounds of appeal 18.8.2016 in your judgment 18 U 69/16 dated 18.10.2017, all and important

events of the years 1979-2006, which spoke against the employment of Mrs. Fuhr were deliberately eliminated,

as well as the illegality of the former regional court committees capped and concealed.

 

The alleged process fraud in your judgment of 18.10.17 to Az 18 U 69/16, the many blockades and the

countless violations of law of the regional court judges, you have with your assistants (the two criminals,

Mrs. Fuhr and Mrs. Glaeser) subsequently and on order "covered".

 

In several paragraphs of the 14 page long "Hearings" from 27.9.2019 to Az 18 W 26/19 (regional court-Az

2b o 233/18, because of the useless expenses = NGA for the inventor's activity) the offenses of your team are

described in more detail, and It follows that you, Mrs M. Stein, the right-wing or process frauds to court

of appeal-Az 18 U 69/16 (regional court-Az 2b o 271/01), together with Mrs. Fuhr, and Mrs. Glaeser

deliberately prepared and executed.

 

That's why you kept the 2 criminals (Mrs. Fuhr and Mrs. Glaeser) at the 18th Senate.

    

The evidence for the scam - committed in the court of appeal Düsseldorf decision of 30 Aug. 2017

to Az 18 U 69/16 (signed Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser), which were then adopted in the court of appeal judgment

(signed Stein / Glaeser / Kirschner) of 18.10.2017, are unshakable, i.e. that you have agreed with the by

Mrs. Glaeser and Mr Fuhr proposed the "limitation period" of the claims for damages on "30.6.2000" or

"at the latest on 31.7.2006" and adopted it in the judgment 18.10.2017.

 

The procedural frauds (with the 6 months and the remaining 18 months) in previous court of appeal decisions

(from Mr. Malsch / Mrs. Glaeser /Mr. Anger) concerning Az 2b o 118/99, you have in above mentioned court of

appeal decisions and in court of appeal judgment 18.10.2017 taken over, and so supported with your signature

the continuation of fraud. The abuse of official power had now been criminalized.

 

This was a deliberate attack by INSIDE against the applicable laws.

 

The repeated and signed by you incorrect cost decisions in several opposing court of appeal decisions

(because of the low and lump-sum expenses incurred by the plaintiff or proponent) are not legal errors,

but targeted offenses to harm the plaintiff, even with smaller financial penalties. This is again abuse of official

power.

So in addition to the great damage (caused by process fraud to court of appeal-Az 18 U 69/16 (regional court

Az 2b o 271/01, i.e. all claims for damages of the plaintiff for the crimes committed by the criminal gang of tax 

office-Mettmann offenses as "barred" on "30.6.2000" to explain) you also wanted to impose fines, by imposing

the legal costs. That's sadism.

 

You can avoid the painful dispute with the plaintiff about the preparation and then the execution of the process

frauds on 30.8.2017 and 18.10.2017 to Az 18 U 69/16, if you decide to Renounce on chair by court of appeal-

18.Senate and look elsewhere for a job; My recommendation: so far from the plaintiff's horizon, so that your

signature in proceedings concerning the signer, never appears again.

 

                 The loss of my factory, my family, my patents, my life's work,

                                               you too must answer.

 

This letter also appears on my website (www.sartoros-dr-ing.de,

Category: Court of Appeal Dusseldorf, and ends with the call:

 

 "Mrs M. Stein, you are a process fraudster, disappear from the horizon of the plaintiff "

      

 (Reference to court of appeal-Düsseldorf Resolutions: 3.9.2015, Az 18 W 1/13, Decision of 30.8.2017,

   Az 18 W 25/16;     court of appeal-Düsseldorf judgment of 18.10.2017, Az 18 U 69/16;

    and further court of appeal decisions / regional court on Az 2b o 271/01).

 

Annotation

 

If the above written is not true or does not apply then it is left to you,

by means of an action for injunctive relief (self-financing) to try to persuade the claimant to

Delete entries in its website.  ΟΨΟΜΕΘΑ

     

       Further additions to the website might follow !!

 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

 

NB: The translation is made with the help of Google translator; Errors are not excluded;

         please consult the German original text.

 

 

 

Last modified on Friday, 06 December 2019 13:44

 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

 Laddringsweg 15

 45219 Essen-Kettwig

  Oct. 13, 2019

 

in advance by fax 0211-4971-548

Court of appeal of Düsseldorf

(OLG) 18.Civil-Senate

Mrs. Glaeser personally

Cecilien avenue 3

40474 Dusseldorf

 

Re: Info to Mrs. Glaeser that she is entitled as "Criminal" on the undersigned's website.

     : Call for exhaustion; if she does not dare, she must give the gown back to the judiciary

 

Mrs. Glaeser

You had been appointed rapporteur for the signer's cases since March 2015 (when Volker Malsch

was the chairman of the 18th Civil Senate) and in addition to the committed "process fraud" dated 3.9.2015

to Az 18 W 1/13,also several heavy file-manipulations are done at your time; e.g. the "disappearance from

the file 2b o 271/01 of the order of publication to the defendant of the recast claims filed to the court on

29.12.2001"; Also at your time the "disappearance from the file 2b o 271/01 of the reference of 9.9.2015 the

2b chamber to the advocate Minnerop" happened.

 

What content had the LG reference is not known; but brought in connection with the content of the letter of 14.9.2015

of the advocate St. Minnerop to LG-Az 2b o 271/01 one could already suspect that the 2b chamber

(= Stockschlaeder-Nöllhas turned on an accomplice to defame the plaintiff.

(see answer of the undersigned of 11th Oct. 2015 to St. Minnerop, Az 2b o 271/01)

 

It is also assumed that you have read i.a. the "Hearings" of 27.9.2019 to Az 18 W 26/19 (LG-Düsseldorf

Az 2b o 233/18), concerning the useless expenses for the realization of the patents in connection with

LG-Düsseldorf Az 2b o 271 / 01 and OLG-Az 18 U 69/16).

 

Several pages of the 14 page long "Hearings" detail your crimes, and this leads to the conclusion that you are

entitled to legal inflection or process fraud to OLG-Az 18 U 69/16 (LG-Az 2b o 271/01), and together

with Fr. Fuhr,have deliberately executed.

 

The evidence of your process fraud - committed in the OLG Düsseldorf decision of 30 Aug. 2017 to Az 18 U 69/16

(signed Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser), which were then adopted in the OLG judgment of 18/10/2017, are unshakable,

i.e. that you along with Fr. Fuhr the alleged limitation of the Claims for damages have rediscovered and used

on "30.6.2000" or "at the latest on 31.7.2006";

 

The Process frauds made in previous OLG decisions (by Malsch & Co) concerning Az 2b o 118/99, you have

take over  in above mentioned OLG decisions and OLG judgment of 18.10.2017, and supported by your signature.

That was against the law, an attack from inside.

  

Your process frauds (in the years 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019) in connection with the cap of the crime

of revenue office of city Mettmann in the years 1979 - 2006 against the engineer + inventor, appear

in several Pleadings of the undersigned to the court;

You are rejected as a prejudiced, or as biased OLG judge.

 

On the other hand, the terms used lately (they are not trinkets !!) show how hard their crimes weigh.

Although the law recognizes simple grounds of bias for the refusal of the judge, the signatory goes to

the criminal code and accuses you of being a "criminal", i.e. one step higher, because of "crimes"

in sense of penal code, whereby the sentence  is prescribed with more than 5 years of imprisonment.

 

The monstrous confrontation with the signer about your process frauds can You temporarily avoid it

if you take the job at OLG-18. Senate already left in Nov. 2019;

 

You can reach the transfer by means of an application (maybe with acquaintances) at the OLG-presidium

and thus your signature will never reappear at procedures concerning the signer.

 

The loss of my factory, my family, my patents, you have to answer for.

 

The OLG-Düsseldorf stamp under an authoritarian decision (that you are allegedly unpremeditated),

without concrete debasement of your offenses, and drawn by you, could have consequences like

a boomerang.

 

Whether the employer (NRW) decides on "recourse claims" against you (and against

the other offenders), or "to leave you" is still unclear.

 

The repeated and by you signed erroneous cost decisions in all rejecting OLG decisions are not

legal errors, but targeted offenses to harm the plaintiff even with smaller financial penalties.

So besides the big damage (caused by process fraud to OLG-Az 18 W 1/13 and to OLG-Az 18 U 69/16 i.e.

all claims for damages of the plaintiff for the crimes committed by the criminal gang of revenue office of

city Mettmann as statute barred! to declare) also wear scars to give.

 

Your predecessor (Mrs Baan) had in addition to the file 2b o 271/01 also the file 2b o 118/99 collected on

her desk, and you  these files, which are also used in the judgment 18 U 69/16 of 18/10/17 , accepted.

 

In it you should have seen that the 2b Chamber had already adopted decisions on both Cases

2b o 271/01 and on Cases 2b o 118/99, and the consideration of Financial tribunal Procedure Az

4 K 3384/01 and of the "Agreement", which it was adopted on 15.12. 2006, has specifically

mentioned for the start of the 3-year limitation period, as of 1.1.2007.

 

The above facts are from you and then by the other women (Stein / Fuhr / Kirschner) on 30.8.2017 (PKH

rejection for the appeal) and on 18.10.2017 to OLG Az 18 U 69/16 (alleged limitation of all claims for damages

on 30.6 .2000) has been suppressedThat was process fraud.

 

       This letter also appears on my website (www.sartoros-dr-ing.de,

        Category Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf) with the request:

 

      "Mrs Glaeser disappear from the horizon of the plaintiff, you are a criminal".

      

        (Reference to OLG-Düsseldorf Resolutions: 3.9.2015, 30.8.2017 and OLG judgment of 18.10.2017

           Az 18 U 69/16).

     

        Further additions to the website might follow !!

LG = regional tribunal of Düsseldorf

OLG = court of appeal of Düsseldorf 

PKH= Demand of plaintiff for official financial aid to pay the tribunal fee 

Last modified on Sunday, 13 October 2019 19:23

                                            The chalenge to Mrs Fuhr, judge of Court of Appeal of Düsseldorf 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

Laddringsweg 15

45219 Essen-Kettwig

October 10, 2019

 

in advance by fax 0211-4971-548

Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf

18.Zivilsenat

Mrs. Fuhr personally

Cecilien avenue 3

40474 Dusseldorf

 

Re: Information to Mrs. Fuhr, that in the website of the undersigned, she is titled as "Criminal".

     : Summoning for invalidation; if she does not dare, she must give the gown back to the judiciary

 

Mrs. Fuhr

 

it is assumed that you will hear the same from censure dated 27.9.2019 to Az 18 W 26/19 (LG-Düsseldorf

Az 2b o 233/18, Procedure concerning useless expenses for the realization Patents

in connection with LG-Düsseldorf Az 2b o 271/01 and OLG-Az 18 U 69/16).

 

In several pages of the 14-page long list of censure, your crimes are described in detail,

and this leads to the conclusion that, you have made deliberately the legal infractions or

the process frauds to OLG-Az 18 U 69/16 (LG-Az 2b o 271/01), together with Mrs. Glaeser.

 

The evidence for your crimes - committed in the OLG Düsseldorf decision of 30 Aug. 2017

to Az 18 U 69/16 (signed Stein / Fuhr / Glaeser), which were then adopted in the OLG judgment

of 18/10/2017, are unshakable, i.e. that you with Mrs. Glaeser invented the alleged limitation

of the claims for damages on "30.6.2000" or "at the latest on 31.7.2006" and

supported it with your signature. That was against the law, an attack from inside.

 

Your process fraud (in the years 2000, 2001, 2017, 2018, 2019) in connection with the covering

of the crimes of the Revenue Office of city Mettmann in the years 1979 - 2006 against the

engineer & inventor, appear in several pleadings of the undersigned to the court; in it you are

as biased or rejected as a biased judge of the OLG.

 

An official liability action of 13.11.2003 and a declaratory action in 2008 still burden

on you. The terms used ultimately show how hard your process fraud weigh.

 

Although the law recognizes simple grounds of bias for the refusal of the judge,

the signatory goes accordingly to the criminal code and accuses you of being a "criminal",

i.e. one step higher, because of "crimes" in sense of penal law, whereby the sentence is

prescribed with more than 5 years of imprisonment.

 

The monstrous confrontation with the signer about your process frauds can you temporarily

avoid it, when you abandon the job at OLG-18. Senate latest in Nov. 2019;

You can reach the transfer by means of an application (maybe with acquaintances) at the OLG-presidium

and thus your signature will never reappear at procedures concerning the signer.

 

The loss of my factory, my family, my patents, you have to answer for.

 

The OLG Düsseldorf stamp below an authoritarian decision (that you are allegedly not biased),

without concrete invalidation of your criminal decisions and drawn by you, could have

consequences like a boomerang.

 

Whether the employer (NRW) decides on recourse claims against you (and against

the other offenders), or to suspend you, is still unclear.

 

This letter also appears on my website (www.sartoros-dr-ing.de,

Category Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf) with the request:

 

      "Mrs Fuhr, bring yourself off the plaintiff's horizon, you are a criminal".

 

(Reference to OLG-Düsseldorf decision 30.8.2017 and OLG judgment of 18.10.2017 Az 18 U 69/16)

 

Dr. Th. Sartoros

Last modified on Thursday, 10 October 2019 19:02

 

The following translation from German to english is made from Google-translation-programm

There is possible that exist errors of translation. The original on German Language is authentical

and has priority. Please contact Dr. Sartoros if you find errors.

 

I-18 U 69/16                                                                                   announced on 18.10.2017

 2b o 271/01

LG Düsseldorf

                                                     OBERLANDESGERICHT DÜSSELDORF

                                                          IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE

                                                                      JUDGMENT

 

In the litigation

 

of Dr. Ing. Theodore Sartoros, Laddringsweg 15, 45219 Essen,

 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

 

Represented by: Advocats-office .........

 

against

 

the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, legally represented by the Minister of Finance of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, this represented by the supervision of revenue offices North Rhine-Westphalia, this represented by the President of the supervision of tax offices, Department

 

Cologne, Riehler Platz 2, 50668 Köln, country complained and appealed,

Procurator: | ........ Lawyers Partnership mbB

 

the 18th Civil Senate of the Court of appeal Düsseldorf has the oral proceedings from the  

by the chairwoman judge at the Court of appeal Düsseldorf Mrs Stein, the judge at the Court of appeal Düsseldorf Mrs. Glaeser and the judge at the Court of appeal Düsseldorf Mrs Kirschner

 

recognized for right:

 

The Appellant's Appeal Against the Judgment of the 2b Civil Division of the Land

Düsseldorf of 11.05.2016 (2b O 271/01) is hereby approved as rejected

that the judgment of default of the chamber of 16.03.2011 (not 26.03.2011)

is maintained.

 

The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

 

This and the judgment under appeal are provisionally enforceable.

 

The plaintiff remains free to avert the enforcement of both judgments against security in the amount of 110% of the enforceable amounts, unless the defendant country provides security before enforcement 110% of the amount to be enforced.

 

The revision is not permitted.

 

                                                       REASONS

 

                                                             I.

 

The plaintiff seeks from the defendant country by way of official liability it means . Damages and compensation due to incorrect tax determination in the period 1979 to 1988 as a result of an external audit of the tax office Mettmann in 1984 and subsequent foreclosure measures. The plaintiff therefore led first long-standing proceedings before the Fiscal tribunal of Düsseldorf, on the one hand directed to change et al the income tax assessment and on the other hand on reinbursement of paid or collected taxes etc. The plaintiff therefore means that his professional and entrepreneurial existence has been destroyed; et al he had escaped subsidies from the Greek state and made his investments in Greece worthless. The defendant country considered the plaintiff's submission to be unsubstantiated, denying it in any case and raising the plea of ​​limitation. Because of the details, reference is made in accordance with § 540 (1) no. 1 ZPO to the actual fixed ascertainments of the district court ruling, insofar as they do not deviate from the following description of the course of the proceedings.

 

1.

 

As early as 1999, the plaintiff applied to the district court of Düsseldorf for an official liability action under reference 2b O 118/99 legal aid. In those proceedings, the district court of Düsseldorf suggested at the Essen district court the initiation of a supervision procedure and ordered the review of the plaintiff's legal capacity. The district court of Essen rejected the establishment of a care; the decision-making process was later withdrawn by the Chamber.

In the following years, this action by the Chamber was repeatedly the reason for the

complaint of bias by the judges involved in the proceedings.

 

2.

 

By written statement of 05.02.2001, the then authorized representative of the plaintiff,

lawyer dr. Plotzgen, Legal aid for an official liability claim filed on the same day in court and referred to the attached motion for a statement of claim of the same date in support of the application; it should be applied for, the country to pay 5,274,315 DM and to pay a reasonable compensation

 

• At least DM 100,000 - to be ordered to pay an application (application 1.) and further (application 2) that the country is obliged to compensate the plaintiff for all material damage resulting from the taxpayers' illegal income and value added tax Düsseldorf-Mettmann from March 1986 and the

 

   4.8.1986 and 08.08.1986 and 29.09.1989 attached seizures of the Sparkasse Ratingen, the

         Sparkasse Düsseldorf and the Düsseldorf branch of the Greek National Bank

          would still arise in the future.

 

These pleadings were first taken by the district Court to Act 2b O 118/99; Following the

appeal of the applicant, a separation was made in November 2001 and the application is

now filed under the reference number 2b O 271/01.

 

3.

 

In a lawyer's brief of December 29, 2001 (BI 156 GA), the plaintiff announced in view of

the imminent introduction of the euro with regard to the payment request, now a conviction

for the payment of 4,591,827.00 EUR and the payment of a reasonable compensation of at

least 50,000 EUR. The district court rejected the requested grant of legal aid from

05.02.2001 - taking into account the written statement of 29.12.2001 - by order of 04.04.2003 (BI 206 GA). The district court did not remedy the immediate appeal.

The Senate rejected the immediate appeal on July 23, 2004 (Ref .: I-18 W 22/03, BI 254

et seq. GA) as unfounded. Further objections were rejected by order of 12.07.2005

(BI 385 GA), because the plaintiff could not achieve the continuation of an already completed procedure by presenting new facts. A further application for annulment dated 20.01.2007 concerning the Senate resolution of 23.07.2004 was rejected by the Senate in the context

of the resolution of 04.07.2007 (BI 438 GA).

 

With a lawyer's written statement of 13.08.2004, the plaintiff again amended the claim

to be filed with regard to the claim for damages and reduced his claim for payment to EUR 1,788,180.46 in addition to the further asserted compensation of EUR 50,000. The plaintiff applied for legal aid for this claim by a separate letter of 09.09.2005 (BI. 415 GA), pointing out that he was not able to pay additional legal costs in the shadow of the public. The application was rejected by the Regional Court by order of 09.08.2007 (BI 472 GA). The regional court did not remedy the immediate appeal against this by resolution dated 18.09.2007 (BI 493 GA).

The Senate rejected the immediate appeal (I-18 W 46/07) by order of 11.03.2008 (BI 540 GA).

 

By further letter dated 14.12.2009, the plaintiff personally announced further or new applications (from BI 779 GA). The Regional Court interpreted the pleading as a renewed request for legal aid and, by order of 12.07.2010 (BI 801 GA), dismissed the application

and did not remedy the immediate appeal against it by order of 03.09.2010 (BI 825 GA).

The Senate rejected the immediate appeal (Ref .: I-18 W 76/10) by decision of 07.12.2010

(BI 843 GA).

 

4.

 

According to the payment adverts included in court tape I, since 12 August 2004 the plaintiff

has commenced to pay in installments the court costs advance required for service of the claim. He has initially total 1,500 EUR and then 17 installments of 150 EUR by 03.01.2006, in total so 4,050 EUR. His then proxy had pointed to the plaintiff's statement of 13.08.2004 (PI 317 et seq.) and at the same time requested that the service should not be served on payment of the full procedural fee § 14 No. 3 lit. b) to make GKG dependent. A further justification of the application according to § 14 GKG announced in this connection did not take place. By order of 11.05.2005 (BI 336 et seq. GA), the regional court rejected the application for service of the application without paying a sufficient advance on costs because the intended prosecution was hopeless. On the other hand, the plaintiff personally filed a complaint; it was rejected as inadmissible by Senate decision of 20.03.2006 (I-18 W 23/05) because the plaintiff was not represented by a lawyer.

 

Although the plaintiff had informed the court by letter of 15.04.2006 (BI 406 GA) that he had discontinued installment payments since January 2006 and did not take up until the decision on his legal costs request of 10.09.2005 (meant 09.09.2005) As of 13.09.2006, further advance payments for the advance on costs were received by the third party in favor of the plaintiff. On 27.12.2006 a further 17.150,00 EUR were added, in total 21.200,00 EUR. On December 9, 2008, another payment of 1,000.00 EUR was made. By order of the Civil Service of 14 January 2009 (BI 629 GA) it was ordered to inform the plaintiff's authorized representative that the advance payment was expected to amount to EUR 28,090.04, the amount of the claim being based on the first draft of 05.02.2001. On 13.08.2010 (BI 816 GA) the amount in dispute was provisionally set by the Chamber at EUR 1,838,180.46.

 

Finally, the claim - consisting of the pleadings of 05.02.2001 and 13.08.2004 - according to order of 03.09.2010 the defendant country on 13.09.2010 (BI 849 GA) was delivered. The date for the oral hearing was first determined on the 19.01.2011 and after application for transfer on the 16.03.2011. On that date, the duly invited plaintiff was not represented by a lawyer, which is why, at the request of the defendant's representative on 16.03.2011,

a default judgment was issued against the plaintiff and the claim dismissed.

On the other hand, the new representative of the plaintiff filed a timely appeal (BI 1076 GA).

 

5.

 

By letter of 14.06.2011, the plaintiff personally (BI. 1076] GA) has another legal aid application for a payment claim in the amount of EUR 1,779,197.00 plus interest, a monthly pension payment of EUR 3,321.00 since July 1, 2006 plus interest and payment of the compensation

in the amount of EUR 90,000.00 plus interest. The district court decided on this application by decision of 22.03.2012 (BI 1187 GA). The plaintiff's immediate appeal of 05.04.2012 (BI 1175 GA) was not remedied by order of 12.04.2012 (BI 1182 GA) because the claim for payment was still undecided and the pension claim lacked the need for legal protection because the (unsubstantiated) application had already been made in case 2b O 118/99. The Chamber had already commented on the compensation for pain and suffering in the decisions of

12.10.2011 and 23.11.2011 in the (further) procedure 2b O 268/01.

 

The Senate rejected this immediate appeal by order of 16.05.2012 (I-18 W 33/12,

BI. 1186 GA).

The hearing received by fax on 25.05.2012 and dated on 26.05.2012 - see p. 84 f.

of the legal aid book I - was unsuccessful (see Bl 1190 GA).

 

With further personal letter of 10.04.2012 (BI 1170 GA), the plaintiff has submitted a

 

supplementary legal aid application for compensation of lost profit in the amount of

 

€ 768,496.46 and the payment of a further compensation of € 20,000.

 

The Regional Court rejected this request by a resolution of 12 April 2012

 

(BI 1183 GA) and ruled on the non-remedy by order of 02.05.2012 (BI 67 f of the

 

legal aid book I).

 

 

 

The Senate had decided on this immediate appeal by order of 16.05.2012 (I-18 W 38/12,

 

Bl. 1188 GA) and rejected it.

 

On the other hand, the hearing, which had already been faxed to the court on 25 May 2012

 

and dated 27.05.2012 (BI 90 f of the legal aid book I), was unsuccessful (BI 1192 GA).

 

 

By a memorandum of 12.07.2012 (BI 1228 GA) of the new representative, Lasaroff,

 

applications for payment of:

 

1. EUR 1.779.197,00 and interest on subsidy losses, 2. a monthly pension of EUR 796,88

 

have since been submitted 01.07.2006 as well as 3. a compensation of at least 50.000,00 EUR

 

announced.

 

The plaintiff personally applied for legal aid for these applications by letter of July 16, 2012 in

 

accordance with a brief of July 12, 2012 (BI 1209 GA).

 

In addition, he has provided legal aid for his claim for payment of further damages for useless

 

expenses in the amount of € 796,599.08 as well as the request to estimate a minimum

 

damage.

 

The Regional Court rejected this legal aid request of 16.07.2012 by resolution of 28.11.2012

 

(BI 1374 GA) and did not remedy the immediate appeal of 10.12.2012 (BI 1411 GA) by order

 

of 19.12.2012 (BI 1416 GA). The Senate ruled on this immediate complaint in Case I-18 W

 

1/13 on 03.09.2015 and stated that the claims asserted by the plaintiff were time-barred.

 

 

By legal notice dated 14.12.2012, the plaintiff filed a further exemption petition for future

 

damage of a material and intangible nature (BI 1396 GA);

 

 

with further legal written statement of 28.08.2013 (BI 1482 GA), a lawsuit extension with

 

respect to a total amount of EUR 786,104.31 was announced as reimbursement of expenses

 

consisting of 29 individual positions.

 

 

The plaintiff himself has again requested personal legal aid in a letter dated 02.09.2013

 

(BI. 1481 GA) for the application announced by a lawyer's brief of 28.08.2013.

 

The Regional Court rejected this request by a resolution of 28.05.2014 (BI 1729 GA)

 

and did not remedy the immediate appeal of 04.07.2014 (BI 1753 GA) by order of

 

07.07.2014 (BI 1764 GA).

 

The Senate also ruled on this immediate complaint on 03.09.2015 (Ref .: I-18 W

 

44/14) with reference to its statements in the decision on I-18 W 1/13 (see BI 1821 GA).

 

 

The plaintiff has submitted a hearing against these decisions dated September 3, 2015,

 

with further letters of 14 September 2016 (BI 1858 GA), 16.09.2015 (BI 1875 GA) and

 

22.09.2015 (BI 1879 GA).

 

By decisions of the Senate of 05.04.2016 (BI 1985, BI 1990), the Senate in both cases

 

rejected the hearings and pointed out that thus the respective procedures are terminated.

 

By further letters dated April 10, 14 and 15, 2016 (BI 2049 et seq. GA), the plaintiff requested

 

that deletions be made in the Senate's decision on Az .: I-18 W 1/13.

 

The Senate rejected this request as inadmissible by order of June 15, 2016 (BI 2131 GA).

 

7.

 

Earlier, namely on 13.04.2016, took place before the district court appointment for oral proceedings (see Protocol BI 2043 f., GA).

 

The applicant requested, by analogy,

 

with cancellation of the default judgment of 16.03.2011, the defendant country to convict

 

him to 1,779,179.00 EUR plus interest in the amount of 5% points above the base rate

 

since lis pendens and

 

 

to him 796,88 EUR per month as statutory pension plus interest in the amount of 5% above

 

the base rate since 01.07.2006 as well as a reasonable compensation in the amount of

 

at least 50,000.00 EUR plus interest in the amount of 5% points above the base rate since

 

lis pendens to pay and

 

declare that the defendant country is under an obligation to comply with the provisions of the

 

pleading of 14 December 2012 under no. 1st, Il. 1-27 and

 

Ill. Incidents described to replace any further material and immaterial damage.

 

The defendant country has requested

 

to uphold the default judgment of 16 March 2011 and to to dismiss the action.

 

Even before the date of the announcement, the pleading of the plaintiff's attorney dated 18.04.2016 filed with the district court on 20.04.2016 (BI 2061 GA), requesting that an action extension of 28.08.2013 be sent in the amount of EUR 86.653,97 because there is still a residual advance on legal fees.

 

By pleading dated 09.05.2016 (entrance court 10.05.2016), the plaintiff representative has requested the reopening of the oral proceedings. In addition, the plaintiff personally by letter dated 06.05.2016 - receipt 09.05.2016 - a new legal aid application (Bl 2102 GA), which was rejected by the district court by order of 10.05.2016. The immediate appeal (BI 2121 GA) of 24.05.2016, which was lodged by the district court, by decision from 30.05.2016 not remedied. By decision of 30.08.2017 (Ref .: I-18 W 25/16, BI 2612 GA), the Senate rejected the immediate appeal.

 

By the judgment announced on 11.05.2016 the district court has the omission of the

 

"March 26, 2011" maintained and dismissed the further action.

 

The district court essentially based its decision on the fact that, if the applications were

 

admissible in the first place, the claims asserted are in any event time-barred.

 

The district court decision was delivered to the plenipotentiary of the plaintiff on 19.05.2016.

 

8.

 

By pleading dated 14.06.2016, the plaintiff, represented by a lawyer, lodged a timely appeal. After extension of the deadline the appeal was justified on 18.08.2016.

 

The plaintiff personally applied for legal aid for the execution of this appeal. By resolution

 

dated 30.08.2017, the Senate - after a final decision on the raised bias statements against

 

the Senate members judge at the Higher Regional Court Mrs Glaeser and judge at the Higher

 

Regional Court Mrs Fuhr - rejected the application; for the reasons given, reference is made

 

to the order (BI 2605 et seq.) The request of the plaintiff on 16.09.2017 to grant

 

him legal aid for the appeal was rejected by the Senate at the hearing on 27.09.2017.

 

The plaintiff complains with his appeal - and in addition by attorney's statement of 22.09.2017 - that the district court decision was unlawful. The asserted claims are his. Specifically, he submits that the district court decision violated the legal judge's requirement (Article 101 of the Basic Law) and violated his right to be heard (Article 103 of the Basic Law). The refusal petitions, in particular against the judge Mrs Stockschlaeder-Noll, as well as other judges, were not granted. The rejected judges, in violation of § 47 ZPO, had taken part in decisions at his expense. For this reason, in particular, the default judgment of 16.03.2011 had not been allowed because of his - made by him personally - biased request of 21.09.2010 was finally decided in July 2011, which must lead to an inadmissibility of the default judgment. Negotiation before the Chamber on 13.04.2016 could not eliminate this deficiency; the default judgment should have been overturned. Furthermore, the refusal proceedings against Ms. Stockschlaeder-Noll of 18.12.2002 were only completed on 19.03.2009. Nevertheless, she has made further decisions in the meantime. The judge had said the untruth when she claimed to have learned of this refusal only in 2007. From the decision of the district court of Düsseldorf of 16.06.2016 to Az. 2b O 76/16 result clearly and definitively that the committees were involved with the participation of the judge Mrs Stockschlaeder-Noll.

 

As far as the Higher Regional Court on 30.08.2017 his legal aid request for the implementation of the Appeal procedure in the cast Chairwoman Judge at the Higher Regional Court of Ms Stein, judge at the Higher Regional Court Mrs Fuhr, judge at the Higher Regional Court Mrs Glaeser rejected, this body with regard on the previous bias requests against the judges Mrs Fuhr and Mrs Glaeser had been unlawfully occupied. According to the business distribution plans 2016 and 2017, the 11th civil senate of the Higher Regional Court would have had to decide on the petitions for bias. His statements were usually dismissed in the decisions of the courts in very few sentences, which constitutes a violation of hearing. The file is incomplete, which results from the manifold deliveries of the plaintiff personally (conditions: 25.09.2017: 13 deliveries). The file is styled and manipulated. For example, the expert opinion Lutz of 11.03.2011 and hearing complaints from 26.05.2012 and 27.12.2012 were missing. Also a variety of other documents, such as the letters of the offices of the district court of Düsseldorf

 

Also, a large number of other documents, such as the letters of the offices of the district court of Düsseldorf were not included in the file, which was made available to the plaintiff as a PDF document - without the cooperation of the court. Nor had the defendant country dealt with its case, in particular in the appeal. The sweeping denial of the country was irrelevant.

 

The legal views of the courts in assessing his claims are completely wrong. This applies in particular to the application and unlawful treatment of the statute of limitations, which is why, according to its calculation, 12.5 years, which would result from limitation periods and inhibitions, were not taken into account. It is also striking that the district court for the calculation of the statute of limitation only to the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf in the procedure I-18 W 1/13 referenced, but before the statute of limitations had calculated very differently. His application for a claim for future damages was admissible because the court was entitled to a value in the judgment was possible. His claims are presented in a conclusive manner, this applies in particular to his presentation on a statutory pension. The right to a pension is not lacking in the need for legal protection because the pension has never been the subject of proceedings 2b O 118/99. In the absence of legal force, court costs may be postponed to parallel proceedings. The claim for damages in excess of EUR 50,000.00, which he asserted in the present case, was not the subject of proceedings 2b O 268/01 and was, moreover, conclusively submitted. His reduced claim extension according to a brief of 18.04.2016 was unjustified in the judgment was not taken into account. The district court had to deliver the application because of the remaining cost advance and the oral proceedings had to reopen. His reduced claim extension, which he wanted to follow up in the appeal also, was not the subject of the procedure 2b O 118/99. Finally, he was not to blame for contributory negligence and the estimate of a minimum damage is very well possible in accordance with § 287 ZPO. The asserted by him of liability according to § 839 BGB (old and new version) is not a tort claim, for the § 852 BGB a.F. would apply. His claims would be the statutory limitation of 30 years in accordance with §§ 195 ff. BGB a.F. subject.

 

The statute of limitation for official liability claims only starts to run after the official action of an official has been established. It emerges from the Case law of the Federal Court of Justice. The financial court proceedings were concluded only with the comparison from the year 2006. Only then did the intention of the officials stand firm. Furthermore, in its order for I-18 W 1/13, the court of appeal Düsselorf had overlooked the fact that there had been further decisions by the fiscal court, such as Appendices K 13 and K 14 in Case 4 K 3384/01, which ended in settlement; there it went to the account of the income tax and value added tax for the years 1979 to 1992, so that this procedure should likewise be counted to the primary right protection, which breaks the expiry of the limitation period of a legal liability claim. The same applies to the further proceedings and decisions of the Federal Finance Court.

 

He had made an unconditional complaint on 05.02.2001.

 

His lawyer has explicitly stated this with a brief dated 17.07.2003. He had therefore at the latest with the legal aid decision of 23.07.2004 a court cost bill had to be served so he had known how much court costs advance he must deposit now. On his claims only old law would apply. This follows from Article 229 § 6 para. 1 sentence 3 EGBGB. There were special circumstances within the meaning of that provision, which occurred after 31.12.2001, and led to the application of the old law. In particular, his application for service of the claim without a court costs advance of 13.08.2004 should be mentioned as a special circumstance. This application was finally decided on 11.05.2005 and 20.03.2006. On 18.12.2006 the advance of legal fees had been fully paid in and nevertheless the delivery of the application was made on 23.09.2010. This delay was caused by the judiciary, which is why the delivery soon in the sense of § 270 ZPO a.F. was done and back to the filing date of 05.02.2001. The regional court has never ruled on his manifold application for annulment. The statute of limitations had been applied completely wrong. It applies in particular for § 208 BGB a.F., in connection with § 127 BGB a.F .. He did not complete the settlement with the tax office until 2006.

 

This comparison is acknowledged with the result that all deadlines had started to run again. The inclusion of a further 6 months in the limitation period by the Higher Regional Court - which the district court was followed by his reference - after § 209 BGB a.F. could not be reconstructed. Also § 203 BGB a.F. be neither directly nor apply analogously. There was no force majeure and no standstill of the proceedings. § 204 BGB n.F. do not apply. In addition, there are a variety of other procedural acts that had interrupted / inhibited the statute of limitations, but all of which had not been observed by the courts. For example, there are the many non-existent and / or wrong-wing committees. He also filed an objection against the default judgment of 16.03.2011. Finally, the statute-barred effect of the legal aid request dated 05.02.2001 - as well as the other legal aid applications from 09.09.2005, 14.12.2009, 14.06.2011, 10.04.2012 and 16.07.2012 - was not considered. According to the statute of limitations applicable until 31.12.2001, a legal aid application had blocked the limitation period. The first legal aid procedure did not end on 23.07.2004, but only on 04.07.2007, because only then was decided on his counter-conceptions.

 

 In its decision of 30.08.2017, the Higher Regional Court on p. 7 also confirmed the statute-barred effect of a legal aid application under BGB a.F. accepted. Finally, the statute of limitation had been barred by the failure to grant a separate file number for the application form dated 05.02.2011, including the negative decision on his request for severance. Furthermore, the initiation of a supervision procedure and the adoption of a decision to prove its inability to act should be cited as such. Completely unconsidered were also the unsaved bank pledges and payments of the tax office Mettmann, the backdated decisions of the district court of 20.11.2003 and the initiation of other public liability claims, i.a. from

11.07.2003, 13.11.2003, 25.03.2008, 23.04.2008, 24.04.2008, 29.04.2008, 15.06.2008, 24.06.2008 and 15.08.2008.

 

The applicant claims that

 

1. amending the judgment of the Düsseldorf Regional Court, promulgated on 11.07.2016, ref .: 2b O 271/01 _

and

 

2.

set aside the default judgment of 16.03.2011, to order the defendant country to pay him EUR 1,779,197 plus interest at the rate of 5% above the base rate since lis pendens and

 

3.

to him 796,88 EUR monthly statutory pension plus interest at the rate of 5% points above the base rate since 1 July 2006 and

 

4th

to him a reasonable compensation in the amount of at least 50,000.00 EUR plus interest in the amount of 5% points above the base rate since lis pendens and

 

5th

to him reimbursement of expenses amounting to EUR 86,653.97 plus interest at the rate of 5% above the base rate from an amount of EUR 51,178.78 since 01.01.1978, from an amount of EUR 30,323.77 since 01.02.1982 to pay out of an amount of € 5,151.42 since 01.01.1997 as well

 

6th

declare that the defendant country is under an obligation to inform the claimant on the basis of the statement of 14.12.2012 under no. |., Il. 1. to 27. and Ill. Incidents to replace any further material or immaterial damage.

 

Furthermore, the applicant claims that

 

                                   remit the case to the court of first instance,

 

The defendant country requested,

 

                                   to reject the appeal.

 

The defendant country refers to what it considers to be the justifications to the judgment under appeal and the Senate order of 03.09.2015 relating to: I-18 W 1/13. It considers that the statement of grounds of appeal does not reveal any new factual and legal elements which could justify an amendment to the judgment under appeal.

Incidentally, the applicant's entire submission - including the pleading of 22.09.2017 - would in particular be disputed with regard to the alleged damage and the causality of a breach of duty with no knowledge.

For further details of the facts and disputes, reference will be made to the content of the written pleadings and the judicial decisions made so far. The file 2b O 118/99, LG Düsseldorf, was before and was the subject of oral proceedings.

 

II.

 

The appeal of the plaintiff is unsuccessful.

 

The district court has dismissed the claim with appropriate reason. The appeal does not reveal any circumstances that speak in favour of a material infringement of the contested decision of the Landgericht of 11.05.2016 (§ 520 (3) sentence 2 no. 2 ZPO), nor does it give any indication that there is any doubt as to the accuracy and completeness of the fact-finding in the judgment under appeal (§ 520 (2) sentence 2 no. 3 ZPO), so that no further ascertainment of facts within the meaning of § 529 ZPO by the Senate is warranted.

In any event, the claims pursued by the plaintiff in the appeal instance are time-barred insofar as the motions filed are admissible at all, which the Senate upholds after renewed review of the legal position.

 

                                                                 A.

 

In order to decide on the legal dispute, the judges involved in the oral proceedings are

 

appointed on the basis of he business allocation plan 2017 of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional

 

Court, taking into account the representation rules laid down there.

 

The Senate pointed this out in the oral hearing and in particular explained why the judge at

 

the Higher Regional Court Mrs Fuhr was prevented from attending the meeting. As far as the

 

plaintiff personally in the context of the legal aid procedure reproach, the impartiality of the

 

judge at the Higher Regional Court Mrs Glaeser with regard to the in the decisions to Az.

 

I-18 W 1/13, 1-18 W 2/13 and I-18 W 44/14 by the Senate made comments about the

 

conception of legality was closed after the decision on the hearing on 27.07.2017 was passed

 

by a decision of the Senate of 22.08.2017 (BI 2605 GA)

 

 

A bias of the judge could not be determined; it is therefore required to be a member of the

 

judicial bench appointed to decide the case under Article 101 of the Basic Law.

 

Although the plaintiff personally and attorney represented repeatedly objected, in fact for

 

judicial refusals according to the business allocation plan 2017 of the Higher Regional Court

 

its 11th Civil Senate should be regarded as a legal judge. The plaintiff overlooks, however,

 

that the  jurisdiction of the 11th Civil Senate concerns the complaints within the meaning of

 

§ 567 ZPO on judicial refusals, which the district court and regional court has taken under

 

consideration of § 45 ZPO. However, if a complaint of partiality relates to a judge of the court

 

of appeal in proceedings pending there, it does not concern the lodging of a complaint, but

 

first of all a procedure in which the judicial bench is determined taking into account

 

§ 45 ZPO, i.e. the Senate itself is called to adjudicate, excluding the judge concerned by the

 

complaint.

 

The plaintiff has already been repeatedly informed of this correct way of determining the

 

statutory judge - most recently in the appointment of 27.09.2017. At this legal classification

 

also the submissions of the plaintiff personally after the conclusion of the oral hearing nothing.

 

 

                                                                                 B.

1.

 

The application under no. 5 of the appeal notice is inadmissible (§ 533 No. 2 ZPO). The corresponding application in the amount of a payment amount of € 86,653.97 was first formulated and submitted in the first instance only after the conclusion of the oral hearing with a non-subsumed written statement of 18.04.2016. He refers to claims for reimbursement of expenses which the applicant praises for the purchase of machinery etc. for Greece in 1977, the installation of machinery etc. in 1980 and lending interest in 1995. In any event, such claims shall be supported as evidence of the causality of an official breach of duty by the defendant country for the alleged damage and the nature and amount of the alleged damage to disputed facts. The defendant country entitled the claim of the plaintiff plead ignorance (§ 138 Abs. 4 ZPO), because in this respect neither own actions nor facts are concerned, which were the object of the own perception of the land servants. Therefore, the amended amendment had to be based on facts which, moreover, could not be based on the decision of the legal dispute in accordance with § 529 ZPO by the Senate. Accordingly, this amendment to § 533 ZPO is inadmissible. The district court was also not required to re-open the oral proceedings in order to enable the application to be served at first instance.

 

2.

 

The under no. 6 of the application for further prosecution is also inadmissible, because he does not have individualized content within the meaning of § 253 Abs. 2 ZPO and thus has no access to legal content. The absence of the legally binding content of the application is made particularly clear by the reference numeral. 1 to 3 of the pleading of 14.12.2012. In this pleading, the reference to the application of 12.07.2012 is referred to under 1. above, as well as to numerous pleadings from proceedings 2b O 118/99 and 2b O 268/01. Under no. Il. of the pleading of 14.12.2012 is referred to a multitude of tax decisions, which are described with "described incidents" completely inadequate, referred to in the third paragraph contains only the reference to an estimation possibility of the court An estimate in accordance with § 287 ZPO requires that the attachment facts be named, but the mere fact that the district court in its decision set a value in dispute for the fees incurred is not sufficient to obtain the necessary facts.

 

3.

 

On the inadmissibility of the above-mentioned applications, the plaintiff has already been informed with the legal aid decision of the Senate of 30.08.2017.

A specification did not take place until the end of the oral proceedings.

 

                                                              C.

 

The other claims made under paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the appeal notice are not enforceable because they are time-barred. The defendant country has legitimately raised the plea of ​​limitation and can therefore refuse performance (§ 214 BGB). The district court has therefore correctly upheld the previously issued objectionable default judgment and dismissed the subsequently extended claim.

 

1.

 

The contested decision of 11.05.2016 does not violate the guarantee of the statutory judge (Article 101 para. 1 sentence 2 GG), which guarantees the parties a fundamental right that only judges determined by law, but not otherwise determined she speaks right. The purpose of this guarantee is to counteract the risk of manipulation of the judicial organs by extraneous influences and to protect the indispensable trust of the law-seekers in the impartiality and objectivity of the courts in a constitutional democracy. Legal judges within the meaning of Article 101, paragraph 1, sentence 2 of the Basic Law are not only the court as the organizational unit and the cognizant court as the panel, but also the judges appointed in each individual case (see BVerfG, 1st senate, 3rd chamber, Decision of 02.06.2009 - 1 BvR 2295/08, cited in juris). The right to the statutory judge is violated by judges if their interpretation and connection of simple statutory jurisdiction is arbitrary or obviously untenable or they fundamentally misunderstand the meaning and scope of Article 101 paragraph 1 sentence 2 GG (BVerfG, loc. Cit.). Measured against this is in the present case no violation of the 2b-Chamber of the District Court of Düsseldorf against the bid by the statutory judge recognizable.

 

The board was appointed according to the business distribution plan 2016 to decide on damages compensation / penalty claims for administrative offenses and the staffing of the committee also corresponded to the relevant business allocation plan. The plaintiff represented on 16.03.2016 before this Chamber, without rejecting the participating judges for bias. By doing so, he is unable, on appeal, to cite circumstances arising from the past which, in his opinion, could justify the bias of the judge who had ruled on the basis of the oral hearing of 16 March 2016 (see § 43 ZPO and BGH, order of 01.06.2006 - V ZB 193/05).

 

insofar as the plaintiff refers to the decision of June 16, 2016 in case 2b O 76/16, which was taken after the first instance has been closed in the present proceedings, this decision is irrelevant for the current appeals procedure, because the self - refusal there is a matter for the judge Decision of 16.06.2016, was made only because the notifying judges were right to point out that otherwise they would have had to decide in the new procedure on compliance with their duties under the current procedure 2b O 271/01. By their ad, which was met by the Chamber of Representatives, they have just prevented the suspicion of bias.

 

2.

 

The constitutionally also guaranteed right to be heard under Article 103 of the plaintiff was also not violated by the district court. In civil proceedings, this right only guarantees that the arguments of the parties are taken note of and taken into consideration. A party cannot demand that the court follow its legal view, nor that the court comment extensively on a party's remarks. The latter cannot be demanded, in particular, if corresponding instructions have already been made before, to which the party could adjust. This is to be assumed throughout the present proceedings. The 13 subsequent submissions to the file, which have now been made by the plaintiff personally in the context of his request for legal assistance, do not violate the principle of the right to be heard. In view of §§ 529 ff. ZPO, a party personally cannot arbitrarily submit any documents and other documents in the appeal instance to the file, which it now considers to be justifiable. Before the Higher Regional Court there is lawyer compulsion. This legal requirement cannot be undermined by the fact that one party carries out its own legal aid procedure and submits documents which have not been properly introduced during the appeal procedure. Apart from that, even the examination of the letters of the applicant who submitted to the Senate, including the documents received after the oral proceedings, gives no basis for a different decision. The case file was not "manipulated" and "styled" by the court, and while it is true that the file has become "confusing" over the years.

 

This is based i.a. that a large number of requests had to be made - even on several occasions - which required that the file frequently be sent between the courts of appeal. This regularly leads to impairment of the chronology of a file. In addition, according to the file system NRW some special issues (for example, legal aid books) have to be created. As a result of the extensive subject lines used by the plaintiff, his letters were not always correct. Finally, the applicant himself frequently referred to documents relating to his own proceedings 2b O 118/99 and 2b O 278/01, without them automatically becoming part of the present proceedings and sometimes even filing different types of data on the file or misrepresenting them Data cited. All these processes may give the impression of a layman that a file is incomplete without this actually being the case. For example, the allegedly missing expert opinion Lutz in the legal aid book I, Bl. 26 ff ..

 

Also the alleged missing hearing from 26.05.2012 and 27.05.2012 are also in this Legal aid book 1, Bl. 84 f. 90 f. For those familiar with court records, it will be readily apparent that not all letters from a court to which a party is addressed are set out in the file in this form. They are based on appropriate - often handwritten, in part marginalized - decisions of the judge, which are then executed by the service staff; this is the case, for example. with the letter of the district court to the plaintiff dated 24.01.2007, which is based on a court order Bl. 264 GA. The court does not provide the plaintiff with a pdf version of the file and therefore is not responsible if the electronic document is incomplete.

 

3.

 

The district court has correctly applied the statute of limitations regulations for the asserted statutory liability claims.

The civil law claim is in the unanimous opinion of case law and literature a tortuous claim. Its codification took place until 31.12.2001 in the civil law code under the heading "25th title, unauthorized actions" and covers the regulations of the §§ 823 to 853 BGB.

 

Since 01.01.2002 these regulations are to be found in "Title 27. Unauthorized acts" Already this systematic position makes it clear that the official liability claim was and is a liability from unauthorized (= criminal) action and was valid until 31.12.2001 the special statute of limitations of the law of the unlawful act - deviating from the general provisions - according to § 852 BGB. According to this provision, the limitation period for possible claims commenced from the time at which the injured party, in this case the plaintiff, became aware of the damage and the person liable for compensation and not at the end of the year in which the event occurred. In addition, the statute of limitation was only 3 years and not 30 years, the relevant time in the present proceedings was in the 1980s and thus already before the lis pendens of the actions leading to the reduction of the plaintiff's tax liability led by the financial court Düsseldorf. Due to the lis pendens of these actions, the three-year limitation period was interrupted in accordance with the general statute of limitations according to § 209 Abs. 1 BGB, even though it was not the lis pendens of the claim for damages due to breach of duty itself, but complaints concerning tax bills contrary to official duty (vg). BGH, judgment of 11.07.1985 - II ZR 62/84; quoted after juris; Palandt / Thomas, BGB, 61st ed. 2002, § 852 BGB, para. 16).

 

On the other hand, contrary to the applicant's contention, it was not necessary for the commencement of the limitation period to prove that it was a material breach of an official obligation. Even for negligence committed official offenses is liable by the state. Nothing else results from the decision of the Federal Court of Justice referred to by the plaintiff (BGHZ 121, 65, 71). It was about the special constellation that was to clarify in a negligent breach of duty, whether there was another substitute except the employment authority itself. As long as it was not clear whether there was another substitute, the limitation period could not start to run. In the present case, however, no other substitute over the state of North Rhine-Westphalia as an employment authority was considered for official violations of the tax office Mettmann, so that the form of fault had no effect on the immediate beginning of the limitation period.

 

Equally insignificant for the beginning of the statute of limitations on 15.12.2006 in the

 

procedure 4 K 1492/03 FG Düsseldorf completed settlement (which also for the method

 

4 K 3384/01 was acquired). The repayments of the income and other tax amounts together

 

with the surcharge on overdue payments and additional expenses are not the subject of the

 

present application before the civil court for lost funds and profits, reimbursement of expenses,

 

etc. The decisive factor is only the determination of the illegality of the ex-post tax assessments

 

and these were only subject to the financial court proceedings until the end of 1999.

 

The same applies to the decisions of the fiscal court Düsseldorf and the Federal Finance Court

 

cited by the plaintiff with a statement of 22.09.2017.

 

 

This becomes particularly clear, for example. in the judgment of the financial court of

 

11.09.2000 (file 4 S 94/96 PKH = Annex K13).

 

 

 

After that, it was not a question of whether late payment penalties were rightly levied, but

 

whether they had been correctly accounted for in the settlement notices, taking account of

 

capital repayments. The action against these billing notices was not a primary legal protection

 

to interrupt the statute of limitations because of the setting of the exit taxes.

 

The unlawfulness of the assessing tax assessments was already fixed by the end of 1999.

 

Consequently, the three-year limitation period commenced after the legally binding conclusion

 

(see § 211 BGB a.F.) of these tax assessments relating to the 1980s before the financial court

 

Düsseldorf. The last judgment, which declared one of these income tax assessments (specifically

 

in the form of a payment order) for (predominantly) unlawful for the years 1986/87, was issued

 

on 24.11.1999 (ref. 5 K 8916/91). It is not disputed that this judgment became final

 

without an appeal. As a result, the validity of the judgment was one month after its service.

 

The exact date of delivery to the parties has not been communicated. In favour of the plaintiff,

 

the Senate assumed - as in previous decisions - for this period until its legal validity 6 months,

 

so that the interruption of the statute of limitations initiated by the legal action before the

 

financial court ended at the latest on 30.06.2000.

 

4th

 

The claim for damages for loss of subsidy (item 2 of the appeals), which the plaintiff wishes to pursue in the appellate court, is - initially based on sufficient substantiation of the claim and on the basis of the cut-off date of 30.06.2000, previously determined under II 31.07.2006 has been barred.

 

a)

An interruption of the statute of limitations according to § 209 BGB a.F. did not take place until 31.12.2001. The plaintiff does not have an unconditional claim within the meaning of. Before expiry of the 3-year limitation period § 253 Code of Civil Procedure, so they are not made pending. On 05.02.2001, he has only initiated a legal aid procedure for the action appended in the annex. The service was dependent on the granting of legal aid. The wording of the legal aid application is clear. The applicant himself has repeatedly stressed that he is unable to pay a corresponding court order. However, without notification of the claim itself, it could not become legally binding and cause the statute of limitations to be interrupted.

 

A submission of a legal aid cost request is contrary to the opinion expressed in the written statement of 22.09.2017 neither in § 209 BGB a.F. in another provision of the statute of limitations of the general section of the Civil Code valid until 31.12.2001 as an interruption or inhibition. However, the case law recognized an exception for legal aid applications (see BGH, judgment of 19.01.1978 - Il ZR 124/76, quoted in juris) and analogous to § 203 BGB adopted a case of inhibiting the limitation period, if the needy creditor a complete application within 6 months before the expiry of the limitation period. These conditions did not exist when submitting the legal aid application of 05.02.2001. An annulment within six months did not threaten him. Moreover, as the applicant itself submits, there was no halt to the administration of justice at the time.

 

b).

On 01.01.2002 the right of limitation was fundamentally reformed. § 852 BGB a.F. as well as the hitherto valid distinction between interruption and inhibition. For so-called old cases, i.e. such disputes in which due claims had already arisen before 01.01.2001, were created in Article 229 § 6 EGBGB transitional rules, which are for the claims of the plaintiff (see Article 229 § 6 para 1 sentence 2 EGBGB). After. The key date rule of Article 229 § 6 para. 1 sentence 2 EGBGB shall continue to apply until the end of the statute of limitations until 31.12.2001 the old law and then the new law (see BGH, judgment of 05.04.2011 - XI ZR 201/09 , Tz. 17, cited from juris); an interruption that has already occurred leads to an inhibition after the key date (see BGH, judgment of 07.03.2007 - VIII ZR 218/06, item 19, cited in juris). By 31.12.2001, however, the applicant's case had not been interrupted, as already explained in II C. 3, so that it could not be transferred into an inhibition.

 

Contrary to the plaintiff's view, there is no case under Article 229 § 6 (1) sentence 3 EGBGB. This provision concerns the cases of the fiction of interruption or non-interruption pursuant to Sections 212, 215 BGB a.F .. These provisions are not relevant in the present case, so that they could not lead the applicant's "special circumstances" to the continuous application of the old law.

 

In accordance with Article 229 § 6 (4) EGBGB, the period of limitation that begins again with

 

the legal effect of thelast financial court ruling of 1999 according to § 852 BGB a.F., i.e.

 

starting from 01.07.2000 and not the statutory limitation period new statutory limitation

 

period according to §§ 195, 199 BGB n.F. from 01 04.2002. This means that without any

 

new circumstances of inhibition occurring after the new statute of limitations applicable since

 

01.01.2002, a possible claim for damages due to a subsidy loss of the plaintiff would have

 

occurred at the latest after expiry of another 18 months, ie on 01.07.2003.

 

As a new state of inhibition could be considered under new law for the first time submission of a legal aid request under § 204 para. 1 No. 14 BGB. Now also a legal aid request can inhibit the expiry of the limitation period, so that the remaining time of the not yet expired limitation period, in this case 18 months, only 6 months (§ 204 Abs. 2 BGB) would start to run after the legal aid procedure.

 

 

In the present case, however, there is the peculiarity that the plaintiff's legal aid application was submitted before 01.01.2002 and that this was also made known to the defendant country on the basis of the decision of the Regional Court of 20.02.2001. Since the application of 05.02.2001 by the court was not decided until 01.01.2002, it is already with the resolutions of the senate from 30.08.2017 (legal aid for the present procedure) as well as from 03.09.2015 to Az .: I -18 W 1/13 was considered in favour of the plaintiff as a legal aid request, which from 1 January 2002 was in principle suitable to inhibit the current limitation period.

 

 

The legal aid request of 05.02.2001 was finalized in the appeal proceedings (I-18 W 22/03) on 23.07.2004 and made known to the persons accredited to the proceedings. Other remedies were not magical. Thus ended the inhibition of the limitation period for the legal aid request according to § 214 Abs. 2 BGB n.F. at the latest six months later, i.e. at the end of January 2005. The remaining limitation period of 18 months then expired on 31.07.2006. This is not changed by the plaintiff's inadmissible opposition to the Senate resolution of 23.07.2004, as the Senate has stated by decision of 12.07.2005 Zu Az .: I-18 W 22/03. By presenting a new life situation, the already completed process could not be continued. Further "annulment requests" - without any legal basis - do not lead to an extension of the effect of the legal aid procedure.

 

In the course of the procedure, further legal aid requests of the plaintiff were still sent to the defendant country; However, these events were no longer able to hinder the prescription once it had occurred. In order to counteract the misuse of § 204 (1) No. 14 BGB by submitting repeated legal aid applications, the legislator has limited the inhibiting effect to the first-time legal aid application (see BGH, judgment of 02.12.2008 - XI ZR 525/07, Tz. 22, cited from juris).

 

(c) The various other circumstances which the applicant relied on to further block the limitation period cannot be taken into account either. The deadline at the latest on 31.07.2006 ~ barred life could not come back. In particular, the delivery of the application from 05.02.2001 after the mathematically sufficient deposit of the advance on legal fees on 27.12.2006 was no longer suitable for the statute of limitations. A retroactive effect of the service according to § 167 ZPO (not § 270 ZPO a.F.) cannot take place, because the delivery is due to lack of payment of the advance following the fixed negative since the end of July 2004 first legal aid proceedings until December 2006 by the plaintiff Actions delayed by more than the usual 14 days. A claim for service of the complaint without a court costs advance - so the application of 13.08.2004 - did not exist. Even if the applicant were allowed to await the decision on this application for service without payment of the advance on the legal fees of 13.08.2004, he had at the latest after the announcement of the decision of 11.05.2005 that such a waiver was out of the question prompt payment of the entire court costs advance. This is true even if, in view of the amount of the fees, you would grant him a longer period than the usual 14-day deposit period. The Senate has already in its legal aid decision of 30.08.2017 a generous calculation of this period to two months in favour of the plaintiff and has assumed that therefore at least from August 2005 it can be assumed that the plaintiff from this date, the delay of service Action until 27.12.2006 is attributable.

 

 

Even if it is assumed that a party is in principle not obliged to pay the advance on its own initiative, but can wait until the court demands payment, this does not change the obligation of the plaintiff to take action. For a party cannot remain idle for ever and, if it does not receive a request to deposit the advance payment and the possibility of § 14 No. 3 GKG is exhausted, must notify the court after a few months at the latest (see BGH, Judgment of 19.10.1977 - IV ZR 149/76, NJW 1978, 215, 217). The plaintiff did not do that after the decision of 11.05.2005.

 

When he finally reported himself, namely on 15.04.2006, he told the court that he had suspended the installment payment that had since been taken in order to save the court costs since January 2006, because his new legal aid request of September 2005 was to be decided first. As another legal aid request was not able to hinder the prescription the plaintiff also bears the risk of late payment of the advance.

The appeal against the decision of 11.05.2005 (including refusal to waive the payment of the advance on legal fees) is disregarded because it was inadmissible from the outset. The claimant filed the claim in person, even though it was a case before the district court, which was subject to the lawyer's obligation.

 

d) In addition, the plaintiff has listed a variety of reasons, which he cites as interrupting or inhibiting. What is common inside is that they have no legal basis from which to derive the desired legal consequences. Not every activity of the court or any claim of the plaintiff leads to an inhibition. The inhibition must rather result from the law. The article 229 § 6 EGBGB cited by the plaintiff again and again gives nothing for it. For this reason, it may also be whether the incidents in each case have been as described by the plaintiff.

 

5th

 

Also the claim for damages under point. 4 of the appeals, which the plaintiff also wants to pursue on appeal, is either contrary to the legal force of the procedure 2b O 268/01 as cited by the district court - as far as the content of the legal aid request in the local proceedings, finally under the reference: I Or the claim for damages in excess of EUR 50,000.00 has become statute-barred in the present proceedings in accordance with the above statements under II. C. 3 and 4 on the statute of limitations.

 

6th

 

Also for the pension entitlement according to para. 3 of the appeals is that he irrespective of, from him already the legal protection requirement ~ as taken by the district court ~ taken and meets the substantive requirements at all, was barred at the end of 31.07.2006. The claim for payment of a monthly pension to equalize the maximum statutory pension since 01.07.2006, the plaintiff personally introduced into the local proceedings with his legal aid application of 14.06.2011, where he himself has provided his then application with the comment that Application for payment of a pension had already been the subject of proceedings 2b O 118/99 and was "now accepted here". On 14.06.2011, such pension rights - in the case of a new issue in the present case - had in any case been time-barred. But even taking into account the procedures in the procedure 2b O 118/99, this does not lead to an unrestricted entitlement to pension payments in the current appointment procedure 2b O 271/01. For even in the procedure 2b O 118/99 the statute of limitations of the claim - the conclusive presentation of such a pension claim in the local procedure assumed - was neither interrupted before 01.01.2002 nor inhibited to a sufficient extent before expiry of the limitation period. As in the local proceedings, only a process aid procedure was initially initiated there, which - as already explained - had no interrupting effect before 01.01.2002.

 

With the original legal aid application of 1999, the plaintiff had indeed announced a claim for recognition. However, he dropped this claim with the revised legal aid application in Case 2b O 118/99, which had been received by the court on 31.12.2001, and limited himself to a payment claim and an application for supplementary pension. If one looks at this application, submitted to the opponent on 31.12.2001 in favor of the plaintiff, as the first application for legal aid within the meaning of section 204 (1) no. 14 BGB n.F. The 3-year limitation period for the right to a pension based on breach of official duties was suspended after the expiry of 18 months. The inhibition lasted until the decision of the legal aid request in the procedure I-18 W 42/03 of the senate on 23.07.2004, so that also as in the local procedure the claim was statute barred at the end of 31.07.2006, because no further inhibition facts were fulfilled ,

 

The application finally filed in August 2004 in case 2b O 118/99 could not be served due to a lack of payment of the advance on legal costs and further legal aid applications were no longer statute-barred.

 

                                                                         III.

 

The decision on costs is based on § 97 ZPO;

 

the decision on provisional enforceability is issued in accordance with §§ 708 No. 10, 709,

711 ZPO.

 

Reasons to allow the revision in accordance with § 543 ZPO are not available.

 

 

 

Litigation value: 1,973,319.93 EUR

 

 

 

 

Mrs Stein                                       Mrs Glaeser                                   Mrs Kirschner

 

 

 

 

Authenticated

Riechert

Justice employees

  

 

Last modified on Saturday, 06 October 2018 19:38

 

 

This comment is published on German and english, into the Germanpage, look there.

 

BGH (Supreme Federal Court of Justice)

DECISION of 24 May 2018 Az III ZR 332/17

concerning the NZB of 19.3.2018

against OLG-Düsseldorf Judgment 18.10.2017

Az 18 U 69/16 (LG-Düsseldorf Az 2b o 271/01

 

The BGH-III Senate has its own jurisdiction ignored when passing the resolution

to III ZR 332/17 of 24 May 2018 ( about Higher Regional Court Dusseldorf Az 18 U 69/16,

LG-Düsseldorf 2b o 271/01) :

 

 Here are only two BGH decisions mentioned, the BGH III civil Senate (Mr. Herrmann /Mr. Seiters /Mr. Reiter /Mrs Liebert / Mrs Böttcher) on May 24, 2018 ignored, at the adoption of the decision

on Az III ZR 332/17 (regarding the (NZB=) non-admission complaint against OLG-Düsseldorf decision Az 18 U 69/16 from 18.10.2018 , LG-Düsseldorf Az 2b o 271/01), thus proving that it is prepared to take political decisions (and able to implement the received order) if the legal cases bring legal action for liability claims for damages amounting to millions (in €).

 

 The first decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) is several times repeated, both, as well as in the LG-Düsseldorf (Az 2b o 271/01) process and OLG-Düsseldorf (18 U 69/16) as well as in the non-admission complaint of 19 March 2018 to BGH Az III ZR 332/17, and has the following (shortened) content:

  

"As long as the harmful interference lasts, the limitation period cannot begin"

 

It is repeatedly recounted and evidence has been provided that the (mentally ill) bank seizure on part of FA-Mettmann for alleged tax evasion of the suitors, since 1986 or since 1989 still persist, and despite the repeated reminiscences of the complaint and the repeal requests of 3 heads of the FA-Mettmann from 1988 and 1989 bank seizures are still not repealed.

 

 The damaging procedure is still going on, and according to BGH case law, the limitation period can not begin.

Nevertheless, the OLG-Dusseldorf has found to Az 18 U 69/16, that the claims for damages and the claim for damages are time-barred.

 

Even the claim for damages, which would become statute-barred only after 30 years, is now barred after OLG judgment 18 U 69/16 of 18.10.2017. JUSTICE ???

 

The BGH-III civil-Senate (composition as above) has not responded to the arguments presented in the NZB, therefore the BGH decision of 24 May 2018 Az III ZR 332/17 is published here below.

The second verdict of the BGH is:

  

"A procedure is completed when all applications are granted".

 

It has been repeatedly stated in the LG / OLG cases (application Az 2b o 271/01 and appeal Az 18 U 69/16) that several applications (inter alia applications for annulment of LG and OLG decisions, applications for bias against LG / OLG judges and GVP, Service applications for the reduced action extension 2b o 271/01 etc) are not granted.

  

In the view of the applicant (based on the BGH decision mentioned above), case 2b o 271/01, with appeal 18 U 69/16, has not yet ended.

 

The supreme Federal Court of Justice (BGH) in the contested decision of 24.5.2018 Az III ZR 332/17 was silent about this and did not write a syllable about both the requested legal aid (= PKH) and the non-admission complaint (= NZB).

OMERTÀ knows about the mafia?

 

The plaintiff remembers the saying of an old (former) Chancellor:

 

"what is it that bothers me of yesterday's chatter"

  So the decisions of the BGH are gossip of yesterday?

 

BGH III ZR 332 17 NZB Entscheidung v 24.5.2018 S. 1      BGH III ZR 332 17 NZB Entscheidung v 24.5.2018 S. 2

 

BGH Beschl. 26.07.2018 Az III ZR 332 17 Zurückweis d ANHÖRRÜGE als unbegr. gez. Herrmann Seiters Reiter Liebert Bötcher S. 1   BGH Beschl. 26.07.2018 Az III ZR 332 17 Zurückweis d ANHÖRRÜGE als unbegr. gez. Herrmann Seiters Reiter Liebert Bötcher S. 2

Last modified on Tuesday, 12 March 2019 20:10

Vorwort des Klägers

Der Leser erfahrt aus diesem Beitrag der RAe Schmitz-Witte & Collegen wie ein prozessunfähiger Rechtsanwalt (Plötzgen) die Aussicht auf Erfolg eines Amtshftungsverfahrens mit fehlerhaften und unbegründeten Anträgen vernichten kann, und wie die LG-Einzelrichterin Fr. Brecht die höhere Rechtsprechung umgeht um den Kläger für seine Internet-Veröffentlichungen zu bestrafen.

Über die Berufung mit dem angegebenen Az des OLG-D´dorf 24 U 131/15 ist noch nicht entschieden. Es folgt daher eine spätere Information 

 

Schmitz ∙ Witte & Collegen

Rechtsanwälte  ∙  Notar

 

                         

                                                                                                                                                              Schmitz ∙ Witte & Collegen ∙

                                                                                                                             Postfach 34 02 44 ∙ D - 45074 Essen


                                                                                                                                                                                       ESSEN
                                                                                                                                                 HERBERT SCHMITZ, Notar a.D.
                                                                                                                                                 zugl. Fachanwalt für Steuerrecht
                                                                                                                                                 KLAUS WITTE1
                                                                                                                                                 HANS-WERNER HEINRICHS2, Notar
                                                                                                                                                 NIKOLAI LASAROFF3
                                                                                                                                                 zugl. Fachanwalt für Arbeitsrecht

                                                                                                                                                 HAGEN
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                                                                                                                                                 zugl. Fachanwalt für Arbeitsrecht
                                                                                                                                                 Zweigstelle

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                                                                                                                                                3 kein Gesellschafter, nicht haftend

                                                                                                                                                  KOOPERATIONSPARTNER:

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                                                                                                                                                Architektenrecht
                                                                                                                                                LARS KÖPPEN
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                                                                                                                                                NICOLE BÖTTCHER
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                                                                                                                                               *2 ALEXANDER HUFENDIEK
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                                                                                                                                                 Rechtsschutz und Fachanwalt für
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                                                                                                                                               3 DETLEF MILDNER
                                                                                                                                                   Rechtsanwalt

 

Vorab per Telefax: 0211 4971 548


Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf
Cecilienallee 3
40474 Düsseldorf

 

 

Essen, 16. Oktober 2015
NL/NR wr 15024558

 

 

In dem Rechtsstreit
Sartoros ./. Plötzgen
I-24 U 131/15
----------------------------

beantrage ich unter Abänderung des am 17. Juli 2015 verkündeten Urteils des Landgerichts Düsseldorf, Aktenzeichen: 2b O 102/14:

Der Beklagte wird verurteilt, an den Kläger 19.323,15 € nebst Zinsen in Höhe von 5 Prozentpunkten über dem Basiszinssatz seit dem 13. August 2013 zu zahlen.

 

 

Zur Begründung führe ich aus:

 

I.

Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat den Klageantrag zu Unrecht abgewiesen, den der Kläger mit seiner Berufung weiterverfolgt. Das Urteil des Landgerichts Düsseldorf wird daher in vollem Umfang der Überprüfung durch das Berufungsgericht gestellt.

 

II.

 

Im Einzelnen ist folgendes zu rügen:

 

1.

Allgemein ist zu rügen, dass die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf den umfangreichen Vortrag des Klägers nicht gewürdigt hat und sich im Einzelnen mit dem Vortrag des Klägers nicht auseinandergesetzt hat. Zumal auch die Akten des Verfahrens 2b O 268/01 nicht beigezogen wurden; in dem Verfahren wurden 35 Beweisantritte unterbreitet.

 

Der Klageantrag des Klägers wird mit „kurzen und knappen“ Ausführungen „weggebügelt“, was nach diesseitiger Auffassung „einzig und allein“ der Person des Klägers geschuldet ist.

 

Dies sei vorangestellt, da unweigerlich der Eindruck entsteht, dass der Vortrag des Klägers, auch wenn er „schlüssig“ erfolgt, einfach nicht berücksichtigt und gewürdigt, da man ihm „kein Recht zu sprechen möchte“, was, wie gesagt, sicherlich seiner Person geschuldet ist.

 

2.

Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat fehlerhaft lediglich mit einem Satz und ohne weitere Feststellungen und Ausführungen ausgeführt: „Der Vortrag des Klägers zu den Pflichtverletzungen des Beklagten und dem infolgedessen nutzlos gezahlten Honorar ist nicht schlüssig“.

 

Diesseits wurde seitenweise - auch im parallel laufenden Prozesskos-tenhilfeverfahren - zu den vorgenannten Voraussetzungen vorgetragen, so dass es sich die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf nicht derart einfach machen kann und die Ansprüche des Klägers lediglich mit einem Satz „wegbügeln“ kann.

 

Im Einzelnen wurde u.a. folgendes vorgetragen, was die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf rechtsirrig nicht gewürdigt hat:

In dem vorliegenden Verfahren geht es ausschließlich um die im Verfahren 2b O 268/01 entstandenen Kosten bzw. Schaden verursachenden Handlungen und Versäumnisse des Beklagten. Wie ausgeführt, sind in diesem Verfahren 35 Beweise angetreten worden und die Einzelrichterin hat die Akten nicht beigezogen.

 

Die nachfolgend benannten Beweise wurden ebenfalls erstinstanzlich aufgeführt.


I. Sachverhalt

 

-2001-

 

Der Kläger beauftragte zuerst im Dezember 2000 den Beklagten mit der Bearbeitung einer Amtshaftungsklage, die er am 5. Februar 2001 beim Landgericht Düsseldorf eingereicht hat; dieses Verfahren erhielt (später) das Aktenzeichen 2b O 271/01 und läuft heute noch.

 

Beweis:

 

1. Klageschrift vom 5. Februar 2001 zum Aktenzeichen 2b O 271/01.;

2. Beziehung der Akte 2b O 271/01

 

Im März/April 2001 ist der Beklagte beauftragt worden auf der Basis der neuen Urteile / Beschlüsse des Finanzgerichts Düsseldorf auch eine zweite Amtshaftungsklage zu fertigen. Mehrere dicke Ordner mit Beweisen sind dem Beklagten ausgehändigt worden. Zur Vorbereitung der Klage sind Gespräche mit dem Beklagten u.a. über rechnerische Methode zur Ermittlung des Schadens geführt worden. Aus den Akten des Verfahrens 2b O 118/99 sind dem Beklagten Unterlagen/Belege über Pumpen sowie Kalkulationen als Beweise für die Klage herangetragen worden, die er nicht verwertet hat.

 

Am 31. August 2001 äußerte der Beklagte, dass seine Berechnungen des Schadens einen Denkfehler enthalten.

Beweis: Schreiben des Beklagten vom 31. August 2001, bereits eingereicht.

 

Es folgten weitere Gespräche mit dem Beklagten und im Schreiben vom 18. November 2001 bestätigte der Beklagte, dass er den rechnerischen Vorschlag des Klägers (bzw. der Uni-Absolventin Isabella Gräfin M., frühere Gehilfin des RA Dr. Küntzel) als plausibel, erachtet und diesen dem Gericht zusenden wird. Der Beklagte war informiert von wem die Berechnung stammte und war verpflichtet, die Berechnung zu überprüfen.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Beklagten vom 18. November 2001, S.1, Abs.3, bereits eingereicht.

 

Die Klageschrift ist schließlich am 20. November 2001 beim Landgericht Düsseldorf mit einem PKH-Antrag eingereicht worden und hat (später) das Aktenzeichen 2b O 268/01 erhalten. Die Überprüfung der Schadensberechnung hat der Beklagte nicht durchgeführt.


Beweis: Beiziehung der Akte des Landgerichts Düsseldorf zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Ende des Jahres 2001 haben die seitens des Beklagten gestellten Klageanträge eine Forderung in Höhe von 3.918.827,88 € zum Gegenstand gehabt.

 

-2002-

 

Am 1. Januar 2002 trat das neue Verjährungsrecht in Kraft (EGBGB 229 § 6).

 

Während der Abwicklung des Verfahrens 2b O 268/01 (auf Grund einer Entscheidung der damaligen Vorsitzenden Richterin Frau Tannert ist die Korrespondenz im Verfahren 2b O 118/99 geführt worden) kritisierte der Streitgegner (Nissen, OFD-D´dorf) die Mängel in den Schriftsätzen des Beklagten und die fehlerhaften Berechnungsmethoden in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01. Der Beklagte hat sich jedoch nicht beeindrucken lassen und seine Anträge nicht geändert.

 

Beweis:

 

1. Korrespondenz mit dem Landgericht zu dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01, geführt unter dem Az.2b O 118/99;

2. Beiziehung der Akte des Landgerichts Düsseldorf zu 2b O 118/99.

 

Am 12. November 2002 fand eine Anhörung der Parteien statt.

 

Die Berichterstatterin hat den Beklagten darauf hingewiesen, dass „Bedenken“ in Bezug auf die Kausalität bestehen und dass seine Klage (2b O 268/01) nicht substantiiert sei, mithin nicht schlüssig sei. Zudem hat der Vertreter des beklagten Landes zu Protokoll erklärt: Die Bankpfändungen waren kausal für den geschäftlichen Misserfolg des Unternehmens des Klägers, aber die den Bankpfändungen zu Grunde liegenden Steuerbescheide waren nicht rechtswidrig. Der Beklagte hat die Bestätigung in seinen Schriftsätzen nicht erwähnt, obwohl ihm diese bekannt war. Dadurch hat der Beklagte die Erfolgsaussichten der Klage geschmälert.

 

Beweis:

 

1. Anhörungsprotokoll vom 12. November 2002 zu 2b O 268/01;

2. Beiziehung der Akte des Landgerichts Düsseldorf zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Der Beklagte hat auf die Warnungen der Richterin nicht reagiert und die vorhandenen Beweise zur Kausalität nicht erbracht und die Klage auch weiterhin unschlüssig belassen.

 

Der alarmierte Kläger reagierte mit weiteren Warnungen und forderte den Beklagten auf, die kritischen Anmerkungen des Gerichts zu berücksichtigen und u.a. die Darstellung schlüssig vorzutragen und die Kausalität (Handlungen des Finanzamtes) nachzuweisen.

 

Beweis:

 

Schreiben des Klägers vom 20. Dezember 2002 an den Be-klagten, liegt dem Landgericht bereits vor (auch als Anlage zum Schreiben vom 16. Dezember 2002 an das Gericht zu 2b O 118/99 beigefügt).

 

Der Beklagte hat trotz der wiederholten Hinweise des Klägers und des Landgerichts nicht reagiert und lies die fehlerhaften und übertriebenen Anträge in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 unverändert bestehen.

 

-2003-

 

Am 4. April 2003 erging der PKH-ablehnende Beschluss in dem Verfah-ren 2b O 268/01. Die PKH-Ablehnung stützte sich auf die fehlenden Beweise zur Kausalität und auf die fehlerhaften Berechnungsmethoden des Schadens. Das Gericht wies darauf hin, dass die Berechnungen des Schadens im spekulativen Bereich liegen und insofern keine Basis für eine Schätzung des Mindestschadens liefern würden. Die PKH-Teil-Anträge bezüglich des Finanzamtes AVT/ESt-86-92 sind ausdrücklich zurückgestellt worden, damit die Parteien ausführlich vortragen können.

 

Beweis: LG-Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 zu 2b O 268/03 (siehe u.a. Seite 7 ff).

 

Am 19. April 2003 versuchte der Kläger mit einem sechsseitigen Schrei-ben den Beklagten dazu zu bewegen, die Hinweise des Landgericht im PKH-Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 zu berücksichtigen, seine Schriftsätze bzw. die sofortige Beschwerde zu berichtigen und zu ergänzen und die Beweise betreffend die Pumpen des Klägers und Beweise zur Kausalität (Handlungen des Finanzamtes als Ursache für die Pleite des Unterneh-mens des Klägers) an das Landgericht nachzusenden.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 19. April 2003 an den Be-klagten, liegt dem Landgericht bereits vor.

 

Am 2. Mai 2003 legte der Beklagte sofortige Beschwerde gegen den LG-Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 zu 2b O 268/01 ein. Die seitens des Landgerichts kritisierten Fehler und Mängel werden jedoch nicht berichtigt. Stattdessen sind in der Beschwerdeschrift Ausführungen enthalten, die aber weder die Kausalität begründen, noch die Berechnungen des Schadens berichtigen. Die ihm übergebenen Beweise für die Handlungen des Finanzamtes und Ordner hat der Beklagte zurückgehalten.

 

Beweis: Sofortige Beschwerde vom 2. Mai 2003 gegen den PKH-ablehnenden Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Am 1. Juli 2003 und 9 Juli 2003 setzten sich der Kläger und der Beklag-ten zusammen und einigten sich auf einige Berichtigungen und Ergänzungen der sofortigen Beschwerde gegen den LG-Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 zu 2b O 268/01. Trotzdem hat der Beklagte die Vereinbarungen nicht eingehalten.

 

Beweis:

 

1. Schreiben vom 1. Juli 2003 des Klägers an den Beklagten, welches dem Beklagten vorliegt;

2. Schreiben vom 10 Juli 2003 des Klägers an den Beklagten, welches als Anlage dem Gericht am 14. November 2014    

     übersandt wurde.

 

Am 8. Oktober 2003 erwiderte der Beklagte dem Streitgegner (OFD-Düsseldorf) betreffend die Verzinsung des Schadens und wiederholte dabei dieselben fehlerhaften Ansichten und Ausführungen im Klageverfahren.

 

Beweis: Schriftsatz vom 8. Oktober 2003 des Beklagten an das Landgericht zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Weitere Beweise mit Anregungen seitens des Klägers an den Beklagten bis einschließlich Juni 2004 liegen dem Gericht in den Akten zu den Verfahren 2b O 29/08 und 2b O 268/01 vor.

 

Beweis: Beiziehung der Akten des Landgerichts Düsseldorf zu 2b O 29/08 und 2b O 268/01.

 

-2004-

 

Am 23. Juli 2004 ergingen die OLG-Beschlüsse zu 18 W 43/03 (betreffend 2b O 268/01), 18 W 42/03 (betreffend 2b O 118/99), 18 W 22/03 (betreffend 2b O 271/01).

 

Auch in den OLG-Beschlüssen vom 23. Juli 2004 sind die Mängel der Klageanträge des Beklagten als Grund für die Zurückweisung der sofortigen Beschwerden gegen die PKH-ablehnenden Beschlüsse vom 4. April 2003 angeführt.

 

Beweis: OLG-Beschluss vom 23. Juli 2004 zu 18 W 43/03 (2b o 268/01), OLG-Beschluss vom 23. Juli 2004 zu

                     18 W 22/03 (2b o 271/01).

 

Der Kläger war erneut alarmiert. Er hatte jetzt, um weiter prozessieren zu können (und um die Verjährung der Ansprüche in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 zu unterbrechen) nur noch eine Chance. Er muss Klagen ein-reichen und die Gerichtsgebühren für die oben genannten drei Klagen zahlen. Der Kläger befindet sich aber in äußerster finanzieller Not. Der Beklagte hatte den Kläger so in eine missliche Lage versetzt. Für die Klageverfahren war zudem ein Rechtsanwalt vorgeschrieben.

 

Der Kläger schaffte es trotzdem – mit Unterstützung - die erste Rate für alle drei Klagen (2b O 268/01, 2b O 271/01, 2b O 118/99) am 13. August 2004 zu bezahlen und die Prozesse weiterhin als Klageverfahren zu führen, da der Kläger nach Äußerung des Oberlandesgerichts Düsseldorf - 18.Senat - bis zum 13. August 2004 nur PKH-Verfahren geführt hatte.

 

Der Beklagte hat am 13. August 2004 für die oben genannten Verfahren bzw. für das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 neue (um den Faktor 8,00 d.h. von 3.918.827,88 € auf 489.498,42 €) reduzierte und wiederum fehlerhafte, wirre und aussichtslose Klageanträge gestellt, ohne diese zu begründen und versprach in einem gesonderten Schriftsatz, die Klage zu begründen (siehe auch erstinstanzlicher Anhang). Die übertriebenen und wirren Anträge vom 20. November 2001 dienten nur der Sicherung weiterer Honorarforderungen, was im LG-Beschluss vom 24. August 2006 ge-schildert wird. Die Leistungen des Beklagten wurden vom Gericht als nutzlos eingestuft.

 

Beweis: Klageanträge vom 13. August 2004 zu 2b O 268/01 (unbegründet geblieben).

 

Mit den Klageanträgen vom 13. August 2004 beantragte der Beklagte auch die Zustellung der Klage, und zwar ohne Zahlung der weiteren Gerichtsgebühren. Er bat zudem um Fristverlängerung bis Ende September 2004 (vgl. Klage vom 13. August 2004, S. 2).

Mit Klageeinreichung ist die Verjährung der Ansprüche unterbrochen worden.

 

Am 28. August 2004 setzten sich der Kläger und Beklagte zusammen und diskutieren über das weitere Vorgehen in den Verfahren. Der Kläger stellt dem Beklagten die Wahl: entweder werden die Prozesse ordentlich weitergeführt oder die Mandate sollten niedergelegt werden. Mit Schrei-ben vom 2. September 2004 mahnte der Kläger eine Rückmeldung beim Beklagten an.

 

Beweis: Schreiben vom 28. August 2004 des Klägers an den Beklagten

 

Der Kläger bat den Beklagten ferner, ihm die übergebenen Ordner zu der nächsten Besprechung mitzubringen, damit ihm die dort enthaltenen Beweise (betreffend die Kalkulationen der Fertigungskosten der Pumpen und der Investitionen in Griechenland etc.) vorgezeigt werden können.

 

Am 17. September 2004 setzten sich der Kläger und Beklagte erneut zusammen, um über die Mängel und Fehler in den Klagen zu sprechen. Die Ordner hat der Beklagte aber nicht mitgebracht. Das Gespräch gestaltet sich sehr mühsam, weil der Beklagte Schwierigkeiten hatte, technische Fertigungsprobleme betreffend die „intelligenten Teile der Pumpen“ zu verstehen. Zudem war er – so der Eindruck des Klägers - gedanklich stets abwesend; er dachte / plante seinen Rückzug aus Düsseldorf; er wohnte bereits in Ahrweiler, wovon er auch gesprochen hat.

 

Um seine seit August 2004 andauernde Verzögerung zu „verschleiern“, zeigte der Beklagte dem Landgericht erst am 30. September 2004 an, dass sich der Kläger in Griechenland befindet. Am 19. Januar 2005 zeigte er dem Gericht an, dass der Kläger eine serienreife Pumpe bei seiner letzten Griechenlandreise und den Zeugen Petronikolos aufgespürt hätte und somit könne er (der Beklagte) nun die Klagebegründung zügig vorbereiten. Der Beklagte hatte den Kläger pflichtwidrig nicht darüber belehrt, dass ein Exemplar der Pumpe und der Pumpenteile dem Gericht hätte vorgezeigt werden müssen. Diesen Mangel hatten die OLG-Richter am 23. Juli 2004 gerügt.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Beklagten vom 30. September 2004 und vom 19.Januar 2005 an das Landgericht zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Der Beklagte bereitete weiterhin seinen Rückzug aus Düsseldorf vor und stellte den Antrag auf Streitwertfestsetzung.

 

-2005-

 

Am 25. Januar 2005 erließ das Landgericht in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 einen Streitwertbeschluss.

 

Beweis: LG-Beschluss vom 25. Januar 2005.

 

Am 25. Januar 2005 erging ein Schreiben des Landgerichts an den Be-klagten in Bezug auf seinen Antrag und dem Hinweis, dass die Ent-scheidung über den Antrag nach § 14 GKG solange zurückgestellt wird, bis die angekündigte Klagebegründung eingeht. Weil sich der Beklagte aber nicht gemeldet hat und keine Reaktion erfolgte, erging am 31. März 2005 ein Schreiben des Landgerichts an den Beklagten mit einer sechswöchigen Ausschlussfrist.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Landgerichts vom 25. Januar 2005 / 31. März 2005 an den Beklagten.

 

Der Kläger wehrte sich mit Schreiben vom 29. März 2005 gegen den Streitwertfestsetzungsbeschluss und am 12. April 2005 wurde das als Gegenvorstellung eingestufte Schreiben des Klägers gegen den Streitwertfestsetzungsbeschluss seitens des Landgerichts zurückgewiesen und an das Oberlandesgericht weitergeleitet.

 

Beweis: Beschluss des Landgerichts vom 12. April 2005.

 

Am 12. April 2005 übersandte der Kläger eine umfangreiche Klagebe-gründung an das Gericht und fügte die Fotos von den Pumpen und Pumpenteilen bei. Weiterhin waren Erklärungen über Kalkulationen und Fertigung der intelligenten Pumpenteile im Werk des Erfinders enthalten, welche der Beklagte bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt pflichtwidrig für sich zurückbehalten hatte.

 

Beweis: Klagebegründung vom 12. April 2005 des Klägers mit Fotos der Pumpen und Pumpenteile

 

Am 14. April 2005 stellte der Kläger erneut den PKH-Antrag für die sei-tens des Landgerichts / Oberlandesgerichts mit den Beschlüssen vom 4. April 2003 / 23. Juli 2004 noch nicht entschiedenen Anträge auf Schadenersatz betreffend die Handlungen des Finanzamtes Mettmann in Sachen AVT und EST-86-92 zu 2b O 268/01. Dies hätte der Beklagte aber machen müssen, was er aber unterlassen hat.

 

Beweis: PKH-Antrag des Klägers vom 14. April 2005 zu 2b O 268/01 (betr. AVT u. ESt).

 

Am 18. April 2005 legte der Beklagte plötzlich seine Mandate nieder, und zwar ohne einen Entwurf der Klagebegründung für das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 vorbereitet zu haben. Zur Fortführung des Klageverfahrens wird aber ein neuer Rechtsanwalt benötigt, was auch der Beklagte anmerkte. Somit sind die Kosten des Nachfolgers erzwungen. Ein neuer Rechtsanwalt war rechtlich unverzichtbar (siehe Schreiben des Beklagten vom 18. April 2005.)

 

Der Beklagte hat sich in den zwei Jahren (4. April 2003 bis 18. April 2005) auch nicht dafür eingesetzt, dass das Landgericht eine Entscheidung betreffend die in den am 4. April 2003 zurückgestellten PKH-Teil-Anträgen betreffend AVT/ESt-86-92 verkündet.

 

Beweis: Anzeige des Beklagten vom 18. April 2005 - Niederlegung des Mandats zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Mit Beschluss vom 11. Mai 2005 lehnte das Landgericht die seitens des Klägers beantragte Verbindung der Verfahren 2b O 268/01 und 2b O 271/01 ab. Ebenfalls wurde eine beantragte Fristverlängerung für die Klagebegründung abgelehnt.

 

Beweis: Beschluss des Landgerichts vom 11. Mai 200zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Am 1. Juni 2005 wurde die am 9. Mai 2005 erhobene Beschwerde gegen den Beschluss des Landgerichts vom 12. April 2005 zu 2b O 268/01 (Streitwertfestsetzung) nicht abgeholfen und an das Oberlandesgericht weitergeleitet.

 

Am 12. Juli 2005 erließ das Oberlandesgericht -18. Senat - einen Sammelbeschluss zu den Aktenzeichen 18 W 22/03 (betreffend 2b O 271/01), 18 W 42/03 (betreffend 2b O 118/99), 18 W 43/03 (betreffend 2b O 268/01) und wies die erhobenen Gegenvorstellungen des Klägers vom 12. August 2004, 24. März 2005, 25. April 2005, 9. Juni 2005 und 1. Juli 2005 als unbegründet zurück.

 

Beweis: Beschluss des Oberlandesgerichts vom 12. Juli 2005 zu 18 W 43/03 (betreffend 2b O 268/01).

 

Am 12. Juli 2005 erließ das Oberlandesgericht -18. Senat - einen Beschluss zu 18 W 21/05 (betreffend 2b O 268/01), mit dem die sofortige Beschwerde gegen den Streitwertfestsetzungsbeschluss des Landgerichts vom 25. Januar 2005 als unbegründet zurückgewiesen wurde.

 

Beweis: Beschluss des Oberlandesgerichts vom 12. Juli 2005 zu 18 W 21/05 (betreffend 2b O 268/01).

 

Am 9. September 2005 stellte der Kläger den PKH-Antrag betreffend die Klageanträge vom 13. August 2004 des Beklagten und übersandte ihn erneut an das Landgericht am 20. September 2005. Somit versuchte der Kläger alles Mögliche zu tun, um das Verfahren zu retten, was ihm aber auf Grund der wirren Anträge und der unschlüssigen Klage des Beklagten vom 13. August 2004 nicht gelang.

 

-2006-

 

Mit OLG-Beschluss vom 16. März 2006 zu 18 W 28/05 wurde die Beschwerde des Klägers gegen die LG-Ablehnung des Antrags auf Verbindung der Verfahren 2b O 268/01 und 2b O 271/01, verworfen. Die Verwerfung wurde mit dem erforderlichen Anwaltszwang im Klageverfahren begründet.

 

Beweis: OLG-Beschluss vom 16. März 2006 zu 18 W 28/05 (betreffend 2b O 268/01).

 

Am 4. April 2006 drängte der Kläger die 2b-Zivilkammer auf eine Entscheidung über die ursprünglichen und noch nicht entschiedenen PKH-Teil-Anträge betreffend AVT u. ESt-86-92.

 

Am 15. April 2006 wurde dem Landgericht gemeldet, dass die Gerichtsgebühren für das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 vollständig einbezahlt worden sind, so dass auf Zustellung der Klage vom 13. August 2004 gedrängt wird.

 

Am 24. August 2006 entschied die 2b-Zivilkammer über die Zustellung der Klage 2b O 268/01

 

Beweis: LG-Beschluss vom 24. August 2006 zu 2b O 268/01; die Klage wird vAw zugestellt.

 

Am 24. August 2006 lehnte die 2b-Zivilkammer den PKH-Antrag des Klägers vom 9. September 2005 für das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 ab. Als Begründung werden u.a. die Schwierigkeiten der Zuordnung der PKH-Zahlen mit den Anträgen des Beklagten aufgeführt. Daraus ergibt sich die Verletzung der Pflichten des Beklagten gemäß § 280 BGB.

 

Beweis: LG-Beschluss vom 24. August 2006 zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Am 19. Dezember 2006 meldete der Kläger der 2b-Zivilkammer im Verfahren 2b O 268/01 zwei weitere Niederlagen des Finanzamtes Mettmann beim Finanzgericht Düsseldorf und die Erstattung eines Teils der bis dahin zurückbehaltenen bzw. gepfändeten Einkommen- und Umsatzsteuer-Erstattungsbeträge 1979-1991.

 

Somit ist die Verjährung aller Schadensersatzansprüche (alt und neu) in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 erneut unterbrochen worden.

 

-2007-

 

Am 8. Januar 2007 wurde die 2b-Zivilkammer erneut aufgefordert, die Gründe für die noch nicht erfolgte Zustellung der Klage zu 2b O 268/01 zu benennen.

 

Am 4. Juli 2007 erging der OLG-Beschluss zu 18 W 2/07 (betreffend 2b O 268/01), mit dem die sofortige Beschwerde gegen den LG-Beschluss vom 24. August 2006 (betreffend die ursprünglichen vom 20. November 2001 und Teil-PKH-Anträge für AVT und EST-86-92) als unbegründet zurückgewiesen wurde. Daraus ergeben sich die Versäumnisse des Beklagten.

 

Beweis: OLG-Beschluss vom 4. Juli 2007 zu 18 W 2/07 (betreffend 2b O 268/01).

 

Mit dem OLG-Beschluss vom 4. Juli 2007 endete (nach BGB a.F.) die Hemmung der Verjährung des ersten PKH-Antrags vom 20. November 2001 des Beklagten.

 

Somit ist der Schaden, verursacht seitens des Beklagten betreffend AVT und ESt-86-92, zum ersten Mal erkennbar geworden.

Am 10. September 2007 und am 6. Dezember 2007 wurde die 2b-Zivilkammer daran erinnert, die Klage zu 2b O 268/01 zuzustellen.

 

- 2008 bis Ende 2011 -

 

Mit Verfügung vom 17. Januar 2008 wurde ein erster Termin für eine mündliche Verhandlung am 7. Mai 2008 in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 bestimmt.

 

Beweis: Verfügung vom 17. Januar 2008 zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Die Klage zu 2b O 268/01 (d.h. nur die Klageanträge vom 13. August 2004 ohne Begründung) ist dem beklagten Land erst gegen Ende Januar 2008 zugestellt worden.

 

Am 30. Januar 2008 stellte der Kläger einen neuen PKH-Antrag für das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 und fügte erneut Bilder von Pumpen und Pum-penteilen bei, und ergänzte ihn am 17. Februar 2008 und am 29. Februar 2008 mit Preiskalkulationen und Nachweisen der FG-Prozesskosten, die der Beklagte dem Gericht nicht zugesandt hatte. Das Fehlen der Unterlagen ist nach einer Akteneinsicht festgestellt worden.

 

Am 9. April 2008 erfolgte seitens Rechtsanwalt Minnerop die Klageerwiderung zu 2b O 268/01 ab. Er schließt seinen Vortrag mit der Anmer-kung: „Die Klage (des hiesigen Beklagten) ist nach allem ersichtlichen abzuweisen, für ein schlüssiges Vorbringen fehlt es nachhaltig und sozusagen an allem“.

 

 

Am 16. April 2008 wurde der Antrag des Rechtsanwalt Borgelt auf Terminverlegung bestätigt, damit er die Akten des Verfahrens 2b O 268/01 einsehen kann und es wurde ein neuer Verhandlungstermin für den 21. Juli 2008 anberaumt.

 

Nach Akteneinsicht stellte Herr Rechtsanwalt Borgelt am 27. Juni 2008 den Antrag auf Verlegung des Termins vom 21. Juli 2008 unter Hinweis auf den Umfang und der Kompliziertheit des Verfahrens 2b o 268/01 und legte schließlich am 11.Juli 2008 sein Mandat nieder.

 

Die Ereignisse von Juni 2008 bis zum 16. März 2011 sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die LG-Richterinnen Engelkamp-Neeser und Stockschlaeder-Nöll ohne Erfolg versucht hatten, den Kläger als partiell prozessunfähig auszuschalten und gleichzeitig die eingeschalteten Rechtsanwälte (Goumagias, Weidemann, Klöpper) aus der Entzifferung und Berichtigung der fehlerhaften Anträge vom 13. August 2004 des hiesigen Beklagten zu halten.

 

Die Einschaltung des Rechtsanwalts Weidemann für das Klageverfahren 2b O 268/01 war insoweit erforderlich, weil der Verhandlungstermin am 16. März 2011 bereits feststand (Anwaltszwang). Der dafür bezahlte Vorschuss in Höhe von 315,44 € war angemessen.

 

Als Herr Rechtsanwalt Weidemann am 13. März 2011 den Antrag auf Verschiebung des Verhandlungstermins vom 16. März 2011 stellte, damit er über das medizinische Gutachten vom 11. März 2011 mit Herrn Dr. Lutz sprechen kann, wurde sein Antrag abgelehnt.

Am 16. März 2011 fand die mündliche Verhandlung zu 2b O 268/01 statt.

 

Die Klage wurde mit einem ersten Versäumnisurteil abgewiesen.

 

Gegen das Versäumnisurteil vom 16. März 2011 legte Herr Rechtsanwalt Weidemann Einspruch ein. Danach verzichtet Herr Rechtsanwalt Weidemann auf die Fortführung des Mandats.

 

Ein erneuter Versuch, die Anträge des hiesigen Beklagten vom 13. Au-gust 2004 nachzuvollziehen, erfolgte im September 2011 seitens Herrn Rechtsanwalt Klöpper, der aber die Gerichtsakten benötigte. Er rief bei Gericht an und sprach mit der Vorsitzenden Stockschlaeder-Nöll, die ihm anriet, das Mandat nicht anzunehmen.

 

Beweis: Aktennotiz der Richterin Stockschlaeder-Nöll vom 27. September 2011, als Anlage beigefügt.

 

Die Klage 2b O 268/01 hätte nach ihrer Aussage keine Aussicht auf Erfolg. Der Termin in dem Verfahren am 5. Oktober 2011 stand fest.

 

Danach verzichtet Herr Rechtsanwalt Klöpper auf die Übernahme des Mandats.

 

Der Kläger versuchte am 4. Oktober 2011 mit einem Antrag nach § 121 ZPO einen Rechtsanwalt seitens des Gerichts bestimmen zu lassen und benannte drei Rechtsanwälte, die aber Zeit benötigten, um die Akten einzusehen und zu studieren. Als Bedingung für die Übernahme des Mandats forderten sie zudem eine Verschiebung des Verhandlungstermins vom 5. Oktober 2011.

 

Am 5. Oktober 2011 fand die mündliche Verhandlung zu 2b O 268/01 statt und der Antrag nach § 121 ZPO wurde ignoriert. Am 12. Oktober 2011 wurden der PKH-Antrag und die Klage 2b O 268/01 (mit den unbegründeten Anträgen des hiesigen Beklagten) durch ein zweites Ver-säumnisurteil abgewiesen.

 

- 2012 bis Ende Juli 2013 -

 

Der Unterzeichnete unternahm einen erneuten Versuch am 18. Januar 2012, um die Klage 2b O 268/01 im Berufungsverfahren 18 U 223/11 zu retten und stellte für den Kläger den PKH-Antrag für die Berufungsverfahren.

 

Der PKH-Antrag für die Berufung 18 U 223/11 wurde am 9. Juli 2012 seitens des Oberlandesgerichts -18. Senat - abgelehnt und die Rechts-beschwerde nicht zugelassen. Am 11. Juli 2012 wurde die Beschwerde gegen den die PKH-ablehnenden LG-Beschluss vom 12. Oktober 2011 ebenfalls zurückgewiesen.

 

Auch die sofortige Beschwerde vom 26. Juli 2012 gegen den OLG-Beschluss vom 9. Juli 2012 zu 18 U 223/11 hatte keinen Erfolg.

Mit einer Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde vom 12. Dezember 2012 versuch-te Herr Rechtsanwalt Vorwerk, beim BGH das Revisionsverfahren (PKH-Antrag vom 1. März 2013 für die NZB) einzuleiten. Der BGH lehnte mit Entscheidung zu III ZR 399/12 vom 27. Juni 2013 die NZB ab.

 

Somit wurde am 27. Juni 2013 das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 endgültig abgeschlossen.

 

Der dem Kläger bis dahin (27. Juni 2013) durch die Fehler und Versäumnisse des Beklagten entstandene Schaden hat sich endgültig manifestiert, und zwar durch die sodann erfolgte Entscheidung des BVerfG vom 13.08.2013 zu Az.:2 BvR 1701/13. Ab diesen Zeitpunkt sind auch die Verzugszinsen zu berechnen.

 

II. Kausalität/Fehler und Versäumnisse des Beklagten im Verfahren zum Az.:2b O 268/01

 

Aus der vorherigen und bisherigen Schilderung des Sachverhalts gehen die Handlungen des Klägers hervor, um sowohl den ursprünglichen PKH-Antrag vom 20. November 2001 als auch die Klage vom 13. August 2004 zu 2b O 268/01 zu retten, damit der Beklagte nicht behaupten kann, der Kläger hätte es versäumt, das Klageverfahren 2b O 268/01 mit einem anderen Rechtsanwalt zu retten.

 

Aus dem Sachverhalt fällt sofort auf, dass der Beklagte niemals den Kläger informiert hat, welche Beweise für die Pumpen, Maschinen und Fertigung erforderlich waren, und wie die Bescheinigungen der zum Kauf der Pumpen interessierte Kunden aussehen sollten. Ferner erfolgten keine Hinweise an den Kläger, was dieser vorzulegen habe, damit die Klagen schlüssig gemacht werden können. Ebenfalls wurde nie darüber gesprochen, welche Kosten aus den Prozessen dem Kläger entstehen würden.

 

Der Beklagte konzentrierte sich stattdessen auf die Urteile / Beschlüsse des Finanzgerichts und auf die Verzinsung des Schadens, ohne zu er-klären, wie der Schaden ermittelt wird.

 

a. Anträge vom 20.11.2001 kausal für die Ablehnung der beantragten PKH und für die spätere Zahlung der

       Gerichtsgebühren

 

Mit den am 20. November 2001 gestellten Anträgen für Prozesskostenhilfe stellte der Beklagte die Weichen für den Misserfolg des

PKH-Verfahrens zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Auf der 1/2 Seite der Klageschrift vom 20. November 2001 machte der Beklagte folgenden Anspruch geltend:

 

„Der Beklagte wird verurteilt dem Kläger DM 7.654.782,-- zu zahlen, nebst gesetzlichen Verzugszinsen, und zwar ab Rechtshängigkeit in Höhe von jährlich 5 Prozentpunkte über dem Basiszinssatz nach § 1 des Diskont-Überleitungsgesetzes.“

 

Auf Seite 4 der Klageschrift verweist der Beklagte auf Abschnitt III, wo der Schaden aus dem Geschäft mit den Gebrüdern Apostolopouloi, Verlust des AVT Auftrages, und der unberechtigten Vereinnahmung von Einkommensteuer, detailliert ermittelt werden.

 

Auf Seite 22 der Klageschrift ist auch der Schadenersatz gemäß § 823 I BGB wegen Verletzung des Persönlichkeitsrechts geltend gemacht worden, und zwar in Höhe von mindestens 80.000,00 DM. Dort im Kapitel „Allgemeines“ erklärt der Beklagte wie der Hauptanspruch verzinst wird.

 

Am 27. Dezember 2001 waren die Ansprüche in Euro umgerechnet worden und mit 3.913.827,88 € geltend gemacht worden.

Ein erheblicher Fehler des Beklagten war die Nichttrennung der Haupt- von den Nebenforderungen in der Berechnung des Schadens und die Ermittlung des Schadens bzw. die Geltendmachung des fehlerhaft ermittelten Schadens in US-Dollar. Anbei exemplarisch die Beweise für 2 Jahre.

 

Beweise: Anträge vom 20. November 2001 zu 2b O 268/01 (Berechnung des Schadens).

 

Der Kläger hat versucht den Beklagten mit Schreiben vom 15. Februar 2005 zu bewegen, den Fehler zu beheben / zu berichtigen, was er aber bis zur Niederlegung der Mandate (18. April 2005) nicht getan hat.

 

Die fehlende Berichtigung der fehlerhaften Berechnungsmethode hat der Beklagte zu verantworten.

 

Das Schreiben vom 15. Februar 2005 des Klägers an den Beklagten ist mit diesseitigem Schriftsatz vom 5. Dezember 2014 beigefügt worden und dort auf den Seiten 8 und 9 kommentiert worden.

 

Ersinstanzlich sind Fotokopien der Schadensberechnungen des Beklagten beigefügt worden, um die Fehlerhaftigkeit der Anträge vorzuführen.

 

Dieselbe fehlerhafte Methode (keine Trennung der Hauptforderung von der Nebenforderung) praktizierte der Beklagte auch für die Ermittlung der Schadenshöhe auf Grund des Verlustes des Auftrages der Firma AVT und auf Grund der Verluste aus der ESt-86-92. Somit sind die Verluste um den Faktor 3,5 bis 7,5 künstlich erhöht worden.

 

Beweis: Verlustberechnungen des Beklagten aus der Firma AVT und aus ESt-86-92.

 

Daraus ergibt sich und unabhängig von allen anderen Gründen, dass die Anträge vom 20. November 2001 auf Grund der künstlichen Erhöhung der Verluste keine Aussicht auf Erfolg hatten, aber eine rechtliche Sicherung der Rechtsanwaltshonorare bedeuteten.

Die Liste mit den geleisteten Vorschüssen liegt dem Gericht bereits vor.

 

Mit den fehlerhaften Anträgen hat der Beklagte die Chancen des Verfahrens zunichte gemacht und somit die Grundlage für die PKH-ablehnende Entscheidung des Landgerichts am 4. April 2003 geliefert. Im benannten LG-Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 sind die Berechnungen als im spekula-tiven Bereich liegend verworfen worden.

 

Beweis: LG Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Die sofortige Beschwerde ist am 23. Juli 2004 seitens des Oberlandesgerichts zu 18 W 43/03 als unbegründet zurückgewiesen worden. Dort sind die Fehler und Versäumnisse des Beklagten ausführlich dargelegt worden.

 

Beweis: OLG Beschluss vom 23. Juli 2004 zu 18 W 43/03 (betreffend 2b O 268/01).

 

Aus den Beschlüssen des Landgerichts / Oberlandesgerichts sich, dass die fehlerhafte Prozessleitung des Beklagten kausal für die dem Kläger entstandenen Kosten (gezahlte Honorare) war.

 

Wenn das Gericht Fehler darlegt und mehrfach die Erfolglosigkeit des Verfahrens auf Grund mangelnder Darlegung / Schlüssigkeit hinweist, dann können diese Fehler / Mängel nicht plötzlich weggefallen sein.

 

Am 4. April 2003 war kein endgültiger Schaden eingetreten, weil der Beklagte eine sofortige Beschwerde am 2. Mai 2003 eingelegt hat.

Schließlich sei angemerkt, dass es nicht Aufgabe des Unterzeichenten ist, die damaligen fehlerhaften Anträge hier richtig zu formulieren.

 

b) Kausalität der Klageanträge vom 13. August 2004 für die Kosten des Verfahrens 2b O 268/01

 

Auffällig ist, dass am 13. August 2004 zwei Anträge gestellt worden sind, und zwar

 

a) „Der Beklagte wird verurteilt dem Kläger 522.273, United States Dollar/USD (kurswert12.8.2004, 426.136,58 EUR) nebst gesetzlichen Verzugszinsen, und zwar ab Rechtshängigkeit in Höhe von jährlich 5 Prozentpunkte über dem Basiszinssatz sowie nebst den von der National Bank von Griechenland für Geldanalagen in US Dollar, Anlage Dauer ein Jahr (Anlage K23) gewährten variablen Zinsen, und zwar im Jahr 1989 für 59.663 USD 16,3%, im Jahre 1990 usw. usw. bis im Jahr 2001 für 522.273 bis zur Rechtshängigkeit 6,875%“;

 

b) „63.361,84 EUR nebst gesetzlichen Verzugszinsen, und zwar ab Rechtshängigkeit in Höhe von jährlich 5 Prozentpunkte über dem Basiszinssatz sowie nebst den von der National Bank von Griechenland mit Schreiben vom 22.5.2001 angegebenen variablen Zinsen (1987: 17,80%, 1988: 17,10 % usw. usw. bis ab 1.1.1992 jeweils bis Rechtshängigkeit.“

 

Der Beklagte hat Haupt- und Nebenforderungen (Zinsen) nicht getrennt und somit die Schadenshöhe um den Faktor 8,0 erhöht.

 

Der Beklagte hat also niemals erklärt, warum er am 13. August 2004 die Schadenersatzansprüche wegen der Verluste aus dem Geschäft mit der Firma Gebrüder Apostolopouloi, aus dem Verlust des Auftrags der Firma AVT, aus dem Verlust der ESt. sowie das Schmerzensgeld nicht geltend gemacht hat. Er hatte zwei Jahre Zeit, um zu überprüfen, ob die Ansprü-che durchsetzbar sind.

 

Ebenfalls hat er nicht erklärt, warum der Anspruch zu a) in US-Dollar angegeben wurde und was es mit den Zahlen auf sich hat, die er sowohl im Anspruch zu a) als auch im Anspruch zu b) am 13. August 2004 geltend gemacht hat.


Er hätte wissen müssen, dass vor deutschen Gerichten nur Ansprüche in DM oder in Euro geltend gemacht werden. Auch das hat der Beklagte am 13. August 2004 nicht gewusst und hat dem Kläger nur Kosten verursacht.

 

Es ist auch nicht nachvollziehbar, wie sich die Anträge vom 20. Novem-ber 2001 und vom 13. August 2004 zueinander verhalten und wie sie abgeleitet werden.

 

Diese Schwierigkeiten hatten nicht nur das Gericht, sondern auch der Kläger; er konnte sich die rätselhaften Beträge in den Anträgen des Be-klagten nicht erklären und nicht enträtseln.

 

Auch an dieser Stelle sei nochmals betont, dass es nicht Aufgabe des Unterzeichneten ist hier die damals fehlerhaften Anträge richtig zu formulieren.

 

Insofern ist die Aussage des Klägers richtig, dass ihm bis Ende 2011 von dem Schaden noch nichts bekannt war.

 

Es gab zwar in manchen Erklärungen in den LG/OLG-Beschlüssen Warnungen der Richter; aber diese waren für den Beklagten bestimmt und nicht für den Kläger als Laien.

 

Die Kausalität der „rätselhaften“ Anträge für den eingetretenen Schaden wird vorerst aus zwei Beschlüssen deutlich und zwar am 24. August 2006. Dort erfolgte die Zurückweisung des PKH-Antrags seitens des Landgerichts mit der Begründung der Schwierigkeit der Zuordnung der Zahlen zu den ursprünglichen Beträgen. 

 

Am 4. Juli 2007 bestätigt das Oberlandesgericht die PKH-Ablehnung.

 

Beweis:

 

1. Beschluss des Landgerichts vom 24. August 2006 zu 2b O 268/01;

2. Beschluss des Oberlandesgerichts vom 4. Juli 2007 zu 18 W 2/07 (betreffend 2b O 268/01).

 

Somit waren die unbegründeten Anträge des Beklagten vom 13. August 2004 kausal für die Kosten des Verfahrens zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Alle Beteiligten: die Oberfinanzdirektion Düsseldorf (Nissen), Rechtsanwalt Minnerop, LG-Richterinnen (Tannert, Brückner-Hoffmann, Stockschlaeder-Nöll), OLG-Richter (Malsch/Haarmann/Schröder/Anderegg), Rechtsanwälte Borgelt/Weidemann/Klöpper) haben auf die mangelhaften Schriftsätze und Anträge des Beklagten hingewiesen, so dass diese Mängel/Fehler nicht plötzlich weg sein können.

 

Auch an dieser Stelle sei nochmals betont, dass es nicht Aufgabe des Unterzeichenten ist hier die damals fehlerhaften Anträge richtig zu formulieren.

 

a) Oberfinanzdirektion Düsseldorf (Nissen)

 

In seinen Stellungnahmen (abgegeben im damaligen Verfahren 2b O 118/99 aber mit Geltung für 2b O 268/01) kritisierte er die Schadensberechnungen des Beklagten und trägt am 20. Januar 2003 zu 2b O 268/01 und zu 2b O 271/01 „Anspruchsvernichtende Einwendungen“ vor. Der Mangel des Kausalitätsnachweises stellte eine sichere gerichtliche Niederlage dar.

 

b) LG-Richterin Tannert

 

Richterin Tannert wies darauf hin, dass der Beklagte übertriebene An-träge in Millionenhöhe am 5. Februar 2001 (später 2b O 271/01) und am 20. November 2001 (später 2b O 268/01) gestellt hatte und keine Kausalität (Handlungen der FA-Beamten) dargelegt hat; sie hat versucht, den Beklagten mit Schreiben vom 21. Februar 2001 zu 2b O 118/99 vorsichtig darauf hinzuweisen. Aber der Beklagte hat den Fehler nicht behoben.

 

c) LG-Richterin Brückner-Hoffmann

 

Die abwertende Meinung der Richterin Brückner-Hoffmann über die Schriftsätze des Beklagten wird hinter dem Begriff „Bedenken“ in dem Anhörungsprotokoll vom 12. November 2002 versteckt. Dort weist die Richterin den Beklagten darauf hin, dass die Kausalitätsdarlegung der Handlungen des Finanzamtes für die Pleite des Unternehmens des Klägers fehlt und dass die Klage unschlüssig sei.

 

Nachdem der Beklagte die Berechnungsfehler und die Anträge nicht berichtigt hatte, beschreibt Frau Brückner-Hoffmann in seitenlangen Ausführungen (ab S. 6 bis 10 im Beschluss vom 4. April 2003) die Fehler und Versäumnisse des Beklagten. Die Klage ist unschlüssig, die Kausalität fehlt u. die Schadensberechnungen werden als im „Spekulationsbereich“ liegend eingestuft. Der Beklagte greift diese Hinweise aber nicht auf. In der sofortigen Beschwerde erfolgte trotz der Hinweise des Klägers keine Berichtigung.

 

d) LG-Richterin Strupp-Müller

 

Im PKH-ablehnenden Beschluss vom 24. August 2006 zu 2b O 268/01 sind die Schwierigkeiten der Zuordnung der PKH-Teilanträge für die Fälle AVT und ESt-86-92 aus dem Jahre 20. November 2001 mit den rätselhaften Zahlen/Beträgen in dem Schriftsatz vom 13. August 2004 überdeutlich geschildert. Der Beschlusstenor lautet: „Es ist nicht nachvollziehbar, welche Einzelpositionen Gegenstand der vorliegenden Teilschadenersatzklage sein sollen. Für AVT und wegen nicht geschuldeter Steuer, ist kein Antrag am 13. August 2004 gestellt“.

 

Warum der Beklagte keinen Antrag für die ESt-86-92 am 13. August 2004 gestellt hat, kann man damit erklären, dass der Beklagte aus dem Beschluss des Oberlandegerichts vom 23. Juli 2004 erfahren hatte, dass für Steuerrückforderungen das Finanzgericht zuständig ist. Er hatte also mit Schriftsatz vom 20. November 2001 nicht Schadenersatz, sondern Steuerrückzahlungen beim Landgericht / Oberlandesgericht eingeklagt und das Oberlandesgericht hat den Beklagten darauf hingewiesen.

 

e) LG-Richterinnen Stockschlaeder-Nöll und Engelkamp-Neeser

 

Die Richterinnen der 2b-Zivilkammer (Stockschlaeder-Nöll/Engelkamp-Neeser) konnten auch nicht begreifen, dass der Kläger auf Durchführung des Prozesses 2b O 268/01 mit den rätselhaften Anträgen des Beklagten vom 13. August 2004 bestanden hat und empfahlen den in den Jahren 2008-2011 nachgeschalteten Rechtsanwalt das Mandat nicht zu übernehmen.

 

Aus der Aktennotiz der Frau Stockschlaeder-Nöll betreffend das Tele-fongespräch mit Herrn Rechtsanwalt Klöpper geht die ablehnende Meinung der Richterin für das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 unter der Prozesslei-tung des Beklagten hervor.

 

Beweis: vgl. anliegende Aktennotiz der Richterin Stockschlaeder-Nöll

 

f) OLG-Richter Malsch/Haarmann/Fr. Schröder/Fr. Anderegg

 

Die langen Ausführungen in den OLG-Beschlüssen vom 23. Juli 2004 des 18.Senats (18 W 22/03, 18 W 42/03, 18 W 43/03) lassen keinen Zweifeln darüber aufkommen, wie viele und welche Fehler und Versäumnisse der Beklagte begangen hat. Der Kläger hat aus den OLG-Beschlüssen vom 23. Juli 2004 erfahren, dass der Beklagte die ihm übergebenen Belege nicht dem Gericht zugesandt hatte. Um die Ausführungen hier kurz zu halten wird auf die OLG-Beschlüsse vom 23. Juli 2004 verwiesen.

 

In dem hiesigen Verfahren hat der Beklagte zu seiner Entlastung einen Klageentwurf vom 28. Januar 2005 für die Klage zu 2b o 271/01 vorgelegt und hat somit versucht, den Eindruck zu erwecken, dass er die Be-lehrungen der OLG-Richter bedacht habe und dies im Entwurf für das Verfahren 2b O 271/01 integrieren wollte.

 

Es wird betont, dass der Beklagte für die Klage 2b O 268/01 bis zur Nie-derlegung seiner Mandate am 18. April 2005 keinen einzigen Entwurf vorbereitet hatte und der Entwurf vom 18. Januar 2005 für das Verfahren 2b O 271/01 (auch die Beleg betreffen das Verfahren 2b O 271/01) hier nicht herangezogen und verwertet werden kann.

 

Nebenbei sei erwähnt, dass der Entwurf im Verfahren 2b O 271/01 vom 28. Januar 2005 darlegt, dass die fehlerhaften Anträge nicht berichtigt worden sind.

 

Außerdem ergibt sich auf Seite 15 (letzter Absatz) des Entwurfs vom 18. Januar 2005 für das Verfahren 2b O 271/01, dass der Beklagte Schwierigkeiten hatte, den Schaden zu ermitteln; Hauptanträge (Schaden) und Nebenanträge (Zinsen) sind nicht getrennt worden.

 

Darüber hinaus hat der Beklagte dem Landgericht zu 2b O 29/08 eine absolut falsche Information am 24. Februar 2012 zukommen lassen, dass der Kläger finanziell in der Lage sei, die Kosten in Höhe von 1.496,54 € für einen Mahnbescheid in Höhe von 73.662,27 € zu bezahlen.

 

Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat prompt diese Infor-mation des Beklagten (ohne sie zu überprüfen!!!) verwertet und zu Unrecht die PKH-Anträge zu 2b O 29/08 (14. März 2012) und zu 2b O 271/01 (am 22. März 2012 und 28. Mai 2014) abgelehnt.

 

Der Beklagte wiederholte am 8. Juli. 2014 zu 2b O 102/14 seine Be-hauptung, dass der Kläger finanzstark wäre, und verlangte auch eine Kopie der Steuererklärung des Klägers.

 

Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf forderte diesmal den Kläger am 26. Juni 2014 auf, nachzuweisen, woher er das Geld hatte, um die Kosten in Höhe von 1.348,00 € zu bezahlen und verlangte Fotokopien der Kontoauszüge der letzten sechs Monate sowie Fotokopien der Einkommensteuererklärungen bzw. Steuerbescheide des letzten Jahres.

 

Hierbei ist am 23. August 2014 seitens des Klägers nachgewiesen worden, dass die Kosten nicht 1.496,54 € betragen (wie der Beklagte behauptete, um die Glaubwürdigkeit des Klägers zu untergraben), sondern nur 1.140,00 € (laut Nachweis der Rechnung des Amtsgerichts Hagen).

 

Einen Teil davon (228,00 €) hat die Sozietät Schmitz, Witte & Collegen vorgestreckt, um den Kläger zu helfen und die restlichen Mahnkosten sind seitens eines Dritten bezahlt worden. Entsprechende Beweise liegen bereits dem Gericht vor; es ist sogar dem Kläger seitens der Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf empfohlen worden, dieselben Beweise an das Oberlandesgericht zu 2b O 271/01 nachzureichen.

 

Die Bescheinigung des Finanzamtes Essen-Süd vom 7. November 2014 deckt die Jahre 2011-2012-2013 ab und bestätigt, dass der Kläger wegen seiner geringen Renteneinkünfte keine Verpflichtung hat, Einkommensteuererklärungen abzugeben. Auch diese Behauptung des Beklagten ist entkräftet worden.

 

Der Kläger musste die Gerichtsgebühren für das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 deshalb entrichten, weil die beantragte Prozesskostenhilfe seitens des Oberlandesgerichts Düsseldorf mit Beschluss vom 23. Juli 2004 endgültig abgelehnt wurde. Ursache für die PKH Ablehnung waren die fehlerhaften Anträge des Beklagten vom 20. November 2001.


Beweis: OLG-Beschluss vom 23. Juli 2004 zu 18 W 43/03 (betreffend 2b O 268/01).

 

Der Beklagte schrieb dem Kläger, dass er vom Schadensersatzanspruch überzeugt wäre, der seitens der Beamten des Finanzamtes Mettmann verursacht wurde und dass er eine Kompensation dieses Schadens erreichen werde; er hielt es als realisierbares Ziel und drängte zur Durchführung der Prozesse.

 

Beweis: Schreiben vom 27. Mai 2005 des Beklagten

 

Auf Grund der Überzeugung, auch des Beklagten, stand dem Kläger wegen der rechtswidrigen Handlungen der Beamten des Finanzamtes Mettmann ein berechtigter Schadenersatzanspruch zu, der aber mit den fehlerhaften Anträgen keinen Erfolg hatte.

 

Diese Überzeugung, nicht nur des Beklagten, sondern auch anderer Fachleute, bestärkten den Kläger, alle Schwierigkeiten (die der Beklagte mittels seiner fehlerhaften Anträge und Schriftsätze bis heute verursacht hat) zu überwinden.

 

Der Beklagte drängte auf die Fortführung der Prozesse selbst am 27. März 2005 und ersuchte Dritte um Unterstützung und um weitere Vorschusszahlungen (siehe sein Schreiben vom 27. März 2005, Seite 4), zu erreichen.

 

Der Kläger musste die Gerichtsgebühren bis April 2006 in Raten bezahlen; auf Grund der geringen Rente (am Rande des Existenzminimums) waren die Zahlungen nicht einfach für den Kläger.

 

Der Kläger musste also kurzfristig einen „Dritten“ suchen und finden.

 

Wenn der Beklagte richtige und nachvollziehbare Anträge am 20. November 2001 gestellt hätte, dann wäre die Prozesskostenhilfe gewährt worden und der Kläger hätte die Gerichtsgebühren nicht zahlen müssen.

 

Für die Gerichtsgebühren - nach endgültigem Eintritt des Schadens im Jahre 2013 - ist der Beklagte erstattungspflichtig.

Kosten 315,44 € für RA Weidemann

 

An Herrn Rechtsanwalt Weidemann sind insgesamt 1.500,00 € bezahlt worden und die Kosten für seine Tätigkeit in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 betragen nur 315,44 €. Der Rest des Vorschusses galt für das Verfahren 2b O 271/01. Herr Rechtsanwalt Weidemann konnte die fehlerhaften Anträge des Beklagten vom 20. November 2001 und vom 13. August 2004 nicht enträtseln. Der insgesamt geleistete Vorschuss in Höhe von 315,44 € ist im Vergleich zu der erbrachten Leistungen nicht nur angemessen, sondern auch sehr gering.

Kosten 5.727,59 € für Nachfolger-Rechtsanwalt

 

Der Beklagte und sein Vertreter (Rechtsanwalt Becker) bestreiten die Notwendigkeit der Beauftragung eines weiteren Rechtsanwalts und die entsprechend verursachten Kosten in der oben genannten Höhe.

 

Aus dem Sachverhalt ist ersichtlich, dass der Beklagte am 13. August 2004 eine Klage eingereicht hat (mit fehlerhaften und unbegründeten Anträgen) und mit Schreiben vom 18. April 2005 den Kläger dazu gedrängt hat, einen neuen Rechtsanwalt zu beauftragen, da ansonsten die Klage nicht zugestellt worden wäre; das Verfahren wäre verloren gegangen. Die Kosten für den neuen Rechtsanwalt wurden nach dem RVG abgerechnet und sind rechtmäßig.

 

III. Haftung

 

Die Schadensersatzpflicht des Beklagten ergibt sich dadurch, dass seine mangelhaften Leistungen nicht nur unbrauchbar, sondern auch kausal für alle Kosten einschließlich der ihm bezahlten Honorare, der Gerichtsgebühren für das Aktenzeichen 2b o 268/01 und für die Vorschüsse an die weiteren Rechtsanwälte waren; der Beklagte hat ein Mandat auf einem Rechtsgebiet angenommen, auf dem er kaum Erfahrung und kaum Wissen mitbrachte (siehe Anträge vom 20. November 2001 und vom 13. August 2004). Insofern hätte er sich nach BGH NJW 83, 1665; NJW 2001, 675 die erforderlichen Kenntnisse verschaffen müssen, was er aber nachweislich nicht getan hat.

 

Der Beklagte hat grundsätzlich jeden Irrtum zu vertreten (BGH NJW 2006, 1911).

 

Seine Irrtümer (Nichttrennung der Haupt- von den Nebenforderungen, die Anträge in USD etc.) sind aktenkundig.

 

Aus den erstinstanzlich beigefügten Schreiben des Klägers an den Beklagten geht eindeutig hervor, dass der Kläger keine sturen Anweisungen gegeben hat, sondern nur Akten / Beweise ausgehändigt hat und Vorschläge (in Bezug auf die höhere Rechtsprechung) zur Überprüfung der Richtigkeit und der Durchsetzbarkeit erteilt hat. Der Beklagte hätte prüfen müssen, welche Hinweise etc. gerichtlich nützlich waren, was er aber nicht getan.

 

Der Beklagte hat auch seine Hinweispflicht verletzt und den Kläger über das hohe Honorar nicht belehrt. Auch bis heute hat der Beklagte keine Rechnung an den Kläger erstellt. Wie kommt er auf 16,3 %, die der Kläger eingezahlt haben soll? Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat dies rechtsirrig verkannt. Der Kläger hat wiederholt die fehlenden Rechnungen / Zahlungen moniert.

 

Er hatte mit den fehlerhaften Anträgen den Streitwert in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 künstlich um das 8-fache erhöht und somit auch seine Honoraransprüche in die Höhe verschoben, was für den Kläger nicht akzeptabel war. Um die künstliche Erhöhung der Honoraransprüche zu verschleiern, hat der Beklagte keine Rechnungen erstellt, was die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf verkannt hat.

 

Der Beklagte hat den Kläger auch nicht informiert, dass sich die Gebühren nach dem Gegenstandswert richten. Insofern haftet er auch dafür (BGH NJW 2007, 2332)

 

Die Auffassung der Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf, dass eine Pflichtverletzung nicht schlüssig dargelegt worden sei, ist fehlerhaft.

 

Es wurde detailliert dargelegt, welche Pflichten der Beklagte verletzt hat.

 

Der Beklagte wurde mehrfach von den Gerichten (LG/OLG) auf Fehler / Darlegungsmängel im Verfahren 2b O 268/01 hingewiesen, was im Einzelnen dargelegt wurde (so z.B. in der Verfügung vom 23. Juli 2004).

 

Beweis: Beziehung der Akte zu 2b O 268/01.

 

Der Beklagte hat aber auf die Hinweise nicht regiert und die „Fehler“ nicht verbessert, korrigiert und ausgeräumt.

 

Diese (Nicht-) Handlungen des Beklagten führten dazu, dass durch die oben aufgeführten Entscheidungen des BGH und des BVerfG der Schaden endgültig eingetreten ist, da der Kläger bis dahin bemüht war, das Verfahren fortzusetzen und die vom Beklagten verursachten Fehler „auszubessern“.

 

Im Übrigen haben die fehlerhaften Handlungen des Beklagten jeweils neu die Verjährungsfrist in Gang gesetzt

 

vgl.: BGH, NJW 1985, 1023.

 

So hat der Beklagte erneut am 13. August 2004 trotz der Hinweise des Gerichts (vgl. LG-Beschluss vom 4. April 2003) fehlerhafte und unbegründete Anträge gestellt, die sodann dazu führten, dass das Gericht am 16. März 2011 bzw. 12. Oktober 2011 diese zurückgewiesen hat, was die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf nicht berücksichtigt hat.

 

Beweis: wie vor.

 

Diese Fehler waren kausal für den endgültig eingetreten Schaden des Klägers. Die geltend gemachten Prozesskosten stellen hier den zu er-setzenden Schaden nach § 280 BGB dar

 

vgl.: OLG Koblenz, NJW 2006, 3150.

 

Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf führt lediglich pauschal aus, dass eine Pflichtverletzung schlüssig nicht dargelegt worden sei. Dieser pauschale Hinweis kann angesichts der ausführlichen Darlegungen nicht nachvollzogen werden. Insbesondere deswegen nicht, weil die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf selbst in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 mehrfach auf Fehler hingewiesen hat, die aber plötzlich nicht mehr relevant seien sollen. Wie kann das sein?

 

Die Pflichtverletzungen des Beklagten sind auch im Kommentar Palandt, § 280, Rz.70 f. zu finden. Der Beklagte hätte den Kläger ebenfalls über die Prozessrisiken und Beweisrisiken informieren müssen, was nicht geschehen ist. Die Hinweise der Gerichte haben Anlass dazu gegeben. Für die Erhebung einer unschlüssigen Klage ist der RA schadensersatzpflichtig, was hier der Fall ist, da die Gerichte mehrfach den Beklagten auf Mängel/Fehler hingewiesen haben, die er nicht berichtigt hat.

 

Sämtliche vorstehende Gesichtspunkte hat die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf rechtsirrig nicht berücksichtigt, obwohl sie erstinstanzlich vorgetragen wurden.

 

3.

 

Rechtsirrig führt die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf aus, der Kläger trage nicht vor, dass der Beklagte aufgrund Informationen des Klägers in der Lage war, einen schlüssigen Antrag zu stellen.

 

Auch hier hat das Landgericht den umfangreichen Vortrag und die Beweisantritte des Klägers überlesen.

 

Der Kläger hat dem Beklagten bereits mit Schreiben vom 19. April 2003 zu dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 auf die seitens des Landgerichts Düs-seldorf mit Beschluss vom 4. April 2003 monierten Mängel geantwortet und ihn mit den entsprechenden Informationen beliefert, d.h. er hat ihm im Einzelnen dargelegt, welches die Amtspflichtverletzungen sind. Er hat im Weiteren auch Hinweise zur Darlegung der Kausalität mitgeteilt, d.h. wie die Kausalität begründet werden kann. In diesem Zusammenhang hat der Kläger dem Beklagten auch das entsprechende Zahlenmaterial geliefert. Er hat dem Beklagten weiterhin die entsprechenden Sachverhaltsinformationen geliefert, aus denen der Beklagte die Darlegung der Schadensersatzansprüche des Klägers hätte schlüssig vortragen können.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 19. April 2003, als Anlage erstinstanzlich übersandt.

 

Zu diesem Schreiben sei angemerkt, dass der Kläger nur vier Seiten des Schreibens übersenden kann, da die weiteren Schreiben nicht mehr ausgedruckt werden können. Das Schreiben war auf einem alten Rechner des Klägers aus dem Jahre 1993 gespeichert. Der Rechner ist defekt.

 

Mit einem weiteren umfassenden Schreiben seitens des Klägers an den Beklagten vom 10. August 2004 (8 Seiten lang) wurde der Beklagte nochmals mit Informationen beliefert, insbesondere zur Darlegung der Kausalität. Der Kläger machte des Weiteren Vorschläge für eine Klageergänzung und lieferte die dazugehörigen Informationen. Insbesondere hat der Kläger den Beklagten auf die zugesandte Kalkulation der Pumpen hingewiesen und ihm mitgeteilt, dass er dem Gericht die entsprechende Kalkulation übersandt hat und auch dem Beklagten. Der Beklagte befand sich somit im Besitz der einschlägigen Informationen zur Begründung der Schadensersatzforderung des Klägers. Ebenfalls hat der Kläger dem Beklagten die Informationen für die ergangenen Kredite und Gewinne mit dem Schreiben erteilt.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 10. August 2004, als Anlage erstinstanzlich übersandt.

 

Zu erwähnen sei, dass der Kläger erst auf Grund der Beschlüsse des Oberlandesgerichts Düsseldorf vom 23. Juli 2004 (18 W 22/03 und 18 W 43/03) von den Mängeln der Klage in den Verfahren 2b O 268/01 und 2b O 271/01 erfuhr, so dass er erst ab diesem Zeitpunkt entsprechend reagieren konnte.

 

Ergänzend sei noch mitgeteilt, dass der Kläger mit dem zuvor genannten Schreiben auf sämtliche Punkte reagiert hat, die das Oberlandesgericht in den zuvor genannten Beschlüssen moniert hat. Der Kläger hat insoweit alles Mögliche versucht, um den Beklagten zu helfen, dies natürlich aus Sicht und mit den Mitteln eines juristischen Laien.

 

Mit Schreiben vom 6. Dezember 2004 weist der Kläger den Beklagten darauf hin, dass er immer noch nicht auf sein umfassendes Schreiben vom 10. August 2004 reagiert hat. Der Kläger warnt den Beklagten, da bereits 4 Monate verstrichen sind, in denen der Beklagte untätig geblie-ben ist. Er weist den Beklagten auf die Monierungen des Landgerichts hin und auf die fehlende Schlüssigkeit der Klage.


Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 6. Dezember 2004, als Anlage erstinstanzlich übersandt.

 

Mit weiterem Schreiben vom 15. Februar 2005 weist der Kläger den Beklagten auf die nicht erfolgte Trennung zwischen Haupt- und Nebenfor-derungen hin und rügt diesen Fehler. Der Kläger fordert den Beklagten insoweit zur Fehlerbehebung auf.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 15. Februar 2005, als Anlage erstinstanzlich übersandt.

 

Mit einem weiteren Schreiben vom 16. Februar 2005 seitens des Klägers an den Beklagten wird dieser mit weiteren Informationen zur Darlegung der Kausalität durch die schädigenden Handlungen des Finanzamtes in den Jahren 1985 und 1986 beliefert. Der Kläger nennt dem Beklagten sämtliche Zahlen / Beträge zur Darlegung der Schadensersatzforderung. Er fordert den Beklagten auf, diese Informationen auszuwerten und bei seinem Schriftsatz zu berücksichtigen.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 16. Februar 2005, als Anlage erstinstanzlich übersandt.

 

An dieser Stelle sei betont, dass sämtliche Informationen anhand der anliegenden Schreiben des Klägers an den Beklagten das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 betreffen. Dies deswegen, weil der Beklagte in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 dem Kläger keinen Schriftsatz-Entwurf übersandt hatte und ein weiterer Vortrag in diesem Verfahren auf Grund der Hinweise des Gerichts erforderlich war. Der entsprechende Vortrag musste fristgebunden erfolgen. Das Gericht hatte dem Beklagten insoweit eine Ausschlussfrist gesetzt.

Mit Schreiben vom 29. März 2005 macht der Kläger den Beklagten auf die noch fehlenden korrekten Abrechnungen der

Honorarvorschüsse aufmerksam.

 

Wie kommt der Beklagte auf 16,3 %? Welche Überweisungen des Klägers soll der Beklagte nicht erhalten haben? Hier hat der Beklagte nichts konkretisiert und die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat dies nicht berücksichtigt. Es müsse die Mehrwertsteuer ausgewiesen werden und für jedes Verfahren müssen getrennte Abrechnungen erfolgen. Des Weiteren macht der Kläger den Beklagten auf die laufende Frist seitens des Gerichts aufmerksam. Die Monierungen des Gerichts müssen beantwortet werden.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 29. März 2005,als Anlage erstinstanzlich übersandt.

 

Mit Schreiben vom 3. April 2005 weist der Kläger den Beklagten auf die falschen Quittungen über die Vorschüsse hin. Der Beklagte hat die Verfahren nicht getrennt. Die Quittungen enthielten Beträge unterschiedlicher Verfahren und wiesen die Mehrwertsteuer nicht gesondert aus. Er forderte den Beklagten nochmals zur korrekten Abrechnung nach der BRAGO auf. Der Kläger forderte den Beklagten insoweit, wie bereits oben dargelegt, auf, zwischen Haupt- und Nebenforderungen zu unterscheiden und die Anträge entsprechend umzustellen. Sodann hätte der Beklagte dem Kläger korrigierte Abrechnungen erteilen müssen, und zwar nur nach der Streitwertberechnung der richtig gestellten Hauptforderung. Schließlich wies er den Beklagten nochmals auf seine fehlenden Ausführungen zur Kausalität der Handlungen des Finanzamtes hin, die Ursache für den eingetretenen Schaden beim Kläger waren. Der Beklagte hatte zu diesem Zeitpunkt immer noch keinen Schriftsatz in dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 geliefert und dies seit dem Jahre 2003. Die Klageanträge sind immer noch seit dem Juni 2003 unverändert geblieben, worauf der Kläger den Beklagten hingewiesen hat.

 

Beweis: Schreiben des Klägers vom 3. April 2005, als Anlage erstinstanzlich übersandt.

 

Zu erkennen ist somit, dass der Kläger alles Mögliche getan hat, um den Beklagten mit den notwendigen Informationen zu beliefern, um die Be-anstandungen des Gerichts auszuräumen. Wohl gemerkt, alles aus der Sicht eines juristischen Laien. Wenn dem Beklagten noch weitere Infor-mationen gefehlt hätten, dann hätte der Beklagte dem Kläger einen entsprechenden Hinweis erteilen müssen, was seine Pflicht war. Ein solcher Hinweis erfolgte nicht. Es sei an dieser Stelle nochmals betont, dass dies in Bezug auf das Verfahren 2b O 268/01 gilt. In diesem Verfahren hat der Beklagte trotz der umfangreichen und zahlreichen Hinweise des Klägers, wie oben dargelegt, nichts getan, d.h. nicht einmal einen Schriftsatzentwurf vorbereitet und dem Kläger als Diskussionsgrundlage und zur Überprüfung zur Verfügung gestellt.

 

4.

 

Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat ebenfalls rechtsirrig keinen Schaden nach § 287 ZPO ermittelt, was es aber aufgrund der Informationen des Klägers durchaus hätte tun können.

 

5.

 

Beweisantritte des Klägers wurden völlig unberücksichtigt gelassen. Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat nicht einmal die Akte zum Verfahren 2b O 268/01 eingesehen, um sich ein Bild vom Verfahren zu machen.

 

Wenn das LG den Vortrag des Klägers berücksichtigt hätte, dann hätte es feststellen müssen, dass der Beklagte keinen Entwurf im Verfahren zu 2b O 268/01 gefertigt hatte und ab August 2004 bis zur Niederlegung des Mandats keine Arbeiten zur Verbesserung der Fehler und Hinweise der Gerichte verrichtet hat.

 

Dieses Verhalten führt ebenfalls zu einer Pflichtverletzung

 

vgl.: BGHZ 83, 21 ff.,

 

was das Erstgericht rechtsirrig nicht berücksichtigt hat.

 

Insofern erfolgte entgegen der rechtsirrigen Ansicht der Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf durchaus eine Kündigung zu einer Unzeit.

 

Das Schreiben vom 17.03.2005, auf welches die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf Bezug genommen hat, hat nichts mit dem Verfahren 2b O 268/01 zu tun, sondern mit dem Verfahren zu 2b O 271/01, was die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf fehlerhaft verkannt hat. Auf diesen Gesichtspunkt wurde das Landgericht mehrfach hingewiesen.

 

In seinen Schreiben vom 06.12.2004 und 15.02.2005 hat der Kläger den Beklagten auf seine Fehler und auf die Pumpenkalkulation hingewiesen, welche der Beklagte am 9. August 2004 nochmals erhalten hatte. In seinem Schreiben vom 10.03.2005 weist der Kläger den Beklagten u. a. auf die Hinweise des Gerichts zur Kausalität hin, die nachgebessert werden muss. Ebenfalls weist der Kläger auf die dem Beklagten über-lassenen Unteralgen, Bewiese usw. hin. Ebenfalls weist der Kläger den Beklagten in seinem Schreiben vom 03.04.2005 auf die Hinweise des OLG Düsseldorf hin, die der Beklagte aber im Weiteren missachtet hat

 

Beweis:

 

1. Schreiben des Klägers vom 06.12.2004, als Anlage beigefügt;

2. Schreiben des Klägers vom 15.02.2005, als Anlage beigefügt;

3. Schreiben des Klägers vom 10.03.2005, als Anlage beigefügt;

4. Schreiben des Beklagten vom 18.08.2008 zu 2b O 29/08, Seite 2, vorletzter Absatz, als Anlage beigefügt;

5. Schreiben des Klägers vom 03.04.2005, Seite 3, als Anlage beigefügt

 

6.

 

Entgegen der Darstellung der Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf war der Kläger durchaus bedürftig. Das Erstgericht weiß, dass die Gerichtsgebühren von einer dritten Person bezahlt wurden. Entsprechendes wurde mehrfach dargelegt, was das Erstgericht aber ignoriert hat.

 

Der Kläger war und ist bedürftig, was anhand der wirtschaftlich bekannten Daten offensichtlich ist.

 

7.

 

Die Einschaltung der Nachfolger war entgegen der Darstellung des Landgerichts durchaus erforderlich. Allein schon aus dem Grund, dass ein Anwaltszwang herrschte. Mit der Niederlegung des Mandats war der Kläger gesetzlich gezwungen, einen neuen Anwalt zu beauftragen.

 

Ferner haben die Gerichte (LG und OLG Düsseldorf) Hinweise erteilt, die es galt, nachzubessern. Die Einzelrichterin des Landgerichts Düsseldorf hat keinen Hinweis dahingehend erteilt, dass die Fortsetzung des Verfahrens „aussichtslos“ sei. Also steht dem Kläger auch das Recht zu, die Fehler, auf die das Gericht hingewiesen hat, nachzubessern, was aber aufgrund des Anwaltszwangs nur mit einem Nachfolger möglich war. Diese „erneuten“ Anwaltskosten wären dem Kläger nicht entstanden, wenn der Beklagte seine Pflichten erfüllt hätte und auf die Hinweise des Gerichts reagiert hätte, was aber nicht der Fall war. Das hat aber nichts mit den Erfolgsaussichten des Rechtsstreits zu tun. Diese Anwaltspflichten bestehen unabhängig von den Erfolgsaussichten des Rechtsstreits, was das Erstgericht verkannt hat. Die Einschaltung der Nachfolger war, was ebenfalls vorgetragen wurde, angemessen, da der Kläger die Fehler beheben konnte. Nur weil das Erstgericht eine andere Auffassung vertritt, heißt dies nicht, dass diese Ansicht automatisch „die richtige“ ist.

 

Das Erstgericht untermauert den eingangs genannten Eindruck, in dem es ausführt, dass die Nachfolger bis heute ebenso wenig zum Erfolg der angestrengten Klageanträge geführt hätte.

Im Ergebnis sagt das Erstgericht in einer durchaus „befangenen Art“, dass, egal welcher Anwalt auftritt und egal was er vorträgt, dem Kläger wird kein Recht zugesprochen, was, wie gesagt, seiner Person geschuldet ist („Der Kläger manifestiert seit Jahren gegenüber den Gerichten, ……“).

 

8.

 

Auf das gesamte erstinstanzliche Vorbringen des Klägers, insbesondere in den Schriftsätzen vom 13. Mai 2014, 24. Juni 2014, 29. September 2014, 5. Dezember 2014 sowie vom 17. Juni 2015 einschließlich der dortigen Beweisantritte wird ergänzend Bezug genommen.

 

Sollte das Berufungsgericht in der einen oder anderen Frage eine Ergänzung für erforderlich halten, wird um einen richterlichen Hinweis gemäß § 139 ZPO gebeten.

 

N. Lasaroff
Rechtsanwalt
zugl. Fachanwalt für Arbeitsrecht

 

Anlagen

Aktennotiz der Richterin Stockschlaeder-Nöll vom 27. September 2011;

 Schreiben des Klägers vom 06.12.2004;

 Schreiben des Klägers vom 15.02.2005;

 Schreiben des Klägers vom 10.03.2005;

 Schreiben des Beklagten vom 18.08.2008 zu 2b O 29/08, Seite 2;

 Schreiben des Klägers vom 03.04.2005, Seite 3

Last modified on Wednesday, 02 December 2015 11:48

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